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ABSTRACT 
Individuals' consistent aptitudes in processing information are referred to as 
cognitive styles (i. e. the wholist-analytic and verbal-imagery cognitive styles). They have 
been suggested to be relevant to many observed behaviours especially in the learning and 
teaching circumstances. However, experimental evidence is required to support their 
validity and further the understanding of their nature. 
The first stream of inquiry profiled different facets of the nature of the wholist- 
analytic cognitive style by various strands of evidence (see Chapter 2 to 5). The wholist- 
analytic cognitive style reflects the way in which an individual tends to organise 
information, either holistically or in parts. The findings revealed that the wholist-analytic 
cognitive style, as a valid and reliable construct, has impact on diverse cognitive processes, 
such as disembedding function, perceiving related/unrelated materials, integrating bodily 
information into a holistic self perception, and etc. All these observed effects were 
discussed to be consistent with the present understanding of this dimension of cognitive 
style. 
The other stream of investigation examined the verbal-imagery cognitive style, 
which is concerned with information representation, verbally or pictorially. Although some 
evidence was found (see Chapter 2 and 5) to support to this cognitive style, the low 
empirical reliability of the measure (i. e. the verbal-imagery test of Cognitive Style 
Analysis test) reduced the certainty of the conclusion. By utilising an improved 
measurement, Chapter 6 investigated the construct validity of the verbal-imagery cognitive 
style with both behavioural and self-report measures. The results failed to support the 
current operational definition of this cognitive style. Critical discussions of this definition 
have been provided and more evaluations of it were suggested. 




in conjunction with Curry's (1983) Onion Model of individual characteristics. A 
distinction between style and skill in the future research is required. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION OF THE WHOLIST-ANALYTIC AND VERBAL- 
IMAGERY DIMENSION OF COGNITIVE STYLE 
Traditionally, experimental psychologists have considered the variation caused by 
individual differences as 'noise' in psychological studies, and view it as barrier to 
generalising findings which must be minimised as much as possible (Plomin & Kosslyn, - 
200 1). However, Kosslyn et al. (2002, p. 34 1) argued that 'the bridges between 
psychology and biology would be easier to forge if researchers treat each participant as an 
individual' therefore taking into account individual differences. The importance of 
investigating the role of individual differences on cognitive processes has gained 
prominence in the literature. Some researchers (e. g. Lamiell, 1981; Underwood, 1975) 
have claimed that naturally occurring individual differences may be more meaningful than 
conventional group methods of testing behaviours. Kosslyn et al. even asserted that data 
that does not take individual variation into account may be uninformative or misleading. 
Since then, a number of effects of individual differences on cognitive processes have been 
studied. For instance, some possible reasons for variation in cognitive performance have 
been concluded to relate to demographics, as well as personality and mental states, and 
physiology (e. g. neurochernistry etc). An individual characteristic, which is often linked to 
information processing, is cognitive style. This thesis aims to clarify further the nature of 
cognitive style and consider its effects on the cognitive performances in relation to 
behaviours. 
In this introducing chapter, the author will review the development of the two, 
cognitive style dimensions (narnely, ý the wholist-analytic dimension and the verbal- 
imagery dimension), which are categorised by Riding and Cheema (1991), followed by 
critical evaluations of the theory and its concomitant measurement. An outline of contents 
I 
in the following chapters will close the chapter. 
1.1 Riding's Two Dimensional Cognitive Style Model 
Cognitive style, which is a popular topic in the study of individual differences, 
contains a set of theories and constructs that seek to explain the way in which individuals 
view the world. It has been defined as "an individual's characteristic and consistent 
approach to organising and processing information" (Tennant, 1988, p. 80), which has 
been viewed as a relatively fixed disposition that leads to differences in behaviour 
(Shipman & Shipman, 1985). The concept of cognitive style has been mentioned as a 
factor to consider in studying a wide range of observed behaviours, such as learning and 
social behaviours (e. g. Ramakrishna & Schilhavy, 1986; Riding & Rayner, 1998; Slocum, 
1978). 
Although there is a widespread belief that cognitive style is a constant and robust 
individual characteristic that is linked to a number of human behaviours and performances, 
it is not easy to define conceptually or operationally. Since the 1940s, many researchers 
have generated a large number of cognitive style labels from various points of view (e. g. 
Allard & Carlson, 1963; Bieri, 1966; Cohen, 1967; Holzman, 1966; 1971; Klein & 
Schlesinger, 195 1; Kogan & Morgan, 1969; Messick & Kogan, 1963; Pettigrew, 195 8; 
Santostefano & Paley, 1964). For example, cognitive style has been regarded as a subset of 
personality (e. g. Jung, 1970), learning style (e. g. Kolb, Rubin, & McIntyre, 1971), or even 
decision-making style (e. g. Rowe & Boulgarides, 1992). However, these different 
cognitive style models seem to be fairly isolated, which queries whether there is a common 
construct of cognitive styles. In addition, the operational definitions of these cognitive 
style labels arose from different researchers, varied periods of study, and diverse research 
questions. This has led to inconsistency and confusion in understanding the nature of 
2 
cognitive style. As a result, either the dimensions of cognitive style or the overlap between 
different labels of cognitive style is not clear enough, and it could be concluded that they 
need further establishment (e. g. Bostic & Tallent-Runnels, 1991). 
In order to solve this problem, several researchers have worked on the 
categorisation of cognitive styles (e. g. Curry, 1983; 1987; 1991; Riding & Cheema, 1991; 
Rayner & Riding, 1997). Among them, Riding and his colleagues (e. g. Riding & Cheema, 
1991; Riding, 1997; Riding & Rayner, 1998) have made impressive progress. They 
surveyed approximately 30 different cognitive style models and concluded that most of 
them can be categorised into two distinct style groups: namely, the wholist-analytic (WA) 
dimension and the verbal-imagery (VI) dimension. 
These two basic dimensions of cognitive style can be surnmarised as follows 
(Riding & Rayner, 1998, p. 44): 
(1) The wholist-analytic dimension reflects the way in which an individual would 
organise information, either globally or in parts. 
(2) The verbal-imagery dimension reflects the way in which an individual would 
represent knowledge, either in words or in mental pictures. 
This thesis aims to investigate these two dimensions of cognitive style with 
experimental studies in order to increase the understanding and reduce confusion in the 
research on cognitive styles. First, there is a brief review of the development of the two 
cognitive style dimensions. 
1.1.1 Development of the nolist-Analytic (WA) Dimension of Cognitive Style 
Witkin and colleagues found individuals' perception of direction was affected by 
two experiences- 1) the surrounding area, as determined visually, and 2) the feeling of 
gravity, as reported by the physical senses (Asch & Witkin, 1948a; 1948b; Witkin & Asch, 
1948a, 1948b). A consistent tendency was reported in that participants use only one type 
3 
of cue (e. g. either visual or postural) in their space orientation studies. This became known 
as the field dependence-independence (FDI) cognitive style. That is, the degree to which 
individuals rely on the external information from environment or internal feedback from 
their body to perceive direction. Witkin (1976) later concluded that the FDI cognitive style 
concerned the dependence upon the surrounding 'field' to a less or greater extent, when 
dealing with a task. So people who tended to use visual cues (from external information) 
were labelled 'field-dependents' (FDs) while those who preferred 'postural' cues (i. e. 
vestibular, tactile, and kinaesthetic, from an internal body sense) were labelled 'field 
independents' (FIs). 
The theory about FDI cognitive style was developed and defined as the ability of 
individuals to segregate an object or information from its background/context (Witkin, 
1976). He also referred to it as the extent to which people are analytical. Individuals 
showing high field independence (R), who are at one extreme, are good at breaking down 
the information they perceive into component parts and focusing attention on the relevant 
parts only. They are not distracted by context and prefer problem-solving approaches that 
emphasise details and basic relationships. They were suggested to be analytical in nature, 
that is, are capable of perceiving information independent from the field/context. Field 
dependent (FD) persons, on the other hand, feel it necessary to employ the 
field/context/background when they perceive and have considerable difficulty in 
perceiving parts of a field as separate from the whole. They prefer more global, perhaps 
intuitive, approaches to problem solving. 
This perceptual-analytical dimension, as named by Witkin (1965), was further 
developed by Riding and Cheema (199 1) to become the wholist-analytic (WA) dimension 
of cognitive style with modifying the original uni-polar dimension of cognitive style (FDI) 
into a bi-polar one. An argued limitation of the FDI cognitive style is that it is only defined 
4 
(operationally) by a Fl favoured task but ignoring any FD advantages (e. g. Riding, 2005). 
As a result, FDs always appear 'inferior' to FIs (i. e. reflecting a uni-polar dimension of 
cognitive style). In contrast, the WA cognitive style investigates both wholist and analytic 
tasks and consequently assesses both the wholist and the analytics ends of the dimension 
continuum (i. e. is bi-polar). 
The new WA dimension of cognitive style refers to an individual's typical method 
for organising information, either as a whole or in parts. Wholists, who are equivalent to 
FDs, tend to see the whole of a situation and are able to hold an overall perspective by 
appreciating the total context. -Analytics, on the other hand consistent with FIs, tend to see 
a situation as a collection of parts and focus on only one or two parts of the whole at a time, 
whilst excluding the others. 
Besides the FDl style, Riding and Rayner (1998) also suggested a number of other 
cognitive style models that are theoretically featuring, or at least, relating to the WA 
cognitive style dimension. They include the levelling-sharpening dimension by Holzman 
and Klein (1954), the impulsivity-reflectivity dimension by Kagan, Rosman, Day, Albert, 
and Philips (1964), the convergent-divergent thinking dimension by Guilford (1967), the 
holistic-serialist thinking dimension by Pask and Scott (1972), the random-sequential 
dimension by Gregorc (1982), the assimilator-explorer dimension by Kaufmann (1989), 
the adaptor-innovator dimension by Kirton (1994), and the intuitive-analytic dimension by 
Allinson and Hayes (1996). However, it is fairly clear that the WA cognitive style 
dimension is mainly derived from the idea of FDI style (Riding, 2005), not only 
theoretically but also operationally. 
Although there are debates about whether the FDI style shares attributes with 
intelligence or cognitive ability (e. g. Flexer & Roberge, 1980; Goldstein & Blackman,. 
1978; ý Kogan, 1983; Messick, 1976; Riding & Pearson, 1994), there is evidence that the 
5 
new WA cognitive style is independent of intelligence (see Riding, 1997). Further, the WA 
cognitive style is viewed as separate from, but interacting with personality, as well as 
relating to observed behaviours such as learning performance/preference and social 
behaviours (see Riding, 1997). Thus, the WA cognitive style is claimed to be a more 
4pure' style compared to the original FDI cognitive style. In addition, Witkin and 
Goodenough (1981) and Riding (1997) agreed that cognitive style is relatively stable and 
will change little during the years of a person's life. However, Witkin (1965) implied that 
in very early childhood, there would be a tendency towards greater Fl. 
1.1.2 Development of the Verbal-Imagery (VI) Dimension of Cognitive SO* 
Discrete from the WA dimension, which principally relates to cognitive 
organisation, the verbal-imagery (VI) dimension emphasises another crucial aspect of 
cognitive style, that is, the principal mode of mentally representing information (i. e. verbal 
or imagery). 
Before discussing this dimension of cognitive style, a brief history of understanding 
of the nature of representations needs to be included. A concern of the imagery 
representation of knowledge can be traced back over a century (e. g. Bartlett, 1932; Galton, 
1883). However, the existence of the imagery representation has been doubted as there 
have been many debates about the nature of the mental pictures; are they inner pictures or 
simply inner descriptions? This debate has led to the two main streams of research: the 
Common Coding Theories and the Dual Coding Theories. In general, the Common Coding 
Theories emphasise the dominance of language and commit to explaining the cognition 
process in terms of only one type of representation (Le. verbal coding). The Dual Coding 
Theories, in which the most well-know work has been done by Paivio (197 1 a; 1986), 
propose two independent (nevertheless interconnected) verbal and non-verbal (imagery) 
representation and processing systems existing in human's cognitive function. The verbal 
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system specialises for dealing directly with language and the non-verbal (imagery) system 
specialises for dealing with non-linguistic events. 
The Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 197 1 a) has provided fundamental basis for the VI 
dimension of cognitive style as to suggest clearly the distinction between the two ways of 
thinking and knowing verbally or using imagery. This postulation has been greatly 
supported by the Selective Interference Effect (e. g. Atwood, 197 1; Baddeley & Lieberman, 
1980; Brooks, 1967; 1968; De Beni & Moe, 2003; Eddy & Glass, 1981; Hampson & 
Duffy, 1984; Janssen, 1976; Logie, Zucco, & Baddeley, 1990). When a person attempts to 
do two cognitive tasks simultaneously, his/her performance will be significantly more 
impaired if the two tasks involve the same representational coding (e. g. two verbal tasks, 
or two spatial tasks) than if the two tasks require different representational coding (e. g. a 
verbal task with a spatial task). The natural interpretation for this finding is that tasks 
involving different kind of representations interfere less with each other because they call 
upon different representational and processing resources. 
In 1976, Riding and Taylor reported their finding that children's learning 
performance was affected by the way knowledge was presented. Consistent with Paivio's 
dual coding hypothesis, the difference was found between the word presentation and the 
imagery presentation. Riding (e. g. 1997) concluded that the VI dimension implies how 
information can be represented, either verbally or in mental pictures, and people constantly 
choose one although most individuals are capable of using either mode of representation. 
Verbalisers prefer, and perform best on verbal tasks, while imagers feel most comfortable 
f 
representing information and performing tasks in mental pictures. When the environment 
demands and cognitive style are mismatched, for example, asking a verbaliser to complete 
ound to decrease (Riding & Caine, 1993). an image task, performance was f 
Although there are several self-reporting preference questionnaires that were - 
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created for measuring imagery 'abilities' (e. g. Paivio, 1971 b; Richardson, 1977), none of 
them have been widely used and supported by enough evidence (see review by Riding & 
Rayner, 1998). Researchers have remarked the difficulties of measurement in this 
dimension as lack of internal control, failing to show correlations with objective 
performance on tasks (Ernest, 1977; Richardson, 1994; Riding & Cheema, 199 1). In order 
to improve the situation, Riding and his colleagues (Riding & Taylor, 1976; Riding & 
Calvey, - 1981; Riding & Cheema, 1991) have measured the VI cognitive style by , 
comparing individuals' response times to either verbal or imagery required tasks. More 
details about this new objective approach will be discussed in later contents. 
Riding (2005) also categorised a related family with the VI cognitive style (whereas 
much smaller than the WA style family). They are the abstract-concrete dimension 
(Harvey, Hunt, & Schroder, 196 1) and the verbaliser-visualiser dimension (Paivio, 197 1 b). 
Although the VI cognitive style bears significantly less literature 'backup' compared to the 
WA cognitive style, it has been reported a great success in education practice, including 
learning and teaching in terms of attainment and attitudes/behaviours (e. g. Pearson, 2007; 
Riding & Rayner, 1998). It thus was claimed a valid dimension of cognitive style (see 
Riding, 2005). 
1.1.3 The 'Third'Dimension of Cognitive Style Research 
Besides the above two dimensions of cognitive style, Riding (199 1; Riding & 
Rayner, 1998) has also identified a 'third' dimension in the literature of style studies, 
which is argued to lie outside the spectrum of 'cognition-centred' individual differences. 
Grigerenko and Sternberg (1995) surveyed 'theories of style' and identified a departure 
from the literature of cognitive style, that is, an 'activity-centred approach'. Although the 
constructs related to this third dimension have been interchangeably labelled either 
4 cognitive styles' or 'learning styles' (Riding, 1996; Sadler-Smith, 1996), it is 
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fundamentally distinct from the other two dimensions of cognitive style (Sadler-Smith, 
1996). To clarify the understanding of this 'third' dimension in the cognitive style 
literature, it will be named 'learning style' throughout the thesis (i. e. it implies its 'learning 
activity-centred' nature). The distinction between the 'learning styles' and 'cognitive 
styles' can be well described by Curry's (1983) Onion Model. 
It is believed that cognitive styles are more fundamental to an individual's personal 
and psychological makeup compared to leaming styles. Curry (1983) conceptualised the 
separations of several style differences through the use of her Onion Model in which the 
layers of an onion are analogous to the different levels of a person's characteristic or style. 
Riding's (1997) categorisations of cognitive style dimensions locate at the core of the 
onion and are defined as the individual's approach to adapting and assimilating 
information. Curry (1983) suggested this innermost layer ("cognitive personality style") is 
relatively permanent and underlying. Thus these dimensions do not directly interact with 
the outside world. Learning styles locate at a next layer ("information processing style"), 
which is a stable but modifiable characteristic. That is, is able to adapt and develop 
through the experience to learning activities. The outermost layers are individuals' 
"instructional preferences" for learning. These refer to an individual's choice of 
environment in which to learn, which is most observable and far more likely to change 
during the interaction with others and the environment. The graphic illustration of the 
original Onion Model can be seen in Figure 1.1. Besides the initial three layers, Curry 
(1987) later included "social interaction" as a fourth layer of the onion. Social interaction 
provides the layer between the "instructional preference" and "information processing"ý 
and relates to the individuals' preference for social interaction during learning. - 
Subsequently Curry (199 1) complemented her theory by the Theoretical Model of 
Leaming Components and Effects to interpret learning-styles or successes. In the new. , ', ý 
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model, she emphasised the maintenance of positive motivation and level of task 
engagement as components of learning styles as well as those habitual information- 
processing approaches. An individual's motivation level in a particular learning task is 
probably affected by the environmental and social situations (i. e. prcferred or Lin-prellcri-ed). 
which will then lead to a corresponding degree oftask engagement. And information 
processing only takes place once the individual becomes engaged in the task. By 
combining the three components, Curry is able to extend the concept of learning style as a 
concept that "... implies intention and willingness to stay focused oil a particular learning 
task in a particular Situation" (Curry, 1991, p. 252). 
Fivure 1.1. Curry's Onion Model (from Polhemus, Swan, Danchak, & Assis, 2005) 
In sum, the research on learning style dimensions is more concerned xvith 
addressing the environment where the learning activities take place and has more emphasis 
on the pedagogical practice of dealing with individual differences (Grigerenko & 
Sternberg, 1995). The 'activity-centred' learning style is a distinct stream from the 
tradition of cognitive style research in psychology, which emphatically relies on cognitive 
functioning (a cognition-centred tradition). For this thesis, the consideration %vIII be merely 
restricted to the first two dimensions (WA and VI) of cognitive style. 
1.2 Critical Issues Relating to the Dual Dimensional Cognitive S"-le 
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1.2.1 The Relationship between the WA and the VI Dimension of Cognitive Style 
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I 
FigUre 1.2. The diagrammatical structure of the WA and the VI dimension of cognitive 
style (from Riding, 2005) 1 
The WA and VI dimensions of cognitive style were claimed to be independent of 
each other, in that an individual's position on one dimension of cognitive style will not 
affect his/her position on the other dimension (Riding, 1997). Correlations between the 
WA and VI dimension have been reported as consistently low (around ± 0.1) (e. g. Riding 
& Agrell, 1997; Riding & Caine, 1993; Riding & Douglas, 1993; Riding & Pearson, 1994; 
Riding & Read, 1996). Diagrammatically, the model has been presented as a two 
dimensional illustration showing the bi-polar nature of the construct as Figure 1.2. 
In addition, although the two cognitive style dimensions were assumed to be 
distinct as underlying mechanisms, they are also suggested to show "adaptation" between 
each other (Riding & Rayner, 1998). The verbal representations are typically viewed as 
componential (built upon phonemes/graphemes, words, sentences, etc. ), which can be 
broken down to details. In contrast, imagery representations provide referentially 
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isomorphic and continuous knowledge, and keep the information of the target holistically. 
Consequently, a highly verbal person can be good at details as he/she is capable of 
extracting the discrete information from his/her linguistic representations of the 
object/event. Highly imagery people are able to hold an overall impression from the 
pictorial representation of the target/environment. Therefore it is possible to trigger one 
style dimension (e. g. VI dimension) when the feature of the other dimension (e. g. WA 
dimension) is not available. Riding and Rayner (1998) have provided an example for this 
case. An analytic-imager does not have the facility from WA dimension of cognitive style 
to obtain an overview of situations; however, his/her imagery representation of the 
environment can probably gain him/her the whole view by generating an image of the 
whole environment. Similarly, a wholist-verbaliser can have the analytic facility by 
employing the componential nature of verbal representations. Riding and Rayner (1998) 
named this substitutable effect 'adaptation'. 
The statement of the adaptation between the WA and the VI style dimensions 
-F sounds plausible. If it is true, then the two dimensions of cognitive style must somehow 
relate to one another at a behavioural, level. But the reported independence between the 
two dimensions makes it ill-supported. Do these two statements conflict? Or is this simply 
because the adaptation process is not reflected on the measurements? This is the paradox 
that Riding and Rayner (1998) failed to explain, and which will be discussed more fully in 
the next chapter. 
1.2.2 The Invariability of Cognitive Styles 
Cognitive styles are well accepted as being an unchangeable individual 
characteristic (e. g. Curry, 1983; Riding, 1997). Riding also explicitly suggested that 
cognitive style is relatively fixed throughout the duration of one's life (Riding & Rayner, 
1998). That is, cognitive styles, as preferred and habitual processes of an individual, are 
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incapable of modification. It seems that cognitive styles are 'default' positions on style 
continua that are stable and constant rather than variable. However, few longitudinal 
studies have been conducted to support this postulation. 
Riding (1997) reported non-significant correlations between age and styles in 
sI amples from wide age ranges to support the invariability of styles. However, a few recent 
findings may imply a trend which is contrary to the above age-style-relationship. Atkinson 
(2005) found that as people grew older, they tended to be less extreme in both the WA and 
the VI dimensions of cognitive style compared to younger people. It is possible that the 
older people may have modified their cognitive styles over the course of life as non- 
extreme styles are more compatible with the changes of surrounding environments. 
More evidence came from the WA family members (i. e. those cognitive style labels 
have been identified into WA style family by Riding and Rayner (1998)). Zhang, Allison, 
and Hayes (2005) investigated whether cognitive style would change when students moved 
from one culture (People's Republic of China) to a new culture (United Kingdom). They 
found a significant change occurred on the intuitive-analysis cognitive style dimension 
over a6 month period. This result is corresponding to Bagley's finding (1988). Thirty-four 
Jamaican children who migrated to Canada were traced. It was found that after two years 
migration these children's FDI scores became higher (towards FI) and closer to their 
Canadian peers. In contrast, the control group of the non-migrant Jamaican children 
remained relatively FD (i. e. incurred lower scores). They suggested this is because life 
experience'may affect cognitive style and when individuals are facing important changes 
in their lives, they would modify their style to improve the person-environment fit. These 
two studies were actually consistent with Atkinson's (2005) finding. 
It could be argued that these studies did not directly challenge the invariability of 
cognitive style. As already mentioned, only a study of the dual dimensions (i. e. WA and 
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VI) with a longitudinal design may provide decisive evidence to address the question. 
However, the studies do suggest that researchers need to re-think the extent to which 
individuals are able to move along the cognitive style continua in accordance with 
enviromnent changes. 
In conclusion, the two assumptions of cognitive style - the independence between 
the dimensions and the invariability - are suggested to be accepted vAt .h consideration. 
Although the previous findings displayed low correlations between the WA and VI 
dimension of cognitive style, Riding himself (Riding & Rayner, 1998) proclaimed an 
'adaptation' process, which might relate the two style dimensions at the behavioural level. 
In addition, the extent to which cognitive styles are unchangeable is of interest. Those 
issues are worthy of further research. 
1.3 Measurement of the Two Dimensions of Cognitive Style 
1.3.1 Cognitive Style Analysis (CSA) 
In 199 1, Riding devised the computerised measurement - Cognitive Styles Analysis 
(CSA) - to assess the two dimensions of cognitive style (the WA and VI dimension; see 
Riding & Cheema, 1991). The aim of the work was to overcome the shortcomings of 
existed assessments of cognitive styles (e. g. GEFT and imagcry-preference-related 
questionnaires) as well as to integrate the theory of cognitive styles into a single construct. 
Riding and Cheema (199 1) has alleged that the uni-polar nature is the fundamental 
weakness of most measures of style, which could be responsible for overlap found 
between the style assessment and the ability-inability progression (e. g. FDI cognitive style 
is an evident example). Hence, CSA assesses both ends of style dimension (bi-polar) in 
order to reflect the style rather than the capability to complete a task (from bad to good). In 
addition, by employing an objective reaction time related assessment, CSA is able to avoid 
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the major design limitations carried by the traditional introspective self-report measures. 
Notwithstanding, the instrument has been claimed to mirror previous findings in the area 
in which cognitive styles have been linked to a variety of learning tasks (e. g. Riding & 
Ashmore, 1980; Riding & Buckle, 1990; Riding, Buckle, Thompson, & Hagger, 1989; 
Riding & Calvey, 198 1; Riding & Dyer, 1980; Riding & Taylor, 1976). -- 
CSA comprises three subtests. The first subtest assesses the verbal-imagery (VI) 
dimension. The test was developed based on two previous VI tests: the Verbal-Imagery 
Code Test (VICT; Riding & Calvey, 198 1; Riding & Taylor, 1976) and the Verbal- 
Imagery Leaming Style Test (VILST; Riding et al., 1989), which determines children's 
position on the VI continuum of cognitive style by their responses to verbal and imagery 
questions. The task was developed into VI test of CSA. In CSA, participants are presented 
statements (n = 48) that need to be judged right or wrong. Twenty-four of them contain 
information about conceptual categories (e. g. 'Are A and B the same type? '), and the rest 
contains information about the appearance of items (e. g. 'Are A and B the same colour? '). 
Half the items require the "same" response and half require the "different" response. The 
assumption is that the judgments of conceptual categories will evoke sýmantic/verbal 
representations while the judgments of item appearances will evoke the imagery 
representations. Although all statements will be presented in words, some 
neuropsychological studies have found that words can evoke the imagery representations 
for example naming colors actually activate the same brain area as perceiving colors (see 
Paivio, 2007). The imagers are predicted to respond more quickly to the statements 
concerning item appearance than the verbalisers, since they are more likely to represent 
items as mental pictures and will respond to appearance more rapidly. The verbalisers are 
expected to have shorter response times in the conceptual category statements because of 
their verbal abstract nature. Response times are recorded by the program and the verbal- 
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imagery ratio is calculated. A low ratio corresponds to a verbaliser and a high ratio to an 
imager. Additionally, since the participants have to read the verbal and imagery statements, 
reading ability or reading speed should not affect the final verbal-imagery ratio. 
The second two subtests assess the wholist-analytic (WA) dimension, which 
contain coherent features with the measures of FDI cognitive style (see description in 
Chapter 2). The first of the two tests (i. e. overall the second subtest of CSA; n= 20) 
requires participants to judge whether two complex geometrical figures are the same or not 
(see Figure 1.3). Half of the pairs are the same and half are not. It is assumed that the 
wholists would respond relatively faster in this subtest, because it involves the overall 
similarity judgment. 
Is this the same as 
FigUre 1.3. An example of wholist questions in CSA C2 
, 
7r] 
Is this contained in 
FigUre 1.4. An example of analytic questions in CSA 
The second subtest (i. e. overall the third subtest of CSA; n= 20) asks participants 
to compare a simple geometrical shape and a complex figure and decide whether the 
simple shape is contained in the complex one (see Figure 1.4). This task needs a degree of 
disembedding of the simple shape within the complex figure. Again, half of the stimulus 
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items expect "yes" responses and the other half expect "no". Therefore, the analytics are 
hypothesised to react quicker at doing this. 
Reaction times from the two subtests are recorded and calculated by the programme. 
Similarly, a low ratio corresponds to a wholist and a high ratio corresponds to an analytic. 
The CSA is the first computerised test to assess the WA and VI cognitive style 
dimensions in an integrated manner. It now is the most popular computerised measure of 
cognitive styles in European universities and organisations (Peterson, Deary, & Austin, 
2003). Riding and his colleagues have published over 30 peer-reviewed papers providing 
evidence of its theoretical support and practical application. They will be discussed 
carefully in the following subsection. 
1.3.2 Reliability and Validity of CSA 
A substantial amount of research has been conducted on the relationship between 
observed behaviours and the application of CSA (see Riding, 1997; Riding & Rayner, 
1998). Findings seem to provide good support. However, few studies have been reported 
concerning its psychometric parameters (e. g. reliability). This is unusual for such a popular 
measurement of cognitive style. In this section, the reliability and validity of the CSA will 
be discussed. 
Reliability. Peterson et al. (2003), employing the original CSA test and a new 
parallel version to do the test-re-test, and split-half analysis, revealed a very low reliability 
of the VI dimension (r =. 27, non-significant) and moderate reliability of the WA 
dimension of the CSA (r =. 53, p<. 01) (for n--50). They replicated the finding later 
(Peterson, Deary, & Austin, 2005a). Similarly, three experiments with different time - 
intervals (from one week to one month), which were carried out by, Rezaei and Katz 
(2004), also reported low reliabilities of the VI test (range r= .30 to . 45) and the WA test 
(range r= . 42 to .5 5). Using two groups of third year undergraduates who were retested on 
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the CSA after either 14 days or 23 months, Parkinson, Mullally, and Redmond (2004) 
found a negative short-tenn test-re-test correlation for the VI test of CSA (r = -. 19); while 
the reliability increased to r= . 36 for the 23-month-interval. The test-re-test reliability is 
relatively stable for the WA test, which varied from . 33 to . 34. They concluded that these 
values are coniiderably below the generally acceptable values of r= .7 (Kline, 2000). 
Albeit Riding (2005) argued that long-tenn test-re-test reliability studies are required to 
confirm those findings. Concerns are therefore still warranted, especially for the VI 
dimension of the CSA test. 
These results clearly exhibit an unsatisfactory reliability for the VI dimension of the 
CSA. It also challenges the theoretical basis of the VI dimension of cognitive style. 
Compared to the WA dimension, the concept of the VI dimension has much less support, 
both theoretically and experimentally (Peterson et al., 2003). It may elicit the question: Is 
the low reliability caused by an un-suitable measuring technology, or more fundamentally, 
by its operational definition? This will be discussed further in Chapter 6; this chapter will 
merely consider the limitations of the measure of the CSA, which might affect its stability. 
Validity. Riding (2003) admitted that (the low reliability of) the measurement is still 
the prevailing problem which limits the research of the VI dimension cognitive style. 
However, he insisted that it should not lead to a confusion of construct validity as there is 
strong evidence reporting the significant relationship between the dimension itself and 
recorded behaviours. He referred to Richardson's discussion (1994, p. 11) that the VI 
dimension of cognitive style is "... a genuine phenomenon that has psychologically 
significant consequences. These consequences define its adaptive functions". 
Riding (2005) has published considerable evidence to claim the construct validity 
of CSA. It contains three aspects. First is the distinction from other individual differences, 
such as intelligence (Riding & Pearson, 1994), common personality measures (Riding & 
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Wigley, 1997) and gender* (Riding, 1997). Second aspect mentions the correlates with 
physiologically based measures (Riding, Glass, Butler, & Pleydell-Pearce, 1997; Riding & 
Rayner, 1998; Glass & Riding, 1999). Finally, ýe emphasises its relation with numerous 
observed behaviours (see review in Riding & Rayner, 1998). 
In contrast, a few studies exhibited negative evidence of the construct validity of 
CSA by demonstrating low correlations between the two style dimensions with their 
theoretically related measures. For instance, Coffield, Moseley, Hall and Ecclestone (2004) 
reviewed a number of style related constructs and reported very low correlations (even 
close to zero) between the dual dimensions of CSA and other measures. Those measures 
even include WANI family related style labels, such as the intuition-analysis dimension of 
Allinson and Hayes' (1996) Cognitive Style Index (CSI). 
Furthermore, K. Garland (personal communication, March 26,2006) has revealed 
non-significant correlations (r values below 0.27) between the WA dimension of the CSA 
and either the Embedded Figures Test (EFT) and the Grouped Embedded Figures Test 
(GEFT) (the two main measures of the FDI 
-cognitive style, which will 
be described in 
Chapter 2). This is a rather unexpected finding. According to the theoretical and 
operational consistency between the FDI cognitive style and the WA dimension of style, as 
Riding and his colleagues admitted (e. g. Riding & Pearson, 1994; Riding, 2005), it could 
be inferred that the two constructs should exhibit a high correlation given the significant 
overlap. However it was not found to be the case by Garland. It might be a considerable 
challenge to CSA's (WA test) construct validity. Whereas the sample size in the Garland's 
study is relatively small for an individual difference study (n = 48), more, evidence is 
required to clarify this problem. Thereby, the author employed a study with a larger 
sample size to re-examine the relationship between the FDI style and the WA., style. It will 
' Although Riding argued that the two dimensions of cognitive style are independent from gender, there were 
a couple of reports of gender difference on the WA dimension; women (occasionally) appear more wholist 
than men. See section 1.3.3 for more discussion. 
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be covered in Chapter 2. 
Nevertheless, the unsupportive results for validity may partially contribute to the 
low reliability of the CSA measure. Although Riding (2003) declared that it is possible 
that a test with low reliability is valid, there is not enough evidence to prove what he said. 
Rather, it may lead to doubt concerning its reported validity. For example, as part of the 
construct validity, the independence of CSA with other unrelated constructs such as 
personality, gender, and intelligence could be attributed to the unreliable data from the 
CSA (Rezaei & Katz, 2004). Thus, it is necessary to think over the limitations of the CSA. 
1.3.3 CSA Findings in the Thesis 
The data of a number of 3 83 participants (121 men, 262 women)l who have been 
tested by the CSA in the present thesis is shown here. The overall mean WA ratio of the 
present sample was 1.17 (SD 0.34), and the overall mean VI ratio was 1.03 (SD 0.12). 
Both means were slightly below Riding's (2005) main standardised sample but not by very 
much (WA 1.25 ± 0.45, VI 1.06 ± 0.20). This might be due to different samples of 
participants. Riding's (2005) standardised sample of CSA contains a wide range of 
individuals (e. g. age, gender, occupation) while the present sample mainly consists of 
university students. The correlation between the two dimensions (WA and VI) of cognitive 
style replicated previous findings and was non-significant (r (383) = 0.058, p > . 25), 
supporting the independence between them. However, the gender difference in the WA 
cognitive style ratios was found significant, t (3 8 1) = 2.8 1, p< .01 (men 1.24 ± 0.3 9, 
women 1.13 ± 0.3 1). This finding is consistent with the gender difference, which was 
reported in Riding's (2005) standardised sample, although Riding (1997; 2005) insisted no 
gender bias should exist in cognitive styles. Hence, in each of the following studies gender 
t In order to purify the present sample into a mainly native English speakers group, the sample of 383 
participants did not include the 40 Chinese participants mentioned in Chapter 3. Besides, there were some 
participants who have attended more than one studies of the thesis, but their cognitive style data had not been 
repeatedly recorded. Thus, this number looks smaller than the sum of the numbers of participants of each 
study. 
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would be tested in advance as a possible confounding variable in order to avoid any 
confusion. In contrast, men (1.04 ± 0.13) and women (1.03 ± 0.11) demonstrated similar - 
mean ratios of the VI dimension of cognitive style (t (3 8 1) = 0.29, p> . 77). 
1.3.4 Criticisms of CSA 
With regard to the stimuli used in the CSA test and the administration guide of the 
CSA, as well as the author's own experience of the administration of the test, several 
criticisms of the CSA have arisen. 
First, the questions of the VI test of the CSA (e. g. "OAK and BEECH are the same 
type" or "LETTUCE and LAWN are the same colout") are rather 'subjective'. This may 
introduce additional variation in responses to the VI questions. Additionally, some 
statements of the VI dimension of the CSA have been reported to be confusing by 
participants. For example, some participants did not think "ICE" and "GLASSES" are the 
same colour since glasses are transparent and "ICE" is a name of a colour, which is light 
blue (Zhang, 2004). However, the CSA feedback states that they are the same colour. In 
another instance, a statement asks that whether "BEANS" and "CHICKEN" are the same 
type. There is some ambiguity here. If they are both food, the answer is 'yes'; but beans, 
could be classed as a plant and chicken is an animal, and so the answer is 'no'. Thus, there 
might be incongruence of the concepts between participants and the test designer. Similar 
comments have been made by Peterson et al. (2004). 
Secondly, as Riding claimed, normal people are able to employ both verbal and 
imagery modes of representation and this dynamic feature may lead to the VI processing 
being sensitive to the environment. That is, the VI mode could be easily switched with - 
regard to the design of the stimuli and shows less stability compared to the WA dimension. 
As stated, the measure of the VI dimension of the CSA uses a word-based task to assess -ý 
both verbal and imagery styles. This is inappropriate given that individuals need to read ., c, 
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the statement (in words) first to make the judgement. All participants may all first be 
aroused to a verbal coding rather than an imagery coding as Riding (1991) expected in the 
imagery task. In addition, Riding has not provided any information about how he matched 
the words used in both verbal and imagery questions, for example word frequency, word 
familiarity, word imageability (the ease with which a word arouses a mental image), etc. 
Nevertheless, linguistic research has shown that. these factors would significantly affect 
people's performances on lexical tasks (e. g. Weekes, 1997). In short, the final results of 
the VI test of the CSA will probably be confounded by the stimuli used. And this could be 
responsible for the low reliability of the VI test of CSA. 
Furthermore, there are also concerns about the overall administration of the CSA 
test. These include: 
1) The amýiguity of the instructions may lead to participants being uncertain about 
their responses. According to the administration guide of the CSA, participants are 
required to work at their 'own rates'. This is in order to assess people processing 
information in a comfortable, relaxed state (Riding, 2005). Although it seems to be 
legitimate, participants' response speeds may vary a great deal depending on their 
understandings of the instruction. For example, some would be very cautious and spend 
more time ensuring they react correctly while some would place the emphasis on speed 
and respond very quickly. Save a natural style tendency, those temporary states could 
influence the final output of the test a great deal. It has been argued that if instructions 
concerning speed and accuracy were stated differently, then the way in which individuals 
process information would possibly change. Rezaei and Katz (2004) have reported a 
finding that when participants were told that their response times were important, the 
reliability of both WA and VI dimension of the CSA increased. Hence, this may be one of 
the ways to increase the reliability of the CSA. 
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2) Rezaei and Katz (2004) argued that the result of the CSA was sensitive to reaction 
times and temporary interruptions during testing. This is partly due to the fact that the 
'Result File' of the CSA does not display the individual reaction times on each item. 
Researchers have no way to detect or eliminate extreme data from the calculation of the 
ratios. More details of the 'Result File' would be useful such as whether the item has a, 
correct response and its individual reaction time. Such a change will not only promote the 
stability of the test, but also provide researchers with more detailed information for 
analyses and broader possibilities for research (e. g. the split-half reliabilities). 
And the limited number of questions of each section (WANI) of the test is not 
enough to balance the biased result (i. e. reaction times are usually very short, thus even a 
single time delay caused by random interruptions could be influential for overall means). 
The general rule is that the longer a test is, the more reliable it will be. Adding more 
stimulus items might sufficiently increase the stability of the test of the cognitive style. 
Rezaei and Katz (2004) also criticised the use of reaction time means to calculate 
. 
final style ratios. However in the latest version of CSA (Riding, 2005), the program has 
employed 'medians' for style ratio calculations, which are much less (statistically) 
sensitive to outlier values. 
3) During the administration of the CSA, several participants reported that they 
pressed the wrong button during the first part of the test. Additionally, participants also 
reported a 'learning' process in the VI section of the CSA. That is, they misjudged the 
statements at the beginning by being too harsh or too lenient with the criteria (e. g. "Are 
ICE and GLASSES the same colour? "). But later after feedback, they modified their 
definitions and category standards throughout the test, to be accordant with the 'correct' 
answers. 
These phenomena imply adding a practice phase to the test would be useful. A few 
23 
practice items will allow participants to become familiar with the stimuli, the tasks and 
responses; and should minimise the variation of reaction times from unfamiliarity. 
4) Cultural differences have been found to play a role in the VI task of CSA, 
whereas Riding (2005) assumed CSA to be culture free in nature. Rezaei and Katz (2004) 
gave one example: in the test, fire engines are assumed to be red, although they are yellow 
in Canada. Similarly, Zhang (2004) found bias when applying the test with a Chinese 
group; for example, one VI question asked if a postbox and a strawberry are the same 
colour. The answer is supposed to be "yes" according to CSA, but in China (and parts of 
Europe) postboxes are green. Further, a Chinese student may never experience "custard" in 
China, so s/he does not know what it is. Thus, care needs to be taken when this test is 
being used outside of the UK. 
1.4 Outline of Thesis 
In this chapter, Riding's two dimensional cognitive style model and its 
computerised measurement (CSA) have been reviewed and evaluated. Currently, both the 
theory and the CSA test have enjoyed a great popularity in research and educational 
application in the UK. Educational psychologists have provided a number of findings 
relating to classroom practice to support its external validity. For example, there is 
evidence that children's learning behaviour and attainment were improved through the 
inclusion of Riding's cognitive styles in the teaching and learning processes in the 
classroom (Pearson, 2007). However, few studies have experimentally investigated its 
nature and the underlying mechanisms. Further, several findings have questioned 
reliability of CSA test (especially the VI test), and this probably increases the criticism of 
its validity. 
The present thesis intends to add experimental evidence to this cognitive style model and 
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CSA. Investigations of cognitive styles and their effects are conducted in a laboratory 
setting. The results may help to both clarify and facilitate our understanding of the nature 
of the two dimensions of cognitive style. In Chapter 2, a study is reported to confirm the 
relationship between the WA and the VI dimension of cognitive style and their 
theoretically related constructs. The two experiments described in Chapter 3 reflect a close 
link between the WA cognitive style and attentional control ability in metalinguistic 
performances and its connection with the proficiency of language mastering. In Chapter 4, 
using a stereotypic paradigm, results demonstrate an effect of the WA dognitive style on 
memorising personality traits with/without pre-existing frameworks of the target. Chapter 
5 investigates the impact of cognitive styles upon behaviours that relate to self concepts, 
such as egocentric perspective taking, empathy, and attachment. Results suggest wholists 
have an advantage in integrated bodily process and imagers are related to other-oriented 
perceptions. In Chapter 6, a more reliable substitute of the VI test of CSA was introduced 
in order to examine the validity of the VI cognitive style with an improved measurement. 
Finally in Chapter 7, a qualitative framework is proposed to accommodate the reported 
results, and an attempt is made to place these findings into a more general context. 
The coverage of the contents (relating to either or both cognitive style dimension) is 
surnmarised in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 
Contents of each chanter 
WA cognitive style VI cognitive style 
Chapter 1 A general introduction and evaluation of the theory and measurement of 
the two dimensions of cognitive style by Riding and Cheema (199 1) 
Chapter 2 An investigation of the relationships between the two cognitive style 
dimensions and their theoretical relatives 
Chapter 3 The impact of the WA cognitive style -------- 
on varied attentional-control-required 
metalinguistic tasks for native and 
second language speakers 
Chapter 4 The influence of the WA cognitive style -------- 
on stereotypic memory formation 
Chapter 5 An examination of differed effects of the two cognitive style dimensions 
on self concept related perceptions and behaviours, such as egocentric 
perspective taking, empathy, and attachment 
Chapter 6 A check of the construct 
validity of current VI cognitive 
-------- style after its poor measure 
reliability has been controlled 
fo r 
Chapter 71 General discussion and conclusion of the results 
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CHAPTER 2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STYLE CONSTRUCTS 
This chapter examined construct validity of Riding's (1991) two cognitive style 
dimensions by checking the inter-correlations between the WA and VI cognitive styles and 
their theoretically related constructs. The significant results complemented the supportive 
evidence to the construct validity of both style dimensions and brought further 
comprehension of the nature of styles. Details are given in the main contents of this 
chapter. 
2.1 Introduction 
A substantial amount of research has been reported to establish the construct 
validity of the two dimensions of cognitive style (i. e. the WA and the VI dimension; 
Riding & Cheema, 199 1). Evidence includes the independence from other unrelated 
individual difference constructs, the association with physiological measures, and the link 
with a range of observed behaviours (as discussed in Chapter 1). However, relatively fewer 
empirical studies are reported to demonstrate a relation between the two cognitive style 
dimensions and their theoretical family members. Here the term "family member/relative" 
refers to the two 'families' of the cognition-centred style research identified by Riding and 
colleagues (Riding & Cheema, 1991; Rayner & Riding, 1997; Riding & Rayner, 1998), 
who consequently surnmarised the WA and the VI dimension of cognitive style to 
represent these two families. Hence, their 'family members/relatives' always refer to those 
constructs who should theoretically feature or at least relate to each of the dimensions of 
cognitive style respectively (as stated in Chapter 1). 
Generally, the construct validity should involve the correspondence with their 
theoretically overlapped constructs. Unfortunately, it is not sufficiently covered in 
previous studies (e. g. Riding, 2005). 
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Thus, this chapter aims to investigate the interrelationships between the WA and VI 
cognitive styles, and their theoretically related peers. If the high interrelations are 
demonstrated, the result can provide the complementary evidence to the construct validity 
of the two cognitive style dimensions. In this study, only those constructs which have 
strong supports in the literature (i. e. widely accepted typologies with valid resulting 
measures) were selected to examine the hypotheses. The chosen constructs were FDI 
cognitive style (Witkin, 1967) and the concrete-abstract dimension and the reflective- 
active dimension of learning style (Kolb, 1976). 
2.1.1 Field DependenceAndependence 
The theoretical kindredness between the FDI cognitive style and the WA dimension 
of cognitive style has been fully discussed in Chapter 1. In brief, the FDI cognitive style 
refers to the ability to 'disembed' an object from its environment. Thus, FI)s tend to 
perceive representations and concepts at face value and prefer dealing with materials in a 
well-presentcd structure. In contrast, FIs are good at determining discrete items/details 
from their background and imposing structure on information. 
Witkin (1967) initially developed the 'embedded figures test' to detect the FDI 
cognitive style by a perceptual task. This is a pencil and paper assessment including the 
disembedding of a shape from its surrounding field. Several variations were developed: the 
Embedded Figures Test (EFT) and the Grouped Embedded Figures Test (GEFT) are the 
two most well known ones. The EFT is administered on an individual basis and the GEFT 
is a group-administered test in order to allow group presentation of the EFT items. These 
are uni-dimensional tests and individuals are classified by their performances. That is, 
better performance equates to more Fl. In the present study, the GEFT was selected as the 
measure of FDI cognitive style because of its better acceptance in the literature (see Witkin, 
Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 197 1). The GEFT consists of 25 items and people are required to 
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trace as many of the simple forms in the complex figures as possible within given times 
(see Figure 2.1). 
Here IS a simple form which we have labeled 'X": 
> 
This simple form, named *X*, Is hidden within 
the more complex figure below: 
FigUre 2.1. Example of an embedded figure in GEFT 
There are three sections in the GEFT: a practice section of seven items, followed by 
two sections of nine items each. Performance is decided by how many simple forms have 
been correctly traced in the last two sections (2 and 3). Sections 2 and 3 were considered 
parallel and the items were designed to be discriminative to increase the difficulties of 
performing the task (i. e. finding the simple form inside the complex figure). However, 
evidence has suggested that participants actually improve their performance from Section 
2 to Section 3 (Cummings & Murray, 1987; Lusk & Wright, 198 1; Panek, Funk, & Nelson, 
1980). The finding cannot be explained by a simple learning or practice effect as a 
reversed order of the two sections did not counteract the effect (Kepner & Neimark, 1984). 
Kirchner, Forns, and Amador (1989) concluded that the improvement from Section 2 to 
I 
Section 3 was resulting from the fact that latter is easier to solve compared to Section 2. -, 
For this reason, Section 2 and Section 3 of the GEFT will be analysed separately in order 




The construct of FD1 cognitive style has been well accepted in the literature, and 
generally manifests strong reliability and validity of the EFT and GEFr (see Witkin ct W., 
1971). However, there are critiques on the theory and measurement of FDI cognitive style 
that question whether this concept is actually rcflccting a cognitive 'style' or cognitive 
'ability'. Evidence purported a significant relationship between overall performance in 
EFT and GEFT and the general ability/'intclligcncc' of participants (see, Goldstein & 
Blackman, 1978; Flexcr & Roberge, 1980; Messick, 1976; Paramo & Tinajero, 1990). For 
instance, correlational studies (e. g. Daku, 1978; Flcxcr & Robcrgc, 1980; Riding & 
Pearson, 1994) have indicated positive relations bct%%-ccn measures of FDI cognitive style 
and various intelligence or achievement tests. If the FDI cognitive style does overlap %vith 
intelligence or abilities, it could result in a narrowcd variance bct%vccn the FDI cognitive 
style and the WA dimension of cognitive style. Riding (1997) has asserted that the NVA 
dimension of cognitive style is "independent from intelligence" (p33). It might explain K. 
Garland's (personal communication, March 26,2006) finding of the non-significant 
correlations between the EFT/GEFT and the NVA test of CSA. Nevertheless, the small 
sample size (n = 48) of the study has reduced the validity of Garland's result. Therefore 
the present study would consider this issue with a more reasonable sample size. 
2.1.2 Experiential Learning Theory 
Kolb, Rubin, and McIntyre (1971) offered a model of thccxpcricntial learning 
progress. They considered learning was based on grasping and transrorming experiences, 
and learning progress could be described as a cycle of action and rcflcction. Kolb (1984) 
extended these ideas to a new learning theory. He proposed that individuals Icam and solve 
problems in dcoritinual proces's of four distinct stages. 'Mcsc arc shown in Figure 2.2. 
Concrete experiences (feeling stage) provide the basis for obscrvations and reflections 
(watching stage), which further develop into thcorics (thinking stagc), then from which 
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new actions are deduced (doing stage), and these lead to new concrete experiences 
(another feeling stage). Kolb believed that when one cycle of learning ends, a new cycle 
begins. So the learning process is continual (Duff, 2000). He also suggested that different 
abilities are required for each of the stages, and individuals tend to be more skilled in some 
stages than others, so that they could be grouped into different learning styles. 
Concrete Expedence, , 
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Figure 2.2. Kolb's (1984, p58) concept of the Experiential Learning Cycle 
Kolb (1985) illustrated four types of learners corresponding to the four stages of the 
experiential learning: divergers, assimilators, convergers, and accommodators. They are 
shown in Figure 2.2, and were defined as follows: 
I Divergers tend to use approaches that include both firsthand 
experience and reflective observation, and perform best at viewing concrete 
situations from different points of view and gathering information. 
2. Assimilators, who have detached observation and abstract 
conceptualisation preferences, feel most confident when they understand a wide 
range of information and formulate it into theories. 
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3. Convergers, whose primary learning modes involve abstract 
conceptualisation and active experimentation, are good at problem solving and 
changing theory application into practice. 
4. Accommodators tend to learn by placing the emphasis on active 
experimentation and concrete experience, and are interested in planning new 
actions and emerging new experiences. 
Two bi-polar dimensions of the cognitive growth (learning) have been proposed 
based on these learning styles: the reflective-active dimension and the concrcte-abstract 
dimension. The two dimensions can be visualised by drawing lines across the leaming 
circle (see Figure 2.2). The reflective-active dimension contains a range of bchaviours 
from detached observation to direct participation. The concrete-abstract dimension 
involves preferences from dealing with concrete targets to handling theoretical concepts. 
Kolb (1976) suggested that a 'leaming style' refers to the way in which an 
individual acquires and uses information. He viewed learning style as a cognitive style that 
manifests itself in the learning environment. There is no formal suggestion indicating the 
relationship between Kolb's learning style and other cognitive styles, such as Riding's WA 
and VI dimensions. But the descriptions of the reflective-active dimension and the 
concrete-abstract dimension might imply this to be so. Kolb described the concrete 
experience stage as 'feeling' and suggested that individuals who prefer this stage would be 
more receptive, feeling, accepting, intuitive, and present orientated, rather than have a 
systematic approach to problems. This explanation seems congruent with the 
characteristics of wholists (and FDs) who tend to depend on the influence of a whole 
surrounding field when viewing information (Riding, 1997; Witkin et al., 1971). Kolb also 
labelled the abstract conceptualisation stage as 'thinking' and argued that the individuals 
who prefer the stage would be more analytical, thinking, evaluative, logical, and rational. 
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He regarded thinking as using logic and ideas over feelings to understand problems. This is 
coherent with the description of analytics (and FIs) who have the preference of detailed, 
processing information and are more adept at determining discrete fragments from context. 
Logically, it may lead to the conclusion that the concrete-abstract dimension should 
positively correlate with the WA dimension of cognitive style. Individuals' varied 
tendency on information organisation (the WA dimension of cognitive style) would affect 
their preferences for ways of leaming, from concrete practice to abstract processing. The 
wholist individuals desire concrete experience while the analytic individuals prefer 
abstract conceptualisation. 
However, Leonard, Scholl and Kowalski (1999) reported a negative correlation 
between the concrete-abstract dimension and the GEFT scores, which pointed the aptitude 
of FDs (wholists) to abstract conceptualisation and the tendency of FIs (analytics) to 
concrete experience. It is rather opposite to the predicted direction. Although Leonard et al. 
(1999) suggested that both the concrete-abstract and FDI dimension reflected the extent to 
which individuals use and develop theoretical constructs, they failed to provide an 
explanation about why such a relation exists. Their finding will be discussed further in the 
discussion section of this chapter. 
Moreover, the 'thinking' stage (abstract conceptualisation) seems to favour the 
advantage of verbal nature (Zhang & Noyes, 2007), while the 'feeling' stage (concrete 
experience) is consistent with an imagery representation mode (Riding & Rayner, 1998). 
Riding (2005) claimed a family relationship between the VI cognitive style and the 
abstract-concrete dimension by Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (196 1). Although the two, 
concrete-abstract dimensions are not necessarily the same, this discussion provides more 
inference of relationship between the Kolb's concrete-abstract dimension of learning style 
and Riding's VI dimension of cognitive style. The VI dimension of cognitive style is 
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mainly about whether an individual tends to represent knowledge language-like or picture- 
like. On one hand, verbal representations, which are language-like, are characterised as 
being propositional and referentially arbitrary. Thus, they have to be conceptualised from 
the outside world and become arbitrarily abstract. On the other hand, the term 'picture- 
like', which refers to properties such as analogue, isomorphic, graphic, and so on, implies 
that the representations reflect the represented targets in a more accurate and concrete way. 
Accordingly, it is logical that individuals' tendency to use verbal or imagery manner of 
representation correlates with their preference of dealing with abstract concepts or concrete 
targets. 
The reflective-active dimension decides whether individuals rely on one's own 
feeling and thoughts to form opinions or enjoy interactions with others and the external 
world. The study of Leonard et al. (1999) demonstrated that this leaming style dimension 
is independent from FDI cognitive style; hence, the WA cognitive style. In addition, 
Riding and Rayner (1998) have commented that there are aspects of the VI cognitive style 
that may affect the focus of individuals' behaviours. Accordingly, verbalisers might appear 
more externally focused because the 'language-like' representation manner encourages 
them to communicate more with others. While imagers might appear more internally 
focused, as the imagery representation does not necessarily require interaction with the 
outside world. Inferentially, the VI cognitive style may link to the reflective-active 
dimension of learning style. 
In order to determine the leaming styles of an individual, Kolb (197 1) developed a 
measure named the Learning Style Inventory (LSI). It was originally a self-descriptive 
forced-choice questionnaire comprising 9 items. Each item contains four words that are 
required to be ranked according to how well it characterises one's learning preference. 
Each word in each set corresponds with a learning orientation (feeling, watching, thinking, 
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and doing). It was later revised in 1985,1993 and 1999 to include 12 items instead of 9. 
In the LSI (Kolb, 1993), four scales are calculated. Each of them relates to one of 
the learning abilities: concrete experience (CE), reflective observation (RO), abstract 
conceptualisation (AC), and active experimentation (AE). Using these scores, two more 
scores can be computed: AE minus RO, indicates an individual's position on the 
reflective-active dimension (AERO); while AC minus CE, indicates a composite score on 
the concrete-abstract dimension (ACCE). The scores show an individual's preferences 
along the two continual dimensions (reflective-active and concrete-abstract), and hence 
indicate which learning stage is preferred. 
Kolb's experiential learning style theory has been widely accepted. However the 
utility of the LSI have attracted some questions (Duff, 2000). For example, Wilson (1986) 
re-analysed three versions of the LSI, and found an inconsistency of factors with those 
Kolb predicted. James (1980) and Wilson (1986) critically discussed the questionnaire in 
terms of the classification of items, the interpretation of words, and the difficulty in 
understanding a number of items. Other criticisms focused on its reliability and construct 
validity (Duff, 2000). In sum, findings of the reliability and validity of LSI earlier versions 
have been mixed (Allinson & Hayes, 1988). 
With these criticisms in mind, the most recent version of the LSI (Version 3A, 2005; 
see Appendix A) was selected for this study. The validity and reliability of the 2005 LSI 
proved to be much better than its pioneers. Studies have shown good internal consistency 
(r > . 7) of LSI 3.1 in either the overall scale or the subscales across a number of 
populations (Kayes, 2005; Kolb & Kolb, 2005; Ruble & Stout, 1990,4991; Wierstra & 
DeJong, 2002). The test-retest reliability of LSI 3.1 ranged from moderate to excellent (r 
--. 54, Ruble& Stout, 1991; r>. 9, Veres, Sims, & Locklear, 1991). Construct validity of 
LSI 3.1 was also reported to be satisfactory (see Kolb & Kolb, 2005). 
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2.1.3 Hypotheses 
According to the above review, three general dimensions of style can be identified: 
1) how individuals tend to organise information, globally or analytically; 2) how 
individuals tend to represent information, verbally/theoretically or imagery/concretely; and 
this second dimension probably relates to the third dimension that 3) whether individuals 
obtain and process information through interaction with others and the external world, or 
in an isolated internal process. - 
Individuals who are on one end of the first dimension tend to have a holistic 
impression of information. In contrast, individuals at the other end of this dimension tend 
to view infonnation as a collection of units-The WA and the FDI cognitive style evidently 
manifest this common dimension. The concrete-abstract dimension, as discussed, should 
be conceptually related to it. It is therefore hypothesised that: 
H 1. The WA ratios and the GEFT scores will be positively correlated. 
H2. The WA ratios and ACCE scores will be positively correlated. Moreover, the 
WA ratios will positively correlate with AC scores but negatively correlate with CE scores. 
The second dimension, the preferred representation mode, is reflected in Riding's 
VI dimension. Because of the nature of verbal and imagery representation, there is the 
possibility that individuals favour different learning stages with regard to their VI style and 
make the concrete-abstract (ACCE) dimension relevant to this style dimension. Therefore, 
it is hypothcsiscd that: 
H3. The VI ratios and ACCE scores will be negatively correlated. Further, the VI 
ratios will negatively correlate with AC scores but positively correlate with CE scores. 
In addition, the first two dimensions of style are expected to distinguish from each 
other according to Riding (1997). That is, the VI style should be independent from both the 
WA style and FDI style. 
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The final dimension of whether individuals interact with others and the external 
world to obtain and process information is captured in the reflective-active (AERO) 
dimension. This dimension may be theoretically independent from the WA dimension but 
related to the VI dimension of cognitive style. Hence, the following hypothesis is devised: 
H4. The VI ratios and AERO scores will be negatively correlated. Further, the VI 
ratios will negatively correlate with AE scores but positively correlate with RO scores. 
Additionally, Kolb and Kolb (2005) have announced the independence between the 
active-reflective (AERO) dimension and the concrete-abstract (ACCE) dimension of 
learning style. Hence, no correlation between the two scores is expected. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Design 
The study is a correlational design. Participants' scores of the GEFT, CSA, and LSI , 
tests were treated as independent variables. 
2.2.2 Participants 
Ninety-nine undergraduates (33 males, 66 females) enrolled in psychology courses 
at the University of Bristol attended the study in return for receiving course credits. 
Participants had an average age of 20.7 years with SD 5.67 years (range from 16 to 58 
years). All participants were reported as native English speakers. 
Among them, 83 participants completed the GEFT, CSA, and LSI tests. The 
remaining 16 participants completed the CSA and LSI only. 
(The data of these 16 participants ývas a result of a filling task of another study. 
There is a series of cognitive style studies presented in this thesis that required a 
completion of the CSA to gain their cognitive style ratios. However, in order to avoid ý.: ý 
relevant confounding effects, those repeated participants (who attended more than one of 
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the studies) did not perform the CSA more than once. Hence they completed the LSI as a 
time filling task instead of CSA in a memory-recall experiment (details see Chapter 4), and 
their results are included in the present chapter. ) 
2.2.3 Materials 
The experiment materials included the computer-based version of CSA (Riding, 
199 1), GEFT booklets (with pencils for tracing the simple shapes), LSI questionnaires, and 
a stopwatch. 
2.2.4 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually and uninterrupted in a quiet room. They began 
by completing the GEFT. They were required to read the instructions on the first three 
pages of the booklets, which included two exaxnple problems. Then they were told to 
perform seven problems in Section I in 2 min (as measured by the stopwatch). After that, 
they were given 5 min each for Sections 2 (nine problems) and 3 (nine problems). 
Participants were required to use pencils to outline the simple forms out of the complex 
figures. All the simple forms were printed on the back cover of the booklets so that 
participants would not see them and complex figures (where to outline the simple forms 
out) at the same time. If participants did not complete problems in a particular section in 
- the required time, no extra time was allowed, and they Would move to the next section. 
Then participants carried out the 12-item self-report LSI questionnaire by ranking 
their preferences to each question. 
Finally, the CSA test was administered with instructions appearing before each of 
the three sections on the computer. The test is self-paced and participants were given 
feedback about their cognitive styles at the end of the test (including their ratios on each 
cognitive style dimension). 
Upon completion of all three tests, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
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2.2.5 Data Analysis 
Participants' positions on the WA and VI dimension were indicated by ratios of 
reaction times corresponding to different task questions. A low ratio (e. g. < 1) always 
refers to a wholist or verbaliser and a high ratio refers to an analytic or imager. Scoring of 
GEFT was given by the number of simple forms (out of a possible 18) that correctly 
outlined the complex figures, in Sections 2 and 3 in the allocated times. The LSI was 
assessing six variables; four primary scores (AE, RO, AC, and CE) that measure 
participants' preferences on the four learning orientations, and two combination scores that 
measure participants' preferences for action over reflection (AERO) and abstractness over 
concreteness (ACCE) in learning. 
The data was initially checked for gender differences. To examine a possible gender 
effect on cognitive styles, three separate one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with 
gender (men versus women) as the between subject factor, were conducted on the FDI 
scores and the WA and the VI ratios. The results revealed no'significant differences 
between men and women (all p> . 05). It implied that gender was not a confounding factor 
with the cognitive style dimensions in the present study. As a result, it would not be taken 
into consideration in the analysis. 
2.3 Results 
The descriptive statistics for the CSA, GEFT, and LSI scores are reported in Table 
2.1. 
Pearson correlations have been conducted on the eleven scores from the three tests. 
The correlation statistics are shown in Table 2.2. The results are described in four. separate 
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2.3.1 The Wholist-Anaývtic Dimension 
The first two hypotheses (H I and H2) tested the inter-correlation of style difference 
measures that conceptually relate to inforination organisation. In testing H I, the correlation 
between the WA ratios and GEFT scores were found significant (r (83) = 0.26, p <. 05). 
HI was therefore supported. However, when investigated further, it was found that the 
WA ratios only significantly correlated with the GEFT Section 2 scores (r (83) = 0.23, p 
< . 05) and not with the 
GEFT Section 3 scores (r (83) = 0.15, p> . 05). 
The frequency diagrams of perfon-nance in GEFT Section 2 and 3 are stated in 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4, which apparently exhibit the ceiling effect in Section 3. 
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Figure 2.3. Perfon-nance distribution of GEFT Section 2 (highest score = nine) 
The relationship between the WA ratios and ACCE scores was found marginally 
significant (r (99) = 0.19, p= . 055) in the predicted direction. Furthennore, when testing 
the relationship between the WA ratios and two primary scores of the ACCE dimension 
(AC and CE score), a significant correlation with CE score (r (99) = -0.21, p< . 
05) was 
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GEFT Sectlon2 Scores (n=63) 
revealed but not with the AC score (p > . 05). So H2 was partly supported in that 
individuals who tend to be more holistic prefer the concrete experience learning rather than 
those who tend to be more analytic. However, the WA style did not affect their preference 





Figure 2.4. Perforinance distribution of GEFT Section 3 (highest score = nine) 
2.3.2 The Verbal-Imagery Dimension 
H3 was designed to determine the relationship between the VI dimension, which 
reflects the way in which an individual prefers to represent inforination, and the ACCE 
dimension, which involves a person's preference for dealing with concrete materials or 
dealing with abstract concepts. The correlation was significant in the predicted direction (r 
(99) = -0.24, p< . 05) indicating that the more verbal individuals are, the more abstract 
conceptualisation they prefer, and the more imagery-oriented individuals are, the more 
concrete experiences they prefer. This hypothesis was further supported by two 
correlations between (both in the predicted directions) the VI dimension and the two 
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GE FT Section3 Scores (n=63) 
primary scores: AC (r (99) = -0.2 1, p< . 05) and CE (r (99) = 0.2 1, p< . 05). 
2.3.3 The Reflective-Active Dimension 
The AERO dimension has been found not to correlate with any of other cognitive 
style dimensions (i. e. WA, VI, FDI), all p> . 05. H4 was therefore not supported. 
2.3.4 Independence between the WA and VI Dimensions and Independence between the 
ACCE andAERO Dimensions 
The relationship between the WA ratios and the VI ratios was found to be 
independent (p > . 05), as was the relationship between the FDI scores and the 
VI ratios (p 
>. 05). The correlation between the AERO dimension and ACCE dimension was also non- 
significant (p > . 05). 
2.4 Discussion 
The present study intended to address the question of whether the varied 
measurements of cognitive style were significantly related to a couple of common 
dimensions. To be more precise, to consider the extent to which the WA and VI dimension 
of cognitive style can represent their theoretical families respectively as has been 
purported (as a part of the construct validity). 
The findings indicated that the five dimensions of the measures did inter-correlate 
on the basis of three separate conceptual dimensions of cognitive style. They will be 
discussed in turn from subsection 2.4.1 to 2.4.4. 
2.4.1 The nolist-Analytic Dimension 
The first one, represented by the FDI style and WA cognitive style, reflects whether 
individuals prefer to view the information globally or analytically. This perceptual- 
analytical dimension of cognitive style has been well established in the literature where 
numerous models have been suggested to be theoretically related to this dimension of 
cognitive style (see Chapter 1). The positiye significant correlation between the FDI scores 
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and the WA ratios empirically confirmed the conceptual overlap between the FDI 
cognitive style and the WA dimension of cognitive style. Individuals who are good at 
separating parts from their background or context, tend to organise information in a loose 
collection of discrete parts rather than a whole. In contrast, individuals may find it difficult 
to disembed pieces from the 'field' because they view information in a holistic manner. 
This result may contradict K. Garland's (personal communication, March 26,2006) 
finding of the non-significant relationship between the FDI and the WA cognitive style 
because of the larger sample size. 
However, it needs to be noted that the correlation between the GEFT scores and the 
WA ratios were only around .3 though significant. There are two potential explanations for 
this moderate correlation. First, it is because of the differentiation between the constructs 
of FDI style and the WA style. The FDI cognitive style, as mentioned in the introduction, 
has been questioned concerning how much its approach assesses style. The FIs were 
consistently found to perform better than FDs in the tests of intelligence (e. g. Goldstein & 
Blackman, 1978; Flexer &Roberge, 1980; Riding & Pearson, 1994). So the FDI construct 
is argued to involve the element of 'ability' rather than 'pure' style. In contrast, Riding's 
WA dimension of cognitive style has been defined as being a pure style and intelligence 
free (see Riding & Rayner, 1998). Reflecting on their measures, the GEFT may assess not 
only the tendency but also the ability for individuals to separate objects from their 
environment. In comparison, the WA test of CSA merely assesses tendency by assessing 
both ends of the dimension continuum and is not related to intellectual constructs (Riding, 
2005). For this reason, although the FDI cognitive style and the WA dimension of 
cognitive style are conceptually very much related, there are unshared variances between 
them (i. e. a general ability factor) and hence their correlation with each other is weakened. 
Secondly, the moderately low correlation can be contributed to the assessment of 
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GEFT itself. The GEFT has been chosen as the measurement of the FDI cognitive style 
because of its popularity, which is based primarily on the convenient administration. 
GEFT is calculated on how many items can be worked out in a given time to represent 
one's rank on the FDI cognitive style dimension. EFT or the WA tests of CSA, in contrast, 
employ reaction times as the indicator of participants' tendency on this perceptual- 
analytical dimension of cognitive style. EFT simply records a participant's reaction latency 
for each disembedding problem. The cognitive style ratios of CSA are also generated 
I based on reaction times. Thus, they are both reaction time sensitive. Compared to EFT and 
CSA, the method used by GEFT probably introduces a ceiling effect into participants' 
responses of the GEFT test by setting an upper limit for participants' performance. Even 
when participants have performed all the problems before the time limits, they cannot get 
extra marks. The current study's participant sample is comprised entirely of university 
students, who could be considered to be the more capable participants among the whole 
population. It is therefore not surprising to find a ceiling effect existing in the present 
finding (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4). Such a ceiling effect possibly compromised the 
correlation within the tests. For example, Participant A accomplishes the test just in time, 
and Participant B completes the test 2 min earlier. According to GEFT, they both scored 
the highest score of 18. In this case, the difference between Participants A and B on this 
dimension of cognitive style has been concealed. However, Participants A and B are able 
to demonstrate different reaction times and thus reveal different scores in CSA and EFT. 
Probably for this reason, the GEFT and other measurements of the FDI cognitive 
style have been reported to correlate low. For example, Goldstein and Blackman (1978) 
reported the GEFT correlated with its original instrument, the Rod and Frame Test, only in 
a medium range, .30-. 65. And K. Garland (personal communication, March 26,2006) 
also found a non-significant relationship bet, %ýeen the EFT and GEFT. - 
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Concerning the present study, although both the scores of the two sections were 
highly correlated with the overall GEFT scores (r values range from . 71 to . 90), the 
relation between the two sections was only moderate (r = .3 5). In addition, the scores of 
GEFT Section 2 were moderately related to the WA ratios (r = . 23), however the scores of 
GEFT Section 3 failed to correlate with the WA ratios (r =. 15; see Table 2.2). The reason 
is apparent in comparison between Figures 2.3 and 2.4, where there was an evident ceiling 
effect in the responses of Section 3. It is consistent with Kirchner et al. (1989) and their 
conclusion that Section 3 is easier than Section 2, and consequently the ceiling effect 
impairs the demonstration of the relationship between the GEFT (especially Section 3) 
scores and the WA ratios. 
Moreover, the positive correlation between the WA ratios and the ACCE scores 
only reached a marginal significance and the hypothesis that the more wholist individuals 
are, the more concrete experience they prefer and the more analytic individuals are, the 
more abstract conceptual isation they prefer has not been fully supported. Nevertheless, this 
result did not support the finding of Leonard et al. (1999) of a negative correlation between 
the ACCE and GEFT scores. Considering the non-significant correlation between the 
ACCE and GEFT scores (but positive r values) in the present study, the confounding effect 
probably came from the GEFT test itself rather than the WA dimension of cognitive style. 
The correlation between the WA ratios and the CE scores was found to be 
significant in a negative direction. This supported the hypothesis that wholists, who have 
the preference of intuitive situations and focusing on the problem as a whole and ignoring 
details, would be at an advantage in the 'feeling' stage of learning with first-hand concrete 
experience. Notwithstanding, individuals' position on the WA dimension of cognitive style 
did not affect their skilfulness in the 'thinking' stage (AC) of learning. The distinction is 
thought to be attributed to an envirom-nental factor. A core intention of modem education 
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is to train children to have an ability to conceptualise knowledge of the outside world. 
Thus, probably the preference of the abstract conceptualisation (AC) in learning is rather, 
dependent on learning experience (i. e. how much the person would accept this idea from 
their teachers) than on own style preference. This postulation may cam support from those 
findings, which revealed that individuals' preferences for abstract conceptualisation (AC) 
actually increased with the level of participation in formal education (Kolb, 1976; Kolb & 
Kolb, 2005). The more education a person receives, more likely s/he prefers abstract 
conceptualisation (AC) during learning activities. 
2.4.2 The Verbal-Imagery Dimension 
The second conceptual dimension of cognitive style is concerned with information 
representation, which was demonstrated by the VI ratios of the CSA and related to the 
ACCE scores of LSI. Compared to the WA dimension of cognitive style, the VI dimension 
has fewer family relatives and hence less literature support for its validity (see Chapter 1). 
However, the present finding may provide some supportive evidence for it. 
The significant negative correlation between the two measures implies the relation 
of an individual's favoured representation mode (i. e. verbal or imagery) and his/her 
preference for concrete or abstract material during learning activities. It indicates that 
'verbal' people favour the 'thinking' more than the 'feeling' during learning activities. In 
contrast, 'imagery' people favour the 'feeling' over the 'thinking'. The consistency 
between the two dimensions was further confirmed by the negative correlation between the 
VI ratios and AC scores. It suggests that the more frequent individuals represent - 
information verbally, the more theories and ideas they develop during learning (i. e. 
systematic approaches to problems by abstract conceptualisation). And the positive 
correlation between the VI ratios and CE scores indicates that the more picture-like ! 




In brief, people's preferred manner of information representation, language-like or 
picture-like (Riding, 199 1), and their favoured learning stage, feeling or thinking (Kolb, 
1984), are conceptually and practically related. It provides extra validity support to 
Riding's (1997) categorisation on the VI dimension of cognitive style. Although the VI 
cognitive style and concrete-abstract (ACCE) dimension might not locate on the same 
layer according to Curry's (1983) Onion Model (see Chapter 1), the concrete-abstract 
(ACCE) dimension to some extent can be regarded as the projection of the VI cognitive 
style on the 'information processing' level. The leaming style (e. g. the ACCE dimension) 
is thought to result from the interaction between the fundamental personal ity/cognitive 
styles (e. g. the VI cognitive style) and the choices of leaming format that are available in 
the environment. In this case, an individual's preference for handling concrete materials or 
theoretical concepts reflects the underlying cognitive style of one's preferred 
representation mode, that is, the VI cognitive style. 
In addition, it is interesting to find out that the concrete-abstract (ACCE) dimension 
did correlate with both the WA and the VI cognitive style ratios, although the latter two 
did not (see Table 2.2). The finding implies that the two dimensions of cognitive style may 
respectively explain partial variance of the concrete-abstract (ACCE) dimension. In other 
words, one's preference for concrete experience or abstract conceptualisation during 
learning activities may be rooted at both (which locate in an inner layer of the 'onion'; 
Curry, 1983) cognitive style dimensions. It more or less supports the 'adaptation' 
postulation that claimed by Riding and Rayner (1998) between the WA and the VI 
cognitive style (see discussion in Subsection 1.2.1 in Chapter 1). Albeit the two cognitive 
styles are independent with one or the other as the underlying mechanism, they are 
possibly correlated at an outer layer of the onion at an information processing level (Curry, 
1983). 
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2.4.3 The Reflective-Active Dimension 
The third conceptual dimension in the present study concerned the reflective-active 
(AERO) dimension of LSI. It decides whether individuals obtain information actively, 
through the interaction including external involvement to the environment or other people, 
or reflectively, via solo internal processes. The independence of this dimension has been 
shown by the non-significant correlation between the dimension scores (including its 
primary scores AE and RO) with all related measures in the WA and VI dimensions. It can 
be proposed that this dimension, which relates to the way a person transforms experience 
externally or internally, has not been conceptually covered by Riding and Cheema's (199 1) 
categorisations. In addition, this reflective-active dimension is suggested to be similar to 
the description of introversion-extroversion dimension of cognitive style (Jung, 1970; 
Myers & Briggs, 1985). Introversion refers to an attitude to form ideas and make decisions 
in isolation. Extroversion points to an orientation toward the outside world where people 
build their ideas through their interaction with it. Thus, both of them probably reflect a 
third dimension in the cognitive style research besides the ones concerned with 
organisation and representation of information. Leonard et al. (1999) supported this idea 
by providing a positive correlation between the dimensions. - 
However, the VI cognitive style failed to exhibit a relationship with this learning 
style dimension. Riding and Dyer (1980) reported a negative correlation between the VI 
cognitive style and the introversion-extroversion cognitive style and purported that one's 
preferred coding mode may influence his/her focus of behaviours. This suggestion is not 
supported by the results. It is argued that the lack of relationship between the VI cognitive 
style and the reflective-active (AERO) dimension concerns the subject of focus. 
Verbalisers were suggested to be more externally focused (Riding & Rayner, 1998). It is ý, 
because the language nature of their preferred representation mode encourages them to, 
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communicate with others. Communication requires other humans but not objects. Thus, 
verbalisers are suggested to be socially rather than generally externally focused. 
Notwithstanding, the reflective-active (AERO) dimension of Kolb's (1985) learning theory 
refers to an attitude towards a general outside world. Differentiated subjects of focus might 
be the reason. This issue will be discussed more in Chapter 5. 
2.4.4 Independence between the WA and V1 Dimensions and Independence between the 
ACCE andAERO Dimensions 
The findings also supported the predictions that the WA and VI dimensions of 
cognitive style are distinct from each other, and the concrete-abstract (ACCE) and the 
active-reflective (AERO) dimension of learning style are irrelevant from one another. 
These are consistent with previous studies (e. g. Riding & Agrell, 1997; Riding & 
Caine, 1993; Riding & Douglas, 1993; Riding & Pearson, 1994; Riding & Read, 1996) 
about the independence between the WA and VI dimension of cognitive style, and with 
those previous findings of the independence between the two learning style dimensions 
(Boyatzis & Mainemelis, 2000; Freedman & Stumpf, 1978; Kolb, 1999). 
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter provides further support for the construct validity of the WA and the 
VI dimensions of cognitive style. The two style dimensions were reported to be good 
representatives of the style dimension of either the tendency of information organisation or 
the preference of representation. The WA cognitive style did correlate with its family 
relative, the FDI cognitive style, as predicted, but only to a moderate degree. This is 
explained in terms of confounding factors (e. g. non-style elements, ceiling effect) relating 
to the GEFT, which reduce the common variance (style-related variance) shared with the 
WA style. The WA and the VI cognitive styles both contribute to the concrcte-abstract 
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(ACCE) dimension of learning but are independent of each other. It is suggested to reflect 
not only the respective 'projection' of the two cognitive style dimensions but also the 
'adaptation' between them at a information processing level although their underlying 
mechanisms keep them distinct. The reflective-active (AERO) dimension is identified as a 
distinct dimension that is independent from the other two cognitive style dimensions (WA 
and VI). Finally, the discussion of the interrelationships between the individual difference 
constructs, either related or not, can facilitate the understanding of the nature of the WA 
and VI cognitive styles. 
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CHAPTER 3. WHOLIST-ANALYTIC STYLE AND ATTENTIONAL CONTROL 
The WA dimension of cognitive style is supposed to reflect how a person views 
information. Previous findings (including the one stated in Chapter 2) have clearly 
demonstrated both the validity and reliability of this cognitive style dimension. Hence in 
this thesis the author's emphasis on the WA cognitive style dimension is moved from the 
construct validity to its possible impact on varied cognitive processes (in comparison with 
the VI cognitive style dimension, see Chapter 6). The intention of these behavioural 
investigations is to facilitate the understanding of the underlying mechanism of this 
cognitive style dimension as well as its applications into daily life. This chapter aims to 
determine the particular effect of the WA cognitive style on the attentional control process. 
Attentional control refers to the ability to function under distracting or ambiguous 
conditions and distinguish relevant or irrelevant information (Bialystok, 1986). Based on 
previous studies, it is proposed that there is a shared variance between the attentional 
control perfon-nance and the WA cognitive style. To examine this postulation, two studies 
are reported in Chapter 3. A metalinguistic task (in English language), which requires 
varied levels of attentional control in different conditions, demonstrated differed 
performances by wholist and analytic individuals in a group of Chinese participants who 
speak English as a second language (Experimentl). Analytics exhibited significantly better 
performance in a high-attentional-control-required condition than the wholists. The finding 
further confirmed the assertion of the common mechanism existing between the WA 
cognitive style and attentional control process. In comparison the native English speakers 
tested with exactly the same task (Experiment 2) failed to show such a difference in 
performance with regard to the WA style. It was argued that the differentiation between 
findings of the second language speakers and of native speakers was due to the level of 
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language proficiency between the two samples. The high language proficiency of native 
speakers either reduced the effort requirement for attentional control in the task or had 
developed matured attentional control skills to cover the impact of a built-in WA cognitive 
style. 
More detailed descriptions of studies are as below. 
3.1 General Introduction 
Within the area of research on the relationship between WA style and language 
acquisitions (of either first or second language), analytics (Fls) were considered to perform 
better than wholists (FDs); however, this difference is more prevalent in the earlier stage of 
language acquisitions (see Tinajero & Paramo, 1998). Many authors (e. g. Abraham, 1983; 
Bialystok, 1992; Buriel, 1978; Cosan & Beaulieu, 1984; Roszkowski & Snelbecker, 1987; 
Satterly, 1976) suggested that this FI superiority relied on the enhanced perceptual 
disembedding and/or restructuring ability, which is demanded by some specific language 
skills (e. g. application of linguistic rules, identifying discrete linguistic units within larger 
ones, and detection of irregularities, etc. ). However, a major criticism of these studies 
could be the simplicity of the methodologies used. Most of these studies have simply - 
focused on the relationship between the WA style (FDI style) and school achievement of 
language, and have not distinguished between measuring linguistic ability and linguistic 
knowledge. This may reduce the validity of the findings. 
Bialystok (1986) proposed that children's linguistic proficiency is based on two 
components of language processing, namely, the analysis of linguistic knowledge and the 
control of attentional processing. The analysis of linguistic knowledge involves 
transferring internal mental representations into explicit linguistic applications. The control 
of attentional processing requires selectively attending to different aspects/representations 
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in a real-time linguistic task; the later component, as suggested by Bialystok (1992) is 
possibly a more general cognitive process functioning across disparate domains. The 
"control of aftentional processing", is believed to reflect the ability of attentional control. 
Here the hypothesis is that the WA style shares overlapped mechanisms with 
attentional control functioning. According to the earlier descriptions, the WA style reflects 
a level of perceptual disembedding ability, which appears to entail an ability of attentional 
control. That is, the ability to function under distracting or ambiguous conditions and 
distinguish relevant or irrelevant information ("control of attentional processing" as 
defined by Bialystok, 1986). This function is consistent with the definition of analytics, 
who tend to analyse the information into discrete parts and have less difficulty in 
separating a part from the whole context. Thus, the present perspective is that analytic 
people would show higher abilities of attentional control, and in the present study it is 
investigated in the context of solving metalinguistic problems. 
Traditionally, the paradigm of attentional control studies involves metalinguistic 
problems where competing information from different aspects is presented and the 
recipient has to focus on only one aspect (Bowey, 1988; Lundberg, 1978). For example, 
Bialystok (1992) presented 7-9 year old children with grammatically correct/incorrect and 
meaningfully correct/incorrect sentences and asked them to judge whether the grammars of 
the sentences were correct. Some of the sentences were grammatically correct but 
meaningfully silly; for example, 'The sun was shining so I opened the chair'. This 
provided participants with two potentially confusing sources of information - grammar 
I 
and meaning - and a need to solve the problem by only focusing on grammatical 
correctness and ignoring the sentence meaning (attentional control). Bialystok found that 
children's performances on the attentional-control tasks positively correlated with their 
scores on FDI cognitive style, which supports the relationship between WA cognitive style 
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and attentional control ability in metalinguistic processing. 
However, although Bialystok's (1986; 1992) theory successfully distinguished two 
component processes of language, her findings were still limited by only studying children 
and not adults. If the WA style shares the mechanism with individuals' attentional control 
in linguistic processing, does it remain even when they are adults? Does this individual 
characteristic function in a similar way in people's first and second language processing? 
Or in other words, how would it function when speakers exhibit various linguistic 
proficiencies? 
In the two studies reported in this chapter, a linguistic correction task was used with 
adults. Participants were given a timed, metalinguistic task and asked to correct 
grammatical and spelling errors in a set of English texts. The texts were manipulated to be 
either semantically correct or absurd. It was deduced that the semantically absurd texts 
would require more attentional control in linguistic processing to reach a given 
performance because participants needed to avoid paying attention to the 'distraction' from 
the meanings. Experiment I investigated adult second language speakers while Experiment 
2 surveyed adult native speakers. The comparison of the two studies intends to display the 
effect of language proficiency on the hypothesised relationship between the WA style and 
the attentional control process. 
3.2 Experiment 1: An investigation of second language speakers 
3.23 IntroductionlHypothesis 
A group of Chinese overseas students who use English as their second language 
was tested in Experiment 1. This experiment was conducted first because second language 
speakers have a mutual feature with children in language practice that they are both at a, 
relatively earlier stage of language acquisition. Thus a congruent finding of the 
55 
relationship between the WA cognitive style and the attentional control process is expected 
as Bialystok found (1992). 
It is hypothesised that when English is processed as a second language, analytic 
participants will show better attentional. control performance in the metalinguistic task than 
the wholists. Operationally, analytic people will be less 'distracted' by semantic absurdity 
and perform more linguistic corrections than the wholists in meaningless contexts. 
Moreover, analytic participants are expected to show better performance (i. e. more 
sensitive to anomalies) than the wholists even in normal contexts, as they are also 
advantageous at some linguistic skills other than the attentional control ability (see 
Tinajero & Paramo, 1998). If this is found to be the case, it would have implications for 




A 'between-subj ects' design with WA cognitive style as a group variable (wholist 
versus analytic) was employed. The dependent variables were percentage of errors that 
participants successfully corrected in the four task conditions (named GNVGm/SM/Sm, 
and described in detail in the Subsection 3.2.2.3). 
3.2.2.2 Participants 
Forty overseas participants took part in this experiment. Their native language was 
Chinese and English was their second language. The Chinese sample comprised 18 males 
and 22 females, with an age range from 20 to 38 years (mean 24.40 years, SD 3.69 years). 
All participants were registered at the University of Bristol, either as students or visiting 
researchers. They all self-reported as fluent English speakers and received financial reward 
for participation. 
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In addition, prior to the formal testing, extra 10 participants (five males, five 
females) with the same selection criteria were tested in a pilot study. Their age range was 
from 17 to 44 years (mean 27 years, SD 7.70 years). 
3.2.2.3 Materials 
Linguistic correction. The identification of errors in a text or judgements of 
grammatical correctness is widely used in assessing metalinguistic abilities. It requires 
participants to detect and correct a number of grammatical and morphological mistakes in 
a particular text. 
The material for the correction task was obtained ftom an online database of 
College English Test Band 6 (CET-6) in China (2005). CET-6 is a standard English level 
examination for Chinese college students and is administrated by the Ministry of 
Education of China. The author chose this database because the material was of a medium 
level of difficulty and appropriate for normal participants. 
Initially, eight English texts were selected. The lengths and difficulties (indicated by 
readability scores, which base their ratings on the average number of syllables per word 
and words per sentence) were carefully matched (see Table 3.1). The content of these texts 
was taken from a widespread list of topics in order to eliminate the influence of the 
participants' own knowledge. 
Table 3.1 
Statistics of the ei2ht orizinal texts used in the stud 
Text 11 21 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Length (words) 191 225 195 ý 202 237 188 220 229 
Flesch Reading Ease Score2 54.5 65.1 53.0 27.0 32.1 50.1 46.5 30.5 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Scor& 11.5 7.4 '10.2 12.0 12.0 11.4 11.7 12.0 
Note': Text I and 2 were used in the pilot study only. 
Noteý- Flesch Reading Ease scores are rated on a1 00-point scale and the higher the scores are, the easier the 
texts are to understand. Most standard texts have Flesch Reading Ease scores of approximately 60 to 70. 
Noteý- Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Scores are rated on USA grade-school level, so the higher scores are, the 
harder the texts are to understand. Most standard texts have Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Scores 
approximately 7.0 to 8.0. 
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Each text contained eight spelling mistakes and 12 grammatical mistakes (in two 
texts there are one more or less of the number of mistakes according to their contents). All 
spelling mistakes were the ones that people might make in dailY life, for example, 
commitee [committee], champtions[champions], commertial[commercial], 
specefied[specified], captialfcapital], unconclously[unconsciously], etc. However, the 
spelling mistakes were designed so that there would be only one correct answer, and if 
participants detected the wrong word, they should then know the correct word. This was 
confirmed from the pilot study. The grammatical errors were produced according to the 
most common rules such as: 
1. subject-verb agreement ýe. g . ......... the Cannes Film Festival remain[remains] an 
essential showcase for international ................ and photographers meets[meet] regular 
to value ...... ""You may noticed[havc noticed] how people who live or work 
closely ); 
2. correct comparative forms (e. g. "The imporlantest [most important] provision of 
the agreement is ........ 66 ....... Real Madrid became the most greal[greatest] club 
ever 91); 
3. appropriate tense (e. g. "Work begins[began] on the current stadium in October 
1944. " "Early audits showed that minorities are[were] pictured far too infrequently 
and ); 
4. active or passive voice (e. g ......... to forrn a partnership knows[is known] as an 
article of ........ ........ 
is imitated by an admired[admiring] fan; ); 
5. definite articles ( ........ in resort city[the resort city] of Cannes, 6 
gave CBS its reputation as quality news broadcaster[a quality news broadcaster]. "); 
6. plurality ( ......... CBS were[was] organised in 1928 ...... " Francois 
Truffaut addressed these issue [this issue/these issues] in 1956 when ........ ); etc. 
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In order to generate the semantically absurd condition of each text, a few nouns and 
verbs in each text were changed in order to make it meaningfully distracting; however, it 
was still possible to complete the task. For example, "On July 13 th , 193 1, 
it begins[began] 
expreimental[experimental] microwave broadcasting in New York, and ten years late 
began regular Jack and Rose weekly broadcasts over WTOS station in the same 
city, In this case, although the sentence is meaningless, participants would be able 
to detect and correct the grammatical target into the past tense according to either the time 
point (" 193 1 ") or the later verb's (the second "began") morphology. 
In total, 16 texts were created from the eight original ones (two example texts were 
placed in Appendix B with one in a meaningful context and the other in a meaningless 
context). Four of them were used in a pilot study in order to decide an appropriate 
difficulty of the task (i. e. how long a participant is allowed to spend on each text). The 
other 12 texts were used for the main experiment. 
Participants were randomly divided into two groups. In the pilot study, participants 
in Group A were tested by the meaningful version of text I (see Table 3.1) and the 
meaningless version of text 2, and participants in Group B worked through the other two 
texts. Similarly, in the main experiment, participants in Group A worked on texts 3,4,5 
with the meaningful version and texts 6,7,8 with the meaningless version; while, 
participants in Group B worked with texts 3,4,5 with meaningless version and texts 6,7, 
8 with the meaningful versions (see Table 3.1). As a result, each participant was exposed to 
both the meaningful and meaningless context conditions, and experienced all the original 
texts in a counterbalanced order. 
Each participant performed four types of task: finding grammatical errors in a 
meaningful context (GM), finding grammatical errors in a meaningless context (Gm), 
finding spelling mistakes in a meaningful context (SM), and finding spelling mistakes in a 
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meaningless context (Sm). These four item types measured different aspects of linguistic 
processing. GM and SM were baseline measures and arguably needed little attentional 
control as the contexts were supportive and had no source of information to 'distract'. 
Thus, they were simple indications of participants' capabilities to analyse the linguistic 
anomalies. However, Gm and Sm are more relevant to attentional control processing 
because participants have to ignore the competing and irrelevant information from the 
meaning, and focus on linguistic forms only. So participants' performances on the later 
two tasks are suggested to reflect their attentional control abilities/skills. 
WA Cognitive Style, Participants were assessed by CSA (Riding, 2005) to determine 
their WA cognitive style ratios. 
3.2.2.4 Procedure 
A pilot study was conducted first to decide the timing of the task. The result 
showed that 4 minutes per text was a suitable time limit for second language speakers so 
that they were able to go through a text of approximately 200 words but not find all the 
mistakes (i. e. ceiling effects were avoided). 
Experiments took place individually in a quiet room. Participants all did the 
linguistic correction tasks first. They were randomly assigned into two groups, A and B. In 
the main experiment, the sequence of six texts (either meaningful or meaningless) was 
presented in a different random order for each individual. Participants were instructed to 
correct as many as possible mistakes (both grammatical and spelling) contained in each 
text in 4 min irrespective of meaningfulness. Then participants finished the experiment 
with the completion of the CSA test, and were thanked and debriefed. 
3.2.2.5 Data Analysis 
An independent t-test was employed prior to formal analyses to check the possible 
gender difference on the WA cognitive style ratios. (The VI cognitive style ratios were 
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also checked for gender differences. None were found, p> . 05). The result suggested that 
gender was not a confounding factor for the present sample (p > . 05) and 
it would not be 
considered in the following analyses. 
3.2.3 Results 
Means and standard deviations of the WA cognitive style ratios and task 
performances are reported in Table 3.2. Two paired sample t-tests were conducted to 
determine if the context (meaning) would affect participants' performances on 
grammatical and spelling corrections. Results revealed that neither the performance of 
grammatical error corrections (t (39) = 0.104, p>. 05) nor the performance of spelling 
mistake corrections (t (3 9) = 0.0 19, p> . 05) were affected 
by context meaningfulness in 
the present experiment. 
Table 3.2 
Means and standard deviations ofparticipants' WA cognitive style ratios and 
Performances' (in Vo) 
WA ratios Grammar Spelling 









Note. = the Dercent aize of the errors in the texts that varticit)ants corrected under each condition: Grammar 
grammatical errors; Spelling = spelling mistakes; M meaningful context; m= semantic absurd context. 
In order to make an operational comparison between 'wholists' and 'analytics, 
participants were divided into two similar size groups based on the median (1.34) of WA 
ratios (e. g. Riding & Agrell, 1997). Wholists had WA ratios from 0.76 to 1.34, and 
analytics from 1.35 to 2.77. The paired sample Mests were re-employed within either the 
wholist or analytic group, and found that participants' performances on grammatical and 
spelling corrections were still unaffected by the context (meaning) (both p> . 05). 
The mean scores were reported separately for each condition with the results of 
ANOVAs to determine if the difference between the WA style groups was significant (see 
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Table 3.3). Four one-way unrelated sample ANOVAs were conducted on participants' 
scores in each experimental condition (GM/Gm/SNVSm); they showed that the analytics 
did correct more grammatical errors than the wholists in the meaningless context (Gm, 
<. 05), but such a difference failed to reach significance in the normal context (GM, p 
. 07). The effect size analysis ( r, P2 ) showed that the WA cognitive style difference 
accounted for about I I% of variance in the dependent variable Gm and about 9% of 
variance in the dependent variable GM. No significant differences were found on spelling 
performances (both p> . 05). 
Table 3.3 
Means and standard deviations (in brackets) ofparticipantsperformances (116) of IVA 
style groups with ANO VA results 
Grammar Spelling 
mm mm 
Wholist (N=21) 28 [12] 27 [131 23 [171 22 [141 
Analytic (N=19) 36 [15] 36 [131 25 [151 26 [171 
F 3.61 4.77 0.19 0.73 
p . 07 . 04* . 66 . 40 
ri p2 . 09 . 11 . 01 . 02 
Note. Grammar = grammatical errors; Spelling = spelling mistakes; M= meaningful context; m= semantic 
absurd context. 
In order to confirm further the relationship between the dependent variables and the 
WA cognitive style continuum, the sample was divided into three groups (13 wholists, 14 
intermediates, 13 analytics) based on their WA ratios (Riding, 2005) and the intermediate 
group was then discarded. The hypothesis is that the larger 'distance' between the style 
groups would positively enhance the differences of performances on the tasks. Thus, two 
new 'en-distanced' WA cognitive style groups were created; a new wholist group 
containing ratios from 0.76 to 1.12, and a new analytic group containing ratios from 1.52 
to 2.77. 
As predicted, the differences were enhanced on grammatical tasks with a larger 
distance betwýeen the two new style groups. Using Gm as the dependent variable, which is 
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more relevant to the attentional ability, the difference remained significant (p ý- .0 1) and 
the WA style accounted for the double variance compared to before (23%). Using GM as 
the dependent variable, which is more relevant to linguistic analysis, the difference became 
significant (p < . 05) and the WA style also accounted 
for more variance (16%). These 
results further supported the hypothesis that more analytic people have better attentional 
control ability. The differences on the performances of spelling tasks remained minor and 
non-significant (p > . 05) (as shown in Table 3.4). 
Table 3.4 
Means and standard deviations (in brackets) ofparticipants'performances r1o) of en- 
distanced TVA style groups with ANOVA results 
Grammar Spelling 
Mm MM 
Wholist (N=13) 26 [12] 25 [131 21 [131 22 [13] 
Analytic (N=13) 38 [151 38 [111 25 [15] 26 [131 
F 4.62 7.31 0.53 0.39 
p . 04* . 01* . 47 . 
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2 Ti p . 16 . 23 . 02 . 
02 
Note. Grammar = grammatical errors; Spelling = spelling mistakes; M= meaningful context; m= semantic 
absurd context. 
3.2.4 Discussion 
The results reveal a strong effect that analytic people are superior to wholist people 
when they solve high-attention-control metalinguistic problems (Gm); this finding 
supported the hypothesis. Analytic individuals, who are characterised by higher 
disembedding ability, benefit in an enviromnent that requires attention to be focused on 
one particular aspect when salient information from competing and irrelevant aspects is 
present. Analytic participants were more able to concentrate on the task (e. g. correcting the 
grammatical errors) whilst ignoring the distracting absurdity from the contextual meaning. 
Wholist participants performed worse because their characteristic is to organise the input 
information as a whole, and hence they are more vulnerable to the distraction from 
structure related information, even when irrelevant to their purpose. As they are more 
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affected by the distraction of contextual meaning, their performance was lower than the 
analytic participants. In addition, the larger the 'distance' between the WA style groups, 
the greater the difference between their performances on the high-attention-control 
metalinguistic task (Gm). It seems that the 'distance' on the WA style dimension 
positively reflects the difference of attentional control ability. This finding is consistent 
with Bialystok's (1992) conclusion that children's attentional control solution to specific 
metalinguistic problems shared a significant portion of the variance with FDI style (WA 
dimension). This is not just limited to children, but also includes adults, who are at an 
earlier stage of a language acquisition. The interesting question is whether this would be 
the case for adults at a later stage of language acquisition. (This question will be addressed 
in Experiment 2. ) 
Moreover, in the en-distanced style groups, analytic participants also performed 
significantly better than wholists in the GM task, which is argued to be a pure indication of 
participants' analysis of linguistic knowledge (detecting and correcting grammatical errors 
in non-nal contexts). In other words, the WA style groups did account for a certain amount 
of variance in the analysis of linguistic knowledge. This finding is also consistent with 
previous studies that the WA dimension of cognitive style may have positive effects on 
language acquisition (see, Tinajero & Paramo, 1998). And because of the relatively narrow 
linguistic application tested in the present experiment (i. e. concerned only with grammar 
acceptability rather than the overall achievement of language that actually reflects a 
number of specific abilities) the result may further support the theory that the greater 
perceptual disembedding/restructuring ability of analytic people (FIs) favours the learning 
and application of linguistic rules (Abraham, 1983; Chapelle & Green, 1992). 
In addition, it was initially supposed that the Sm task would imply selective 
attention towards vocabularies, and simultaneously, the ignoring of meaning. However, the 
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WA style seemed to have no effect on spelling corrections in either normal or semantic 
absurd context (SM/Sm). The non-significant effect of WA cognitive style may result from. 
that the task is too easy to be automated. Thus, the possible difficulties due to the low 
attentional control ability could be quickly overcome as the two aspects of the problem, 
spelling and context meaning, are not very closely connected. 
Further, there was an interesting finding that for these overseas Chinese students, 
the context meaningfulness would not influence their performance. This is surprising given 
a subsequent finding reported in this issue (see Experiment 2) that native English speakers' 
linguistic performances were heavily (and naturally) affected by the context 
meaningfulness. The consideration of a biased sampling can be ruled out, because a non- 
difference between the meaningful and meaningless conditions not only existed across the 
whole sample, but also was found within each cognitive style group (i. e. wholist or' 
analytic). If the null effect of context meaningfulness on participants' performance was 
caused by an overall 'analytic' sample, for example, the effect of context meaningfulness 
should have been found in the wholist group. Therefore, it is something beyond style itself. 
Feedback from participants suggested that they were consciously ignoring the 
meaning when solving the problem. For example, some of the participants could not even 
recall the topics of the texts after the testing. This is probably due to the specific skills 
those participants applied during the test. Tasks conducted in the present experiment were 
originally revised from an exercise of English language examination in China. The 
students must have been taught and trained to apply an attentional control skill (e. g. 'Work 
on grammars and ignore the meanings! ') to solve the problem, as it is efficient to earn 
marks in a limited time. This suggests the difference between attentional control ability 
and skill. On one hand, the attentional control ability could be an in-built characteristic like 
cognitive style. On the other hand, the attentional control skill could be intentionally 
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developed as a result of training/instruction. This issue will be covered with more details in 
the next section. 
In conclusion, the findings of the present experiment align with the suggestion that 
the aptitude of analytic individuals not only favours the solution that requires a high ability 
of attentional control, but also the linguistic application of grammatical rules in second 
language processing. Interestingly, the participants also showed the use of an attentional 
control skill during the task, which suggests a distinction is necessary between attentional 
control ability and the attentional control skill. The last issue will be further emphasised in 
discussion of Experiment 2. 
3.3 Experiment 2: The follow-up investigation of native speakers 
3.3.1 Introduction lHypothesis 
Experiment I has showed a significant main effect of the WA cognitive style on the 
attentional control task (i. e. Gm) in second language processing. The analytic participants 
performed more corrections than wholist ones in a distracting meaning context. This result 
suggested that analytic people were less 'distracted' by semantic absurdity than wholists in 
their second language processing. Combining with Bialystok's (1992) finding, both results 
provide support to the hypothesis that there is a relationship between WA cognitive style 
and attentional control ability. However, previous research has merely focused on children 
of a young age (Bialystok, 1992) and second language speakers, that is, both at a relatively 
earlier stage of language acquisition, and this leaves the question of whether the findings 
can be applied in later stages of language acquisition, specifically, for native adult speakers. 




The present experiment remained a 'between-subj ects' design with WA cognitive 
style as a group variable (wholist versus analytic). The dependent variables were 
percentage of errors that participants successfully corrected in the four task conditions 
(GNVGni/SNVSm, identical with Experiment 1). 
3.3.2.2 Participants 
Forty-two native English speakers (28 females, 14 males) participated in this 
experiment. Their ages ranged from 15 to 26 years (mean 19 years, SD 1.48 years). All 
participants were registered on undergraduate psychology courses, and received course 
credit for participation (except one female participant who was a work experience student 
aged 15, and who attended the experiment voluntarily). 
In addition, prior to the formal testing, further 10 native English participants (five 
females, five males) were tested in a pilot study. All participants of the pilot study were 
postgraduate students or staff at the university. They took part in the experiment 
voluntarily. Their age range was from 17 to 44 years (mean 27 years, SD 7.70 years). 
3.3.2.3 Materials 
Linguistic correction. The present experiment employed the same linguistic 
correction task with Experiment I that manipulated the relative degree to which the 
attentional control processing is implicated in each text. 
WA Cognitive Style. Participants took the CSA (Riding, 2005) to describe their 
profiles of WA cognitive style. 
3.3.2.4 Procedure 
A pilot study was conducted first to decide the timing of the task. The result of this 
showed that 2 min per text was a suitable time limit for native speakers, in which they 
were able to work through a text of approximately 200 words but be unable to find all the 
mistakes (compared to the 4 min per text for Chinese participants in Experiment 1). 
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The procedures of the linguistic correction task were identical with Experiment I 
except that participants had 2 min instead of 4 min to work on each text. After the 
metalinguistic task, participants completed the CSA test, and were then thanked and 
debriefed. 
3.3.2.5 Data Analysis 
An independent west did not reveal any significant gender difference on the WA 
cognitive style ratios in the present sample (p > . 05). Also, no significant gender difference 
was found on the VI cognitive style ratios, p> . 05. 
3.3.3 Results 
Table 3.5 
Means and standard deviations ofparticipants' WA cognitive style ratios and task 
performances (016) 
WA ratios Grammar Spelling 









Note. M= meaningful context; m= semantically absurd context. 
Participants' performances were recorded as percentages of errors that were 
successfully corrected under each task condition (GM/Gm/SM/Sm). Table 3.5 reports 
means and standard deviations of participants' WA cognitive style ratios and their task 
perfortnances. Two paired sample Wests were employed to determine if the context 
(meaning) would affect participants' performances of grammatical and spelling correction. 
The results revealed that more grammatical errors were corrected in the meaningful texts 
than in the semantically absurd texts, t (4 1) = 5.47, p< .01, as well as spelling mistakes, t 
(4 1) = 3.32, p< .01. This suggested that the meaning of context did affect native 
participants' performances in the linguistic correction tasks (in contrast with second 
language participants in Experiment 1). 
In order to make an operational comparison between 'wholist' and 'analytic' 
68 
participants, the sample was divided into two equal size groups based on the median 
(1.025) of WA ratios (see, Riding & Agrell, 1997). The divisions were: wholists 0.61 to 
1.02, analytics 1.03 to 1.67. 
Four one-way ANOVAs on participants' scores in each experimental condition 
(GNVGm/SNVSm) showed no main effect of WA style group (p >. 05). See Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) ofperformances r1o) of WA style groups 
Grammar Spelling 
mm mm 
Wholist (n=21) 47 [12] 37 [12] 40 [16] 36 [161 
Analytic (n=21) 46 [111 31 [121 39 [161 33 [161 
F . 047 2.052 0.111 0.637 
p . 830 . 160 . 741 . 430 
, qr" . 001 . 049 . 003 . 016 
Note. M= meaningful context; m= semantically absurd context. 
Table 3.7 




Wholist (n=14) 46 [13] 38 [9] 43 [161 38 [15] 
Analytic (n=14) 44 [111 33 [121 36 [10] 30 [121 
F . 242 1.402 1.588 2.183 
p . 
627 
. 247 . 
219 
. 152 
qr. " . 009 . 051 . 058 . 077 
Note. M= meaningful context; m= semantically absurd context. 
Imitating Experiment 1, the sample was divided into three equal groups (14 
wholists, 14 intermediates, 14 analytics) based on their WA ratios, and the middle group 
(intermediates) was then discarded (Riding, 2005). As a result, a new wholiit group 
containing ratios froni 0.61 to 0.94, and a new analytic group with ratios from 1.13 to 1.67 
were constructed. 
Four more one-way ANOVAs were employed on the new en'-distanced sample 
(n--28). The results showed that the new WA style groups had no significant effects on the 
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performances (GWGm/SNVSm) either. See Table 3.7. 
3.3.4 Discussion 
The main aim of the present chapter was to consider the role of attentional control 
in metalinguistic problems in relation to WA cognitive style. Experiment I supported the 
hypothesis that analytic people were 'distracted' by semantic absurdity to a significantly 
lesser degree and showed better attentional control ability than wholists in second 
language processing. 
Bialystok (1992) also reported that children's solutions to specific metalinguistic 
problems (requiring high levels of control of attention) shared a significant portion of the 
variance with FDI style (WA style). These previous results supported the idea that 
attentional control ability features the WA cognitive style. It is likely that the way in which 
an individual tends to organise information (wholist or analytic) would relate to his/her 
attentional control performance. 
However, as results showed in Experiment 2, in contrast to second language 
speakers and children, native adult English speakers did not perform differently on the 
metalinguistic tasks according to their WA cognitive style. This also applied when only the 
individuals at the extremes of the wholist and analytic scales were considered, which 
decreased the possibility that the non-significant difference between the WA style groups 
was caused by the insufficient 'distance' between the wholist and analytic style groups. 
It is worth noting that the present sample of native speakers had a relatively 
restricted range of the WA ratios (1.05 ± 0.20) compared to the second language speaker 
sample in Experiment 1 (1.37 ± 0.40). The WA ratio distribution of the present sample 
(1.05 ± 0.20) was also more "wholist" than Riding's (2005) original standardised sample 
(1.25 ± 0.45; n= 999). However, the data was much closer to a recent sample (Riding, 
2005) which comprised of 2131 school pupils, aged 12 to 16 years, with 1056 males and 
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1075 females (1.10 ± 0.44). The possible inconsistency between the present sample and 
the standardised sample might narrow down the application of the finding (i. e. the very 
analytic people, with WA ratio > 1.65, might be still able to show better performance in 
attentional. control tasks than the very wholist people, with WA ratio < 0.65, who hardly 
featured in the sample of Experiment 2). However, the conclusion can be drawn (albeit 
cautiously) that for most people with moderate cognitive styles, their performances of 
attentional control in metalinguistic tasks were irrelevant in terrns of their WA cognitive 
style in their native language. In addition, all participants' mean metalinguistic 
performance scores ranged from 30-50%; thus, ceiling and floor effects were not an 
influence here. 
There are three possible theoretical interpretations for these results. 
First, the hypothesis is a null assumption that neither the solution to metalinguistic 
tasks nor the WA cognitive style is relevant to attentional, control ability. This explanation 
is relatively unlikely as a previous series of experiments has adequately established the 
mechanism of attentional control in metalinguistic processing and connected it to WA 
cognitive style (Bialystok, 1988a; 1988b; 1992; Experiment 1 of the chapter). 
The second interpretation is that the result relates to different levels of participants' 
proficiency of language in the experiments. Adult native speakers have considerable 
superiority to both second language speakers and children in linguistic application. For 
them, language processing has become over-leamed and automatic; thus, it requires less 
attentional effort. Jackendoff (1987) found that compared to low-skilled performers, high- 
skilled performers paid less attention, but needed the same level of detail and explicit 
representations (knowledge) to achieve a given level of performance. It could be deduced 
that because of adult native participants' significantly high proficiency in using the English 
language, their metalinguistic processing no longer relies on attentional control ability to ý 
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any prominent degree. Therefore their WA cognitive style will not affect the performances 
in the attention control tasks (i. e. Gm, Sm). This interpretation is consistent with the earlier 
claim on FDI cognitive style (e. g. Davey & Menke, 1990; Davis, 1991) that the effect of 
FDI on children's reading abilities gradually lessens when those abilities become more 
automatic. However, young children and average second language speakers, who are 
relatively 'low-skilled performers', still need extra effort to control their attention in 
metalinguistic processing (i. e. switching focus between distinct aspects of input) and their 
WA cognitive style will have a significant effect. 
A third interpretation is that attentional control processing in native language can 
evolve as a domain-specific skill and separate from the WA cognitive style, which remains 
a domain-general individual characteristic. At an earlier stage of language acquisition, 
attentional control ability works as a domain-general individual characteristic (which is 
related to WA cognitive style) and can be applied to language practice resulting in diverse 
performances. However, after a certain level of experience, an analogous but nurtured 
domain-specific attentional control skill is developed to aid linguistic processing, while 
WA cognitive style remains unchanged throughout the time. This could explain why 
young children and second language speakers' metalinguistic performances are affected by 
their WA cognitive style. They have not yet developed mature attentional control skills to 
compensate the limitations of their own attentional control abilities in contrast to native 
adult speakers. 
The idea of nurtured attentional control skill is indirectly supported by several 
studies of bilingual children, who were found to have enhanced attentional control skills in 
metalinguistic tasks but undifferentiated knowledge of literacy compared to monolingual 
children (e. g. Edward & Christophersen, 1988; Galambos & Goldin-Meadow, 1990). The 
same age children showed a similar level of literacy, but the bilingual children 
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demonstrated better skills of attentional control because they had more experience of 
changing their focus of attention between two languages. Bialystok (1992) also suggested 
that different attentional. control strategies were developed and applied by children with a 
low level and a high level of language proficiency (e. g. varied years of training and 
experience). Although she did not explicitly include second language speakers into her 
theory, the logical similarity is obvious. 
In sum, children and second language speakers, who have less experience of certain 
language practice, are still relying on their innate attentional control ability (relating to 
WA cognitive style). However, experienced native speakers, who have developed their 
attentional control skills and have had plenty of language practice in daily life, are much 
less affected by the fixed WA cognitive style/attentional control ability. 
In conclusion, although in children and second language speakers, analytics showed 
better attentional control performance that were more robust to distracting information in 
the metalinguistic task than wholists; native adult speakers failed to show the same 
tendency. This difference can be explained in two ways: 1) different levels of attentional 
effort are required in language processing according to the level of language proficiency; 2) 
there is a distinction between attentional control ability as a built-in individual 
characteristic (relating to WA cognitive style) and attentional control skill as a domain- 
specific strategy (which can be nurtured with language practice). For native speakers, who 
have become proficient in their language, certain attentional control skills have been 
developed to compensate the limitation of their innate attentional control abilities 
(reflecting in the WA cognitive style). The latter interpretation may have academic 
implications. The distinction between style and skill needs to be taken into consideration in 
future cognitive style research and the mechanism underlying it needs to be explored 
further. On one hand, the results would suggest that although style might be fixed, people's 
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learning activities are changeable, which enable them to improve their performance. For 
example, perhaps wholist people have a natural disadvantage in certain metalinguistic 
tasks; however, by developing specific skills through practice, they approach the same 
level of performance as analytic people, who were naturally superior at the beginning. 
On the other hand, this finding could highlight possible confusion between style 
and skill. Currently, there is much debate about the research of styles, such as, the validity 
of the measurements, - their stability, even the existence of styles etc. But researchers 
should not lose sight of the most fundamental issue: wfiat are styles? Perhaps they have 
been confused with human nurtured skills. The clarification of the two concepts could be 
critical regardless of whether researchers' final aim is to understand styles, or to apply 
them to educational environments. A review of style and skill, their distinction and 
relationship, could be especially important for all researchers working in this area. 
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter investigates the relationship between the WA cognitive style and 
attentional control. Results from two metalinguistic experiments, which surveyed both 
second language speakers and native English speakers, suggested that the analytic 
individuals appeared. a significant superiority in the attentional. control process at an earlier 
but not a later stage of language acquisition (second language speakers versus native 
speakers). It is argued that the WA cognitive style, as a domain-general individual 
characteristic, does share a certain amount of variance with the attentional control process. 
However, during the development of language proficiency, the influence of WA cognitive 
style in the metalinguistic performance is likely to be 'overwritten' by either the reduced 
requirement of attentional. effort or the appearance of substitutable attentional control skills. 
The finding may have implication on the future research of style. 
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In short, this chapter has illustrated how the WA cognitive style might affect an 
individual's selection of information from language input. It is suggested that analytics 
demonstrate an advantage over wholists by specifically targeting only relevant information. 
Then naturally, the next question of interest is how would they utilize the information 
perceived? The next chapter will continually emphasise the impact of the WA cognitive 
style on the perception of social information by the agency of stereotype formation. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE WHOLIST-ANALYTIC STYLE AND STEREOTYPE 
FORMATION 
In conjunction with Chapter 3, this chapter maintains the emphasis on the WA 
cognitive style, and will investigate its impact on the stereotype formation of social 
individuals (based on presented descriptions). Stereotype was suggested to be a product of 
the strategy to represent social information efficiently. Hence, it is rational to hypothesise 
that a relationship exists between the way a person prefers to organise information (the 
WA cognitive style) and his/her stereotypic representations of social information. By 
addressing such a relationship, further clarification of the mechanism and application of 
this dimension of cognitive style will be made. The findings in this chapter revealed that 
wholists and analytics did manifest diverse aptitude in organising stereotypic information. 
The intermediates, who were newly introduced in the present chapter and were 
characterised with the features of both wholist and analytic, resulted in the best 
performance of memory. 
4.1 Introduction 
The social environment around us is complex to the extent that it is not possible to 
process information without some manner of simplification (see Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; 
Lippman, 1922). Accordingly, the stereotype is one of the tools that help to reduce the 
cognitive load of social information. Stereotypes have been suggested as being energy- 
saving mental devices for efficient analysis of the complex social environment to which 
people are exposed (see Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Higgins & 
Bargh, 1987; Lippman, 1922; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Sherman, Judd, & 
Park, 1989 etc. ). It is easy to understand that in a certain social situation, for example, 
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when meeting a stranger, it is necessary to evaluate the person in order to hold an 
impression of him/her. There could be two ways to perform the evaluation. One is 
individuation by mentally representing every person individually. This is effort consuming 
(Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986). The other way is 
stereotyping that involves mentally assigning individuals into socially meaningful 
categories and generalising the knowledge of the categories (i. e. stereotypic knowledge) to 
the understanding of individuals. That is, linking the individuals' information to pre- 
existing knowledge frameworks. In this way, people are able to represent the social 
environment in a cognitively economical manner (Hamilton, 1979; Hamilton, Sherman, & 
Ruvolo, 1990; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986). Thus, stereotyping is a popular theme in social 
psychology research in both revealing the mechanisms underlying human adaptation to the 
environment and considering the implication of this type of behaviour (e. g. as in a court 
case). 
Interestingly, if the use of a stereotype could be regarded as a consequence of the 
strategy that people use to organise better information of others (e. g. Crawford & 
Skowronski, 1998), it is logical to assume there is a relationship between stereotyping and 
people's inherent tendency in the way they organise information, namely, the WA 
cognitive style. Hence, the present study will employ stereotype as an agency to 
investigate the impact of the WA cognitive style on information categorisation. 
This study employs the paradigm of Macrae et al. (1994). In their stereotype study, 
they presented participants with lists of trait words describing hypothetical targets. Some 
of the trait words of each list were consistent with a stereotype label (e. g. 'caring' is 
consistent with the stereotypic beliefs of 'doctor') and others were neutral (e. g. 'unlucky' 
has nothing particular to do with the stereotypic beliefs of 'doctor'). Participants were, 
required to use these word lists to form an impression of each target. Finally, they were 
I 
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asked to complete an unexpected written recall of those trait words. 
In the paradigm, the between-subject manipulation was whether participants were 
presented with the explicit stereotype labels (e. g. 'doctor'). Hence, there were four 
stereotypic conditions of the stimuli in the study: (A) stereotype-consistent traits with 
stereotype label presence; (B) stereotype-neutral traits with stereotype label presence; (C) 
stereotype-consistent traits with stereotype label absence; (D) stereotype-neutral traits with 
stereotype label absence. The theory behind such a paradigm is that the stereotype labels 
provoke accessible mental frameworks, on which participants are able to organise 
information with ease (especially stereotype-consistent ones); while with the absence of 
the stereotype labels, the accessing of such frameworks becomes difficult and results in 
compromising the memory of the information (Macrae et al., 1994). 
Condition A involves the least difficulty because the presence of the stereotype 
labels provides explicit themes relating to pre-existed knowledge frameworks (e. g. the 
stereotype category 'doctor'). Condition B is probably more difficult and effortful 
compared to Condition A. In this condition, although explicit stereotype labels are 
presented (e. g. ' 'doctor'), the stimulus materials (e. g. 'unlucky') are not originally 
associated with the provoked frameworks. Therefore, in order to form the impressions of 
the targets (as required by the instruction) participants strive to reconcile the incongruent 
information into the stereotypic categories. Conditions C and D are without the presence of 
stereotype labels; thus there are no available explicit clues for the relevant mental 
frameworks and organisations. However, there is eviden6e to suggest that in such theme- 
absent situations, individuals may sometimes spontaneously strive for the structure of 
organisation (Tulving, 1962). Hence, in Condition C individuals are still possible to access 
the potential mental frameworks'but not in Condition D. 
In the study of Macrae et al. (1994) and others thatemployed the same paradigm 
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(e. g. Crawford & Skowronski, 1998), strong stereotype biases in recall have been reported. 
Findings included: more trait words were remembered when the stereotype labels were 
explicitly presented than when labels were absent; more stereotype-consistent trait words 
were remembered than stereotype-neutral ones; and the explicit presentation of the 
stereotype labels especially facilitated the memory of those stereotype-consistent trait 
words. 
The present study examines how the way people tend to organise information, 
either in a whole or analytically, might affect the stereotype biases. The WA cognitive 
style groups are hypothesised to demonstrate different performances with respect to the 
four stereotypic conditions, which will be discussed as below. Note that, here the term 
swholist' and 'analytic' only refer to the relative tendency along the dimension of WA 
cognitive style. Further discussion of the grouping will be covered in Section 4.2. 
In Condition A, the presence of the stereotype labels can import meaning to the 
stereotype consistent stimulus materials and could be served as organisation themes 
(Bransford & Johnson, 1972). In such supportive circumstances wholist individuals 
probably have advantage to hold holistic structures of the materials and accordingly 
connect to the relevant pre-existing frameworks. Thus their performance of the recall could 
be enhanced. 
Condition B is rather complex compared to Condition A. Although there are 
stereotype labels provided, the stimulus materials do not semantically relate. Thus, 
participants have to reconcile the discrepant information with the provoked stereotype , 
beliefs. That is, they have to apply the mental models (e. g. pre-existing beliefs) upon those 
originally unrelated materials, which is necessarily effortful. Douglas and Riding (1993) 
reported that wholist individuals were less able to impose mental organisation on - 
unstructured materials when no integrating cue was provided. However, with the help of 
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explicit themes (e. g. stereotype labels), wholist individuals can manage to result in 
comparable performance with analytic individuals. Thus no performance difference is 
expected between wholist and analytic participants in Condition B. 
In Condition C the stereotype labels are not presented, but the stimulus materials 
are stereotype consistent, and therefore related to each other. Here, wholists who have a 
better natural overview of information are more likely to gain the implicit structure of 
stimuli compared to analytics. On the other hand, analytic participants who tend to view 
information as collections of units are probably not motivated to construct the information 
into organised structures. But they are able to show relatively good memory of discrete 
words even without facilitation of associated organisations (Burton & Sinatra, 1984). 
Consequently, analytic participants may demonstrate equivalent recall performance with 
their wholist peers. No performance difference is expected between wholist and analytic 
participants in Condition C. 
Condition D, which is different from all other conditions, has no facilitation of 
explicit organising themes or associated knowledge frameworks. Participants' performance 
in this condition is simply the incidental memory of lists of discrete trait words. Wholist 
individuals might be disadvantageous here as they have difficulty in perceiving and 
organising discriminate units (e. g. Burton & Sinatra, 1984; Douglas & Riding, 1993). 
Overall, individuals may exhibit different trends of the stereotype bias with respect 
to their WA cognitive styles as they would interact with stereotypic conditions in varied 
ways. Wholist individuals are predicted to exhibit a more "dependent" trend in their 
performance. Their performances are likely to be influenced by the presence of explicit 
stereotype themes and the stereotype-relatedness of the materials and will therefore be 
sensitive to each experimental condition. In contrast, analytic individuals, who can be 
regarded equivalent to 'field-independents', are expected to have a more -"independent" 
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trend in their performance. In this experiment the presence of stereotype labels is a 
between-subject factor, while every participant will be ex osed to both stereotype-related .P 
and unrelated materials. In this case, analytic individuals could be less influenced by the 
relatWness of stimuli because they prefer to persist in their strategy of organisation 
(probably triggered by the presence/absence of the labels) and ignore the changes in 
material congruence. For example, analytic participants might regard all stimulus words 
(no matter whether they are stereotype-consistent or neutral) as discrete units when the 
stereotype labels are not present. 
Accordingly, a short list of hypotheses is stated below. Hl-H2 describe the possible 
differences caused by the WA cognitive style on the stereotypic conditions. H3 reflects the 
hypothesised impact holistic and analytical aptitude might have on overall stereotype bias 
trend. 
H I. Wholist participants will show better recall performance than analytics in 
Condition A (stereotype-consistent traits with stereotype label present). 
H2. Wholist participants will show poorer recall performance than analytic 
participants in Condition D (stereotype-neutral traits with stereotype label absent). 
H3. Overall, wholist participants will show a more "dependenf' trend in 
performance according stereotypic, conditions; while analytic participants will show a 
more "independent" trend. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Design 
The study was a3x 2x 2 mixed design with the WA style (wholists, intermediates, 
and analytics) and the presence of stereotype labels (present versus absent) as between- 
subject factors, and the trait type (stere0type-consistent versus stereotype-neutral) as the- ý 
, 
81 
within-subj ect factor. The dependent -variable was the number of traits participants recalled 
at the end of the experiment. 
4.2.2 Participants 
Sixty-six participants (54 females, 12 males) took part in the study. Gender was not 
considered as a confounding factor in stereotypic studies (Crawford & Skowronski, 1998; 
Macrae et al., 1994). Thereby, the high portion of females in the present sample was 
argued acceptable. 
They had an average age of 19.5 years with SD 3.17 years (range from 15 to 40 
years). All were registered in undergraduate psychology courses and received course credit 
for doing the study except two female participants who were work experience students 




Stereotype labels andpersonality traitsfor impression formation task 
Nigel (doctor) Julian (artist) John (skinhead) Graham (estate agent) 
Caring Creative Rebellious Pushy 
Honest Temperamental Aggressive Talkative 
Reliable Unconventional Dishonest Arrogant 
Upstanding Sensitive Untrustworthy Confident 
Responsible Individualistic Dangerous Unscrupulous 
Unlucky Fearless Lucky Musical 
Forgetful Active Observant Pessimistic 
Passive Cordial Modest Humourless 
Clumsy Progressive Optimistic Alert 
Enthusiastic Generous I Curious Spirited 
Note. Stercotype-consistent words are in bold type. 
Table 4.1 shows the targets and the descriptive personality traits used in the 
experiment. These stimuli were identical to those used in Macrae et al. (1994). Five in ten 
descriptive traits of each target are stereotype consistent with respect to the stereotype 
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label provided and five are neutral. Macrae et al. have conducted a pilot study to require 
participants to rate the extent to which a large number of traits were characteristic of a 
range of social categories. The consistency of the traits with each stereotypic target was 
then determined. 
In the present study, a DMDX programme (Forster & Forster, 2003) was employed 
to display the stimuli. Four blocks of the programme were produced with one target for 
each block. Each time a trait appeared (e. g. aggressive), it was displayed beside the target 
name (e. g. John) for 3000 ms (as in Crawford & Skowronski, 1998). To control for any 
possible primacy and recency effects in recall, the 10 describing traits in each block were 
randomised by the prograrnme prior to each session and the order of presentation of the 
four blocks (target names) were counterbalanced within either stereotype label condition 
but matched between the two conditions. That is, Participant A in the stereotype-label- 
present condition received the targets in the Graham - John - Julian - Nigel sequence, 
while Participant B in the stereotype-label-absent condition received the same sequence. In 
this way, the stimuli displayed in the two experimental conditions were identical except for 
the stereotype label presence. 
The CSA (Riding, 2005) was used to collect the profiles of WA cognitive style of 
the participants. 
4.2.4 Procedure 
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually, and were randomly assigned into 
either the stereotype-label-present or the stereotype-label-absent condition. The 
participants were told that in the study, information of four individuals would be presented 
in the form of descriptive traits and they were required to use these traits to fonn 
impressions of the targets. 
Then, participants were scated facing a computer screen about 60 cm away. Each 
M 
trial began with a blank mask on the screen for 1000 ms and the stimuli were presented at 
the centre of the screen in font Arial, size 66 for 3000 ms with the target name at the left 
hand side and the trait descriptor at right hand side (e. g. "John Aggressive"). In addition, 
half of participants were also given a stereotype label with the target name (e. g. "John- 
skinhead Aggressive"). 
Following the paced presentation of stereotype trials, participants completed the 
CSA (Riding, 2005) to determine their position on the WA dimension continuum. There 
were 16 participants who had been tested by CSA in the author's previous studies and 
instead they completed the 12-item Learning Style Inventory (LSI) developed by Kolb and 
Kolb (2005). Those data of the questionnaire was not included in the present study and 
rather provided a filled delay between the trait presentation and the trait recall. 
Finally, participants were required to perform an unexpected recall task of the traits 
with which they had been presented. They were given a sheet of paper with four target 
names on the top and were asked to write down as many of the originally matched traits 
under each name as possible (see Appendix C). Each participant had 10 min to complete 
the task. The dependent measure was the number of traits correctly recalled and attributed 
to the appropriate target. After the recall task, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
4.2.5 Data Analysis 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine whether participants that were 
assigned to the two label-presence conditions (i. e. stereotype label present versus 
stereotype label absent) differed in WA cognitive style ratios. The results revealed that the 
WA style ratios were well matched across the between-subj ect condition (p > . 05). 
4.3 Results 
Cognitive style groups. Being consistent with Riding's (2005) division, participants 
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were partitioned into three similar sized Luoups on this cognitive style dimension. 
Participants whose ratios were below 1.00 were grouped into the 'wholist' group (n = 22), 
participants whose ratios were between 1.00 and 1.26 were grouped into 'inten-nediate' 
group (n =2 1), and those whose ratios were beyond 1.26 were grouped into the *analytic' 
group (n = 23). 
The 'Inten-nediates' were separately grouped for the first time in this thesis to allow 
the new type of analysis. As an operational definition of this style group, intermediate 
individuals are those who respond to wholist and analytic questions (see Chapter 1) almost 
equally fast in the CSA test (Riding, 2005). Thus, they have the equivalent proficiency to 
view information holistically or analytically. 
Recall peýformancc. The numbers of stereotype-consistent and stereotype-neutral 
traits correctly recalled and attributed to the appropriate targets were recorded for each 
participant. Figure 4.1 presented the means of the number of recalled traits as functions of 
trait type and label presence condition in WA groups. 
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Wholist Intermediate Analytic 
Figure 4.1. Number of traits recalled as a function of stereotype label presence, trait type, 
and WA cognitive style groups 
A three factors mixed ANOVA was employed with WA cognitive style group 
(wholist, intermediate, and analytic) and label presence (with versus without) as between 
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subject factors and trait type (stereotype-consistent versus stereot ype- neutral) as a within- 
subject factor, on the number of traits that participants correctly rccallcd in the study. As 
predicted, participants recalled a greater number of traits in the stereotype- I abel -present 
condition (mean = 6.19) than the stereot ype-label -absent condition (mean = 4.44), F (1,60) 
= 12.36, p< .01, Tjp 
2- 0.17. Also there was a congruity bias in that a greater number of 
stereotype-consistent traits (mean = 5.85) was recalled than of stereotype- neut ra I traits 
2 (mean = 4.78), F (1,60) = 9.35, p< . 
01, ilp = 0.14. Further, a significant label presencc x 
2 
trait type interaction was revealed, F (1,60) = 10.56, p< . 
01, ilp = 0.15. Post-hoc 
exploration of the interaction using the Tukey HSD method (MSE = 4.033) showed that (i) 
the recall performance of stereotype- consistent traits in the label present condition 
(Condition A) was significantly higher than all other three experimental conditions 
(Condition B, C, D; all p< .0 1); (ii) trait recall performances were equivalent for 
stereotype- cons 1 stent and stereotype-neutral traits in the label absent condition (Condition 
C and D) and stereotype- neutral traits in the label present condition (Condition B, all p 
> . 05). This trend is clearly 
demonstrated in Figure 4.2 in that the detached 95% 
confidence limit of the recall performance in condition A was above all three other means. 
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Stereotype Pre ent Stereotype absent 
Figure 4.2. The label presence x trait type interaction with 95% confidence interval 
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Additionally, there was also a main effect of WA cognitive style group, F (2,60) = 
3.3 1, p< . 
05, ilp 2=0.10. A further post hoc test using the Tukey HSD method suggested 
that wholist participants (mean = 4.59) showed significantly lower recall perfon-nance than 
intermediate participants (mean = 6.17), p< . 05, and close perfon-nance to analytic 
participants (mean = 5.19), p> . 05. Analytic participants recalled slightly less traits than 









Wholist Intermediate Analytic 
Figure 4.3. The means of number of recalled traits across WA style group with 95% 
confidence intervals 
To investigate further such a difference, four one-way ANOVAs were separately 
employed on the recall perfon-nances of each of four conditions with WA cognitive style 
groups as the only between-subject factor. It was revealed that: 
i) In the stereotype label present condition, neither the recall of stereotype- 
consistent traits (Condition A; F (2,30) = 0.54, p> . 58, ilp 
2=0.04) nor the recall of 
stereotype-neutral traits (condition B; F (2,30) = 0.34, p> . 
71, ilp 2=0.02) differed within 
the WA cognitive style groups; 
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ii) In the stereotype label absent condition, the recall of stereotype-consistent traits 
(Condition C) was not (F (2,30) = 1.11, p>. 34,11 p2=0.07) but the recall of stereotype- 
neutral traits was (Condition D; F (2,3 0) = 4.85, p< . 05, ilp 
2=0.24) affected by the WA 
cognitive style groups. 
The difference of the recall perfonnance in Condition D has repeated the pattern of 
overall recall performance that wholist participants performed worst (mean = 2.82) in that 
their recalls were significantly lower that intermediate participants (mean = 6, p< . 05). 
Analytic participants (mean = 4.6) showed better recall than wholist ones but worse than 
intennediate ones, however both the differences failed to reach significance, p> . 05. See 
Figure 4.1. 
There was no significant interaction between the WA cognitive style groups and 
other experimental conditions, all p >. 05. 
Further, to present more direct images of stereotype bias trend within each WA 
cognitive style group, three more two-way mixed ANOVAs with label presence (with 
versus without) as between-subject factors and trait type (stereotype-consistent versus 
stereotype-neutral) as within-subject factor on trait recall performance were conducted for 
the wholist, intennediate, and analytic groups respectively. 
For wholist participants, significant main effects were revealed by the stereotype 
label presence (label present, mean = 5.68; label absent, mean = 3.50, F (1,20) = 8.04, p 
= . 01, TIP 
2= 0.29) and by the trait type (stereotype-consistent, mean = 5.4 1, stereotype- 
neutral, mean = 3.77, F (1,20) = 6.57, p< . 
05, ilp 2= 0.25); however, no significant label 
presence x trait type interaction was found (F (1,20) = 0.18, p> . 















Stereotype Present Stereotype Absent 
Figure 4.4. The stereotype bias trend for the wholist cognitive style group 
In contrast, for intennediate participants, neither the stereotype label presence (label 
2 
present, mean = 6.67, label absent, mean = 5.67, F (1,19) = 1.08, p> .31,111, = 0.05) nor 
the trait type (stereotype-consistent, mean = 6.6 1, stereotype-neutral, mean = 5.72, F (1,19) 
= 2.07, p> . 16, ilp 
2=0.10) showed significant main effects, but the label presence x trait 
type interaction was significant (F (1,19) = 6.35, p< . 05, ilp 
2=0.25). Post-hoc exploration 
of the interaction using the Turkey HSD method (MSE = 3.918) showed a consistent trend 
with the overall label presence x trait type interaction (see Figure 4.5) that (i) the recall 
performance in Condition A was significantly higher than in Condition B (p < .0 1), 
Condition C (p < .0 1), and Condition D (p < . 05); (ii) trait recall performances were 
equivalent in Conditions B, C, and D (p > . 05). 
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Stereotype Present Stereotype Absent 
Figure 4.5. The stereotype bias trend for the intermediate cognitive style group 
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Stereotype Present Stereotype Absent 
Figure 4.6 The stereotype bias trend for the analytic cognitive style group 
For analytic participants, the main effect of stereotype label presence condition 
(label present, mean = 6.23; label absent, mean = 4.15) was found to be significant, F (1, 
2 1) = 5.88, p< . 05,11P2 = 0.22, while the main effect of trait type (stereotype-consistent, 
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2= mean = 5.54; stereotype-neutral, mean = 4.84) was not, F (1,2 1) = 1.5 1, p> . 23,11P 0.07. 
The label presence x trait type interaction was found significant (F (1,2 1) = 7.8 5, p< . 05, 
11P 2=0.27). Post-hoc exploration of the interaction using the Tukey HSD method (MSE 
3.706) revealed the same pattern again: namely that (i) participants showed better recall 
performance in Condition A compared to the other three conditions (all p< .0 1); and (ii) 
recall performance was similar on Condition B, C, and D (all p> . 05), see Figure 4.6. 
4.4 Discussion 
4.4.1 Overall Stereotype Bias 
The provision of stereotype labels generally increased the recall of the presented 
trait words, with this effect being most pronounced for stereotype-consistent traits. In 
addition, more stereotype-consistent traits were retrieved overall compared to stereotype- 
neutral traits. They are consistent with previous findings using the paradigm (e. g. Macrae 
et al., 1994), which supports the validity of the experimental manipulation. 
The stereotype bias in memory could be explained by the accessibility of pre- 
existing mental frameworks. The presence of the stereotype labels offers cues for 
accessing the relevant mental knowledge frameworks, which facilitate the memory of 
categorised representations by simplifying the process of organising and structuring 
information. When the stereotype labels are absent, however, there will be a lack of such 
accessible cues to mental frameworks and it will make the memory and recall process 
more effortful and resource-hungry (Srull & Wyer, 1989). Consequently, recall 
performance is lower. 
Furthermore, the presence of the stereotype labels manipulates the expectancy of 
the stimuli presented. It has been suggested that expectancy-congruent information should 
be superiorly encoded in memory compared to expectancy-incongruent information. - This' 
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is because of the advantage held by expectancy-congruent information in being assimilated 
or integrated into an existing knowledge structure (Neisser, 1976; Taylor & Crocker, 198 1). 
Stereotype labels, which can serve as guiding themes, affect expectancies of the presented 
stimuli (i. e. stereotype-consistent traits are more likely to be expectancy-congruent, while 
stereotype-neutral traits are probably expectancy-incongruent). In line, the presence of 
stereotype labels enhances the encoding and representation of stereotype-consistent traits 
rather than stereotype-neutral traits in long-term memory (Bodenhausen, 1988; 
Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993; Stangor & Duan, 
1991). However, the absence of the stereotype labels leads to no expectation of personality 
traits and accordingly exhibits no difference between the stereotype-consistent traits and 
the stereotype-neutral traits. 
4.4.2 Influence of WA Cognitive Style on Each Stereotypic Condition 
It is of interest to find that wholist participants remember generally less trait words 
than intermediate and analytic participants. Trying to explain such a difference, further 
analyses have been introduced into each stereotypic condition. With consideration of the 
hypotheses, the results will be discussed in turn. 
Wholist participants did not exhibit a better recall memory in Condition A 
(stereotype-consistent traits with stereotype label present) but were equivalent with 
intermediate and analytic participants. HI is therefore not supported. It was probably 
because of too little difficulty and effort required in accomplishing the task and so the 
advantage of participants' preferred organisation (e. g. a global view) could not be 
sufficiently reflected in their performance. The overtly presented organising themes and 
the presumed existence of a semantic relationship between the trait words probably would 
make the work rather easy and effortless for all participants. So the superiority of the 
wholists' adept organisation will be concealed by the 'ceiling effect'. Although the 
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analytic individuals are not as good as wholist ones in viewing spontaneously the stimuli 
in holistic frameworks, they are still able to represent the materials efficiently. Hence, no 
difference was found regarding WA style groups in Condition A. 
There was no difference in recall performance between the WA cognitive style 
groups in Condition B (stereotype-neutral traits with stereotype label present), which 
supported the prediction made in the introduction. In this condition, wholist participants 
have constructed originally unrelated information into frameworks with the aid of explicit 
stereotype labels and finally get equivalent performance with analytic and intermediate 
participants. This result is consistent with Douglas and Riding's (1993) finding. 
The WA cognitive style groups remembered equal numbers of stereotype-consistent 
traits in Condition C (with stereotype label absent), which is again consistent with earlier 
prediction. In this condition, wholist participants were presumed to construct (by their 
adept holistic view) implicitly related materials into frameworks though no explicit theme 
was presented. In contrast, analytics might perceive the trait words without holistic 
structures. However, their superior memory for unstructured materials has compensated 
any possible difference caused by organising strategies. 
The only difference demonstrated between the NYA cognitive style groups was 
found in Condition D (stereotype-neutral traits with stereotype label absent). H2 was 
therefore supported. Wholist participants exhibited a compromised memory of 
discriminate trait words compared to intermediate and analytic ones. Their holistic nature 
of viewing the world causes difficulties in perceiving discriminate units sufficiently (e. g. 
Douglas & Riding, 1993). Burton and Sinatra (1984) have found a discrete word recall 
disadvantage for FD children, which supported this assumption. 
4.4.3 Impact of TVA Cognitive Style on Overall Stereotype Bias Trend 
Individuals did show different general trends of the stereotype bias with regard to 
93 
their WA cognitive style. H3 was supported. For example, wholist participants showed no 
label presence x trait type interaction but a significant main effect of label presence and 
trait type. Their performance in four stereotypic conditions showed an obvious 'step' shape 
corresponding to the difficulties of the conditions (see Figure 4.1,4.4). In other words, the 
performances of the wholist participants were overtly 'dependent' on experimental 
conditions. For instance, they structured stimuli with the help of explicit cues of relevant 
mental frameworks, and/or expectancy congruence of materials respectively, but without 
an active integrating process. As a result, the facilitation of the cued mental frameworks 
and the stimuli expectancy congruence were additive, but not integrative. 
Analytic participants differed from wholist ones in that they showed a significant 
label presence x trait type interaction and a main effect of stereotype label, but no main 
effect of trait type. It is consistent with the hypothesis that analytic individuals were more 
'determined' about their strategy to organise information and less sensitive to the stimulus 
materials. The strategy could be chosen according to the given circumstance. For example, 
the provision of explicit stereotype labels may trigger those analytic participants to 
organise all information in relation to mental frameworks irrespective of trait type. By this 
strategy, they generally remembered more trait words than those in the stereotype label 
absent condition. It is noteworthy that even the neutral trait words were remembered more 
than the two conditions, without label presence (Conditions C and D) (see Figure 4.1). 
Although the difference was slight, it can somewhat support the postulation of strategy. 
The stereotype-neutral traits were hard to represent within therned frameworks, however 
the mental effort participants spent to organise them within frameworks did arguably 
enhance the memory. On the other hand, the absence of the explicit labels probably led to 
an unstructure of stimuli and such a strategy was constant for both consistent and neutral 
traits. It was found that the analytic participants who had not received explicit theme clues 
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recalled less stereotype-consistent traits than stereotype-neutral ones (see Figure 4.1). 
Although the difference was non-significant, its tendency was opposite to any classic trait 
type effect. The most intuitive interpretation is that they did not stereotype the information 
at all. In short, analytic participants were more persistent in their strategy of information 
organisation once it had been decided in the given circumstances, and kept the strategy 
'independent' from the stimulus materials. 
The intermediate group, which was newly introduced in this chapter, revealed 
another different trend of stereotype bias. In the experiment, the intermediate participants 
showed a significant label presence x trait type interaction with no main effect of label 
presence or trait type. This is argued to result from a combined manner of wholist and 
analytic organisation. Intermediate individuals characterise with the same level of holistic 
and analytic organising ability (Riding, 2005), and freely select to use either. For those 
who have seen the stereotype labels, the holistic feature enabled them to be sensitive to the 
material and only employed the stereotype to think about the stereotype-consistent 
information during encoding. In contrast, the stereotype-neutral traits were probably 
represented in an unstructured (analytical) way. While for those without the stereotype 
labels Presented, they were 'material-independent' during the encoding that treated all 
materials as discrete information. Moreover, the analytic view helped intermediates to 
perceive unstructured information with ease, which led to an overall better memory 
compared to wholist participants. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The study revealed a robust stereotype bias in that the stereotypic information was 
generally easy to remember especially when a stereotype label was explicitly presented. 
Further, in conjunction with the WA cognitive style, it was found that the infonnation 
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processing in different stereotypic conditions would be affected by one's favoured 
organisation aptitude. The wholists depended more on stereotypic conditions during 
information processing and memorised passively corresponding to the aids (e. g. presence 
of stereotype label, material consistency, etc. ) provided by the situation. The analytics 
were more independent from the influence of stimulus materials that once they chose the 
strategy of perception according to experimental settings (i. e. presence of stereotype labels) 
they would persist with it irrespective of stimulus consistency. The intermediates, who 
entail both holistic and analytical views of perceiving, selectively used one of the two 
organisations depending on the task requirement and obtained the best performance in 
memory of stimuli. Moreover, the study has demonstrated an inability of wholist 
individuals to organise and memorise irrelevant information. 
The next chapter will move on to the issue of how cognitive styles affect the way an 
individual regards the self. 
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CHAPTER 5. COGNITIVE STYLES AND SELF CONCEPT RELATED 
BEH"IOURS 
Chapter 4 discussed the influence of the WA cognitive style on strategies used to 
deal with information about others. The present chapter aims to relate the WA cognitive 
style, in conjunction with the VI cognitive style, to another domain of social perception, 
namely that of the self-related concepts. The study collected data from three aspects. First, 
a couple of tasks concerning the embodiment and disembodiment processes of the self 
were devised, in which both revealed a main effect of the WA cognitive style, with 
wholists showing superiority on both tasks. It was concluded that the WA cognitive style 
(applying global or analytical organisation) influences the integrated bodily self 
representing process. Secondly, empathy scores of participants were reported, which is 
assumed to reflect an ability of emotional disembodiment, and an imager advantage was 
found. Therefore, the VI cognitive style arguably affects the comprehension and intuitive 
response of others' mental states (empathy) by individuals' adept coding manners. Finally, 
participants' attachment styles, which were suggested to relate to self- or other- oriented 
attentions, were investigated. The VI cognitive style was found interacting with gender on 
attachment anxiety. Being inclined to the verbal representation might consequently 
reinforce the attachment anxiety (which probably links to other-oriented attention of social 
behaviours), but only for women. In sum, the WA and the VI cognitive styles are suggested 
to be connected to self-related concepts, nevertheless in different aspects. 
5.1 Introduction 
As the previous chapter showed the impact of cognitive style on processing others 
(though only the WA cognitive style was found relevant so far), it is sensible to transfer 
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the focus to the other side of social perception; the concept of self Will the cognitive 
styles, which decide the way we may process information, also affect how we perceive 
ourselves and how we separate ourselves from others? To investigate this issue, the present 
study employed both behavioural and self-report measures to reflect different aspects of 
self-rion-self processes. The embodiment/disembodiment tasks (Subsection 5.1.1) examine 
the representation of spatial self and self-disembodiment, while the empathy questionnaire 
(Subsection 5.1.2) reflects the aptitude of an emotional disembodiment. In addition, 
subsection 5.1.3 introduces attachment styles as index of self-oriented or other-oriented 
social attentions. With all these measures, the particular relationship between the cognitive 
styles and the self-related processes might be determined and shed light on the 
understanding of cognitive styles. The introduction first starts with the representation of 
spatial self. 
5.1.1 Embodiment and Disembodiment ofthe Self 
The sense of self is a very special concept during processing therefore it has crucial 
implications of understanding human consciousness. Numerous studies have distinguished 
specific brain mechanisms for the self and body processing (Blanke et al., 2005; Blanke, 
Landis, Spinelli, & Seeck, 2004; Jeannerod, 2003; Metzinger, 2003) from all other mental 
executions. It has been in particular favour in recent neuropsychological research whereby 
plenty of findings have linked the self process to diverse physiological basis. This 
subsection will emphasise the evidence of the representation of spatial self. 
The sense of self can be reflected in two contrasting processes, namely, the 
embodiment and the disembodiment process. Embodiment involves mentally localising 
oneself within his/her own body borders while disembodiment refers to localising the self 
out of the body (Arzy, Thut, Mohr, Michel, & Blanke, 2006). Two specialiscd tasks were 
employed to demonstrate the two processes by taking each in turn. 
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DisembodimentlEgocentric Perspective Taking 
The disembodiment process of the self was found particularly associated with the 
cortex at the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) responding to localise the self out of the 
body (Arzy et al., 2006; Blanke, Ortigue, Landis, & Seeck, 2002; Blanke et al., 2004; 2005; 
Zacks, Rypma, Gabrieli, Tversky, & Glover, 1999). It often includes imagining the self at 
an extracorporeal position (outside the embodied position). In the present study, this self 
disembodiment process will be represented by an egocentric perspective transformation 
task. 
Egocentric perspective transformation refers to mentally transferring oneself into 
another person's position and imagining what they would be able to see (Zacks et al., 
1999). It is an essential activity in one's day-to-day life, especially as it is an element of 
many human social interactions, such as shaking hands, giving directions to a stranger, 
finding a way according to the map, and so on. To give directions, for example, the 
individual must imagine him/herself standing as the other person to work out the route that 
the stranger needs to take. In other words, he/she would have to imagine and view the 
physical surrounding through another person's eyes. That would require us to perform an 
egocentric perspective transformation in the mind; that is, a change in one's imagined 
position (disembodiment) and aligning one's egocentric orientation in relation to an 
external peispective. 
Children are not capable to view the world distinct from an egocentric viewpoint 
until the concrete operational stage (e. g. 7-11 years old). For example, Piaget and Inhelder 
(194 8) tried out the three-mountain problem on 4-7 year old children and found that the 
children always reported what they saw even though they were asked to tell what a doll, , 
placed in an opposite position, would see. Although later researchers have questioned - 
Piaget's division on children's age (e. g. Donaldson, 1978; who suggested that children 
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with age 3.5-5 years old are already able to transform their egocentric perspective), it is 
generally accepted that the ability of perspective taking emerges alongside children's 
cognitive development. 
Egocentric perspective transformation is a process that engages the processing of 
self and body representation, which distinguishes it from the normal object-based mental 
rotations. Although the two processes seem likely, a strong dissociation has been reported 
between processes of object-based mental rotation and egocentric perspective 
transformation (Amorim & Stucchi, 1997; Hegarty & Waller, 2004; Huttenlocher & 
Presson, 1973; 1979; Presson, 1982; Simon & Wang, 1998; Wang & Simon, 1999; Wraga, 
Creem, & Profitt, 2000; Zacks, Mires, Tversky, & Hazeltine, 2000). In addition, there is 
preliminary evidence suggesting that the object-based mental rotations and the egocentric 
perspective transformations depend on different neural structures (Creem et al., 2001; 
Kosslyn, DiGirolamo, Thompson, & Alpert, 1998; Zacks, et al., 1999). Each of these 
processes can be selectively impaired following localised brain lesions (Ratcliff, 1979; 
Semmes, Weinstein, Ghent, & Teuber, 1963), each one giving rise to different patterns of 
local brain activity (Zacks et al., 1999), and relating systematically to stimulus presentation 
and individual differences in spatial ability (Zacks et al., 2000). Therefore, the egocentric 
perspective transformation is argued to be beyond the normal mental rotation processes by 
being particularly related to the coding of the self. 
Furthermore, it was suggested that imagining taking another perspective and 
actually taking another perspective might employ a common mechanism. Wohlschalger 
and Wohlschalger (1998) have reported that response times for mental and manual 
translation of an object are consistent. And accordingly, they concluded that rotary 
manipulation and mental rotation share a common process in the brain, which is thought to 
control both real and imagined rotations. In line with this, the (mental) egocentric 
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perspective taking was believed to share a common mechanism in the brain with that 
actually taking the perspOctive out of the body (Arzy et al., 2006). The later execution 
rarely happens with most individuals but some researchers have found a coherent 
relationship between out-of-body experience (OBE) and mental perspective taking 
(Amorim, 2003; Blackmore, 1982; Brugger, 2002; Cook & Irwin, 1983). An OBE is a 
speciaý form of egocentric perspective transformation; it is a distortion experience in the 
spatial unity of self and body that the individuals feel themselves as they locate outside of 
their bodies and view the world from an elevated position (Blanke & Mohr, 2005). 
Findings (Amorim, 2003; Blackmore, 1982; Brugger, 2002; Cook & Irwin, 1983) have 
suggested that the mental transformation and OBEs activate a similar brain area (i. e. TPJ). 
In other words, seeing oneself from another perspective (OBEs) and imagining seeing 
oneself from another perspective trigger an overlapped brain region. Therefore, if any 
conclusion can be drawn based on the mental transformation task, it should be plausible to 
apply it to corresponding actual activities. 
The present study applied a mental transformation task to investigate the egocentric 
perspective transformation (disembodiment) process in a normal population. Participants 
were required to make a left/right decision by mentally takirig the perspective of a stimulus 
person (see Figure 5.1). Participants must decide whether, after imagining standing as the 
drawing person (Steve or Samantha), the right or left hand is marked. Their reaction times 
of the decision were then recorded. 
When the figure is facing away from the participant (herein referred to as back- 
facing), the indicated hand corresponds with one's own right/left orientation. So the figure 
is intuitively conceivable as oneself and a judgement is simpler to make. However, if the, 
figure is facing towards the participant (front-facing), there is a body orientation 
disagreement. It necessitates an additional mental rotation (further cognitive movement) of 
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the self to attain a concordant perspective orientation, as shown by longer reaction time 
(e. g. Arzy et al., 2006; Blanke et al., 2005; Ratcliff, 1979; Zack et al., 1999). Even so, the 
disembodiment transformation is not onlY performed for the more cognitively demanding 
front-facing figures but also for the back-facing figures (Blanke et al., 2005; Mohr, Blanke, 
& Brugger, 2006; Zack et al., 1999). The process of mental perspective taking was 
empirically tested through the use of simple line drawings of human figures, which have 
been demonstrated to be reliable (see Blanke et al., 2005; Parsons, 1987; Ratcliff, 1979; 
Zack et aL, 1999). 
Steve 
t t, lh Samantha 
RgUre 5.1. Stimuli used in the disembodiment/embodiment task. 
Furthermore, the cognitive styles are hypothesised to affect the disembodiment 
process and consequently affect the performance of the transformation task. The WA 
cognitive style might be an influential variable as it entails the ability to disembed a part 
from the whole. Analytic individuals are characterised with greater disembedding abilities 
compared to wholist ones. Hence they will naturally have more ease to disengage from the 
egocentric view (disembodiment) and result in it feeling easier to take another person's 
perspective. Hence, it could be logical to infer an analytic individual superiority in the 
transformation task. 
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However, the argument can be hypothetically reversed. If the egocentric 
perspective transformation process invokes greater reliance on empathetic processes (e. g. 
Davis et al., 2004; Vogeley & Fink, 2003) one may expect a wholist advantage, as wholist 
people are suggested to be more group dependent and socially friendly (Riding & Rayner, 
1998). This point will be covered more in Subsection 5.1.2 in relation to empathy. 
The VI cognitive style is also thought relevant because of its capability to 
manipulate the focus of behaviours (Riding & Rayner, 1998). Imagers are able to build an 
image of the world without interaction with others and keep inward (internal focus). They 
are assumed to have a disadvantage during the disembodiment task because their internal 
focus might interfere with such a disembodying process by the tendency to stay with their 
own perspective. Verbalisers, in contrary, are more outward because the communicability 
of the verbal representation encourages them to be more externally focused. Thus, it may 
help them in the disembodied task performance. 
Embodiment 
The embodiment process was suggested to relate especially to the left extrastriate 
body area (EBA) in the lateral occipitotemporal cortex (Arzy et al., 2006; Astafiev, 
Stanley, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2004; Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001). 
Embodiment (i. e. feeling the self inside the body) is a solid basis of the concept of the self 
(Churchland, 2002; Gallagher, 2005; Kircher & David, 2003; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 
We own a body, which we move and feel, and with which we interact with the world. 
Upon this basis, we build up a personal history and consequently become who we are. 
Distortions of the embodiment process are frequently relevant to psychological disorders. 
For instance, the disturbing experiences of embodiment have often been reported linked to 
schizophrenia or schizotypy (e. g. Angyal, 1936; Bleuler, 1950; Burrack & Brugger, 2005; 
Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 1978; Lenzenweger, 2000; Mechl, 1990; Mohr et al., 
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2006). 
However, the embodiment of self location is rather difficult to investigate solely. 
Normal people hardly have any trouble of the sense of embodiment, and so have hardly 
any feeling of it. As such, there is less evidence reported for this concept compared to the 
disembodiment. A few studies have revealed a body position (congruent or incongruent) 
effect on embodiment that the body location actually influences the brain activities during 
embodied self location (e. g. Arzy et al., 2006). Arzy et al. (2006) concluded that the 
embodied self location and the actual body location may also share neutral mechanisms at 
EBA. 
In the present study, an embodiment task was introduced as a control task that 
employed the exact same stimuli as the disembodiment task (shown in Figure S. 1), but 
required an embodied perspective. The identical use of the stimuli with the same 
orientations of the visuospatial perspective (back- and front-facing) and the same response 
mode (left/right judgement) minimised the possibility of introducing additional variables. 
In this task, by imagining themselves looking at a mirror (the stimulus person is the mirror 
reflection), participants would perceive their real intracorporeal position (i. e. keep 
embodied self location) (Arzy et al., 2006). Here an opposite pattern of responses is 
expected, when compared to the disembodiment task. In the miffor (embodiment) task 
participants are expected to respond faster to front-facing figures as a more common 
experience in daily life. The back-facing figures, which are a relatively rare experience, 
would require an extra mental rotation and thus take longer judgement times (Arzy et al., 
2006). 
If the cognitive styles (both WA and VI) are merely relevant to the disembodiment 
process, they should not have any effect on the performance of the control (embodiment) 
task. In contrast, if the cognitive styles show a similar pattern on both tasks, they should be 
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related to a joint underlying mechanism of both tasks, for example, an integrated bodily 
image process. This hypothesis will be further discussed in ýhe discussion section. 
5.1.2 Empathy 
The ability to take the perspective of others may not only concern the spatial self 
representations but also emotional mental states. By taking another's perspective 
emotionally, one could predict what the other person is feeling, so as to respond 
appropriately. This introduces a new variable into the present study, namely, empathy. 
Overall, empathy has been agreed as having two main strands (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004): the cognitive empathy and the affective empathy. The cognitive 
empathy refers to the process that understands others' feelings. To achieve this, individuals 
have to first push aside his/her own current feeling and put the self into the mental state of 
another person (Leslie, 1987). In short, cognitive empathy involves the ability to predict 
another's mental state and resulting behaviour (Dennett, 1987). Affective empathy, in 
contrast, describes an observer's emotional responses to the affective states of other 
persons. It may involve both the matching response of the target (e. g. frightened by seeing 
someone's anger) and affection that goes beyond a simple matching feeling like sympathy 
and compassion (Davis, 1994). Besides that, only appropriate other-orientated mental 
responses can be regarded as affective empathy. Consequently, the combination of the 
cognitive and affective empathy leads to the common understanding of 'empathy'. 
To explain empathy, Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) conceptualised a model 
with two profiles, empathising and systemising, as two major dimensions. These two 
systems are independent but have an effect on each other and possibly a trade-off -- 
relationship. Empathising is the drive to comprehend another's mental state and to provide 
responses with appropriate emotions. Systernising refers to the capability to analyse and , 
derive the underlying rules and regularities that govern behaviours. While systernising aids 
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our understanding of how the world works when rules are applied, empathy allows us to 
identify with another person's emotions, essentially to 'mentally put ourselves into 
someone else's shoes'. Usually, one's empathising ability is inversely correlated with 
systernising ability. For'instance, the better at systernising a person is, the less empathetic 
he/she is (Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 2003). 
A female superiority has been constantly replicated in studies and women are 
usually reported as being more empathetic than men in the healthy population (e. g. Baron- 
Cohen et al., 2003; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Davis, 1980; Davis & Franzoi, 
1991; Hoffman, 1977; Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004). Baron- 
Cohen and his colleagues explain such a gender bias by the Extreme Male Brain theory of 
autism (see Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). They categorised individuals on the 
autistic spectrum as exaggerated cases of a severe tendency towards the systemising 
process, that is, an extreme male brain. According to the theory, the so-called male brain is 
defined as an individual who is predominant with the systernising process while the female 
brain refers to the predominant empathising process. Accordingly, women are, more 
empathetic because they are more likely to be 'female brained'. (However, as unavoidable 
limitation for all self-report measures, Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) admitted that 
the female superiority could be possibly attributed to the fact that women have greater 
I 
social desire to report empathetic behaviours. ) In line, there was found to be significantly 
more male autistic patients than female ones (a gender ratio of 8: 1; Wing, 198 1). On the 
other hand, autism could be regarded as an empathy disorder because of the patients' 
deficits of mindreading, which has been proved by many studies (Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Gillberg, 1992; Yirmiya, Sigman, Kasari, & Mundy, 
1992). 
The autistic individuals (having deficits of empathic behaviours) were described as 
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having a 'fragmental view of the world' by which they see everything in parts rather than a 
coherent whole situation (Frith, 1989). Besides, an autistic superiority was found on the 
EFT (i. e. an analytic aptitude), which associated autistic spectrum with global- versus 
local- processing differences (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Shah & Frith, 1983). Frith 
(1989) suggested that people with autism showed a detail-focus type of information 
processing at the expense of global configuration and contextualised meaning. This line of 
research pointed to a potential connection between the WA dimension of cognitive style 
and the systemising-empathising-process-balance. If the autistic spectrum (which is 
inversely correlated with the empathic spectrum) increases with the global-local 
processing difference (which is proposed to be a major feature of the WA cognitive style), 
it is suggested to associate with the WA cognitive style, too. 
In addition, the wholist (/FD) individuals have been described as tending to be more 
social than their analytic (FI) peers (Witkin & Goodenough, 1977). They prefer contacts 
with others, activities involving social interaction, and are more open to their feelings. 
Wholist people are usually characterised as displaying warmth, affection, tact, and 
accommodation. In comparison, analytical people appear to be more cold and distant 
(Witkin & Goodenough, 1977). 
Therefore, wholist participants would be expected to report higher scores of 
empathy as they are usually thought to be social dependent and to interact more with 
others. In contrast, analytic participants may exhibit rather impaired overall empathic 
records since they tend to be more systernising. 
Empathy, especially the cognitive component of empathy, was thought to entail the 
emotional form of egocentric perspective transformation (disembodiment) process (Davis 
et al., 2004; Vogeley & Fink, 2003). Researchers have theoretically linke. d the (cognitive) 
empathy with perspective-taking tasks such as role-taking (Mead, 1934), non-egocentric 
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responding (Piaget, 1932) etc. Therefore, the disembodiment process and cognitive 
empathy are suggested as sharing an overlapped underlying mechanism. 
Hence, it is also reasonable to assume that analytic people show higher cognitive 
empathy. Similar to egocentric transformation (disembodiment), to empathise cognitively 
with someone, individuals need to first 'disembed' from their current mental state and 
think about the contents of another's mind. Thus, analytic people who have better 
disembedding ability are assumed to have benefits during this process. 
The VI dimension of cognitive style may also affect the empathy. Verbalisers are 
supposed to more frequently represent the external world with abstract descriptions (inner 
speech) whilst imagers represent the world by mental pictures. Therefore imagers would 
exhibit better empathy than verbalisers since the concrete pictorial representations enable 
them to imagine a social setting with details which the others are experiencing, and 
consequently this helps them to empathise the emotional state (e. g. 'Lily intends to give a 
speech in public. ... There 
is a crowd. ... They are all staring at her. ... They are 
whispering. ... I would be very nervous 
if I was her. '). 
5.1.3 Attachment 
One's experiences in infancy and early childhood with parents are very important in 
influencing later life activities. It is the centrepiece of many theories about attachment (e. g. - 
Bartholernew & Horowitz, 1991; Bowlby, 1969; 1973; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; 1990; 
Simpson & Rholes, 1998). Early attachment experience is the basis for everyone to form a 
life-long unique personality style by which one socially interacts with others. It is easy to 
understand that if an infant receives a sensitive and responsive care from parents, s/he 
would be more likely to regard herself/himself as love-worthy and others as dependable. 
And such an impression could last throughout their lifespan. In comparison, if a person 
experiences neglect, a lack of response, or inconsistent care during infancy, s/he may hold 
108 
the beliefs that the self is worthless and/or others are unreliable. These impressions from 
infancy attachment experiences are probably guiding the person's affect and cognition 
even into adulthood, especially in the attachment-related situations (e. g. Bartholernew & 
Horowitz, 1991; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Mikulincer, 1997). 
In 1991, Bartholemew and Horowitz proposed a model of attachment with two 
distinct underlying dimensions concerning the beliefs and feelings about the self and 
others. These were anxiety (i. e. the extent to which a person strives to maintain proximity 
with others due to insecurity) and avoidance (i. e. the extent to which a person strives to 
maintain emotional distance due to insecurity in their relationships with others). 
Individuals who are anxiously attached (i. e. score highly on the anxiety dimension) 
have negative representations of themselves. For example, they regard themselves as 
unworthy of love and fear abandonment by attachment figures (e. g. parents, lovers, close 
friends, etc. ). As a result, they would usually experience a low level of social-confidence 
and be more likely 
io hold an obsessive, dependent relationship with their loved ones 
(Collins & Read, 1990). 
Those who are avoidantly attached (i. e. score highly on the avoidance dimension) 
have negative representations of others. They would regard their partners in their 
relationships as not trustworthy or reliable. (Note that in this chapter the term 'partner' 
does not necessarily refer to the partner in a romantic relationship, but also refers to the 
one being attached to in other kinds of relationships, such as friends, family members, etc. ) 
As a result, they feel uncomfortable sharing intimacy with others and maintain their 
independence from partners (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998; Mikulincer, Shaver, & 
Pereg, 2003; Rowe & Camelley, 2003). 
In contrast, the secure attached people (i. e. those who score low on both dimensions) 
are holding positive beliefs about themselves and others, and consequently feel 
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comfortable with closeness and independence in relationships (Hazan & Shaver, 1987; 
Kirkpatrick & Davis, 1994; Mikulincer & Erev, 1991; Pietromonaco & Carnelley, 1994). 
Those who have a secure attachment were also found to have developed constructive 
coping responses to stressful situations, to seek more social support, and to report fewer 
feelings of distress than insecure individuals (Mikulincer, Florian, & Weller, 1993; 
Simpson, Rholes, & Nelligan, 1992). 
The two attachment dimensions of the self and others (anxiety and avoidance, 
respectively) are suggested to vary independently (Bowlby, 1973). This assumption is 
empirically supported by the four attachment style groups (i. e. secure, preoccupied, fearful, 
and dismissing) in the populations assessed by the two attachment dimensions (e. g. 
Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Brennan et al.; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; etc. ). Although 
the secure and fearful attached individuals have a congruent disposition (e. g. positive or 
negative, respectively) in both attachment dimensions, there are individuals who 
demonstrate contrasting valences in the two dimensions. For instance, preoccupýied 
(attached) people have negative beliefs/feelings of the self but they have positive 
perceptions of others. Dismissing people, in contrary, hold negative impressions of others, 
but a positive image of the self. 
Additionally, the anxiety and avoidance dimension of attachment could be regarded 
as indexes of general evaluations of self and others, resulting from perceptions of parental 
treatment during the early stages of life (e. g. Bartholomew & Shaver, 1998; Brennan, 
Clark, & Shaver, 1998; Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000; Luke, Maio, & Carnelley, 2004). 
It was found that one's attachment anxiety would extensively affect global evaluations of 
the self with self-esteem and self-confidence (e. g. Bartholomew & Horowitz, 199 1; 
Collins & Read, 1990; Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994a; 1994b; Luke et al., 2004; Murray, 
H olmes, Griffin, Bellavia, & Rose, 2001), and robustness against psychological distresses 
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(e. g. Carnelley, Pietromonaco, & Jaffe, 1994; Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994a; 1994b). In 
summary, the less anxious an individual is with his/her attachment, 'the higher self- 
esteem/self-confidence and lower level of distress s/he has. Similarly, there is evidence to 
associate the attachment avoidance with evaluations of others, such as positive 
expectationsibeliefs of others (e. g. Collins & Read, 1990; Cozzarelli, Hoekstra, & Bylsma, 
2000; Feeney & Noller, 1990; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Mikulincer, 1998), and general 
humanity-esteem (Luke et al., 2004). The lower the avoidance level of attachment, the 
more positive and trustful expectations and beliefs the person is holding towards others 
(e. g. family members, colleagues, and strangers). The attachment styles/dimensions, albeit 
formed from the basis of specific personal relationships in one's early life, would reflect a 
more general perception of the self and others (i. e. not merely limited to the caregivers in 
early childhood) and result in differing social attentions. 
For instance, a positive attachment was reported to associate with an aptitude of 
exploration of new stimuli and environments (Mikulincer, 1997) and empathetic behaviour 
towards people (Mikulincer, Hirschberger, Nachmias, & Gillath, 2001). However, people 
with highly anxious attachment were found to pay redundant attention to others and search 
for even slight signals from others' behaviours (Mikulincer et al., 2003). This is because 
they always feel the worthlessness of the self and constantly fear abandonment from others. 
The anxious attachment does not provide them with a secure base to keep social 
independence and results in an other-oriented bias of their perceptions. Hence, their 
attentions are over-preoccupied with interpersonal relationships and overly focusing on 
others in social enviromnents. 
Similarly, the avoidant attachment was found to be related to strategies that involve 
avoidance of new information (Mikulincer, Shaver, & Pereg, 2003), lack of empathic 
responses to others who are in suffering (Westmaas & Silver, 2001), and negative 
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correlation with self reported communion (which reflects a concern for others; Shaver et 
al., 1996). It was suggested that, because of mistrust, avoidantly attached individuals have 
a rather compulsive self-oriented attention (to maintain the emotional distance) in social 
environments and dismissing others' feelings (Mikulincer, Shaver, Gillath, & Nitzberg, 
2005). In conclusion, the two dimensions (anxiety and avoidance) of attachment are not 
only relevant to the beliefs individuals hold with themselves and others, but also reflects 
the attention orientations of their social perception/behaviour. 
On the other hand, cognitive styles have long been argued to relate to the self and 
non-self concept. The WA cognitive style (FDI style) was suggested to increase with self- 
reliance and decrease with interpersonal dependence (e. g. Korchin, 1986; Witkin, 
Goodenough, & Oltman, 1979). In sum, wholist people were suggested to be more socially 
dependent, whilst analytic people were postulated to be more self-reliant during 
interactions with others (Riding, 199 1). For example, Fls have been found to be less 
sensitive to social cues (Witkin et al., 1971) and show less incidental leaming of social 
materials than FDs (but not differing in non-social stuff; Eagle, Goldberger, & Breitman, 
1969; Fitzgibbons, Goldberger, & Eagle, 1965). Paul (1975) also reported a connection 
between less separation anxiety and better performance on disembedding ability (Fls). A 
survey investigating personal characteristics of undergraduate students who were living in 
joint university accommodation revealed that wholist students were seen as more assertive, 
helpful and humorous (other-oriented personalities) compared to analytic students who 
were shyer (self-oriented personality) (Riding & Wright, 1995). Riding and Wright also 
reported that analytic students behaved more separately than wholist ones during 
interactions with flatmates. 
The VI cognitive style, which affects the representation mode of information, may 
influence the self- or other- orientation of social perception too, by manipulating the focus 
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of activity (Riding & Rayner, 1998). Verbalisers are externally focused and socially active 
because they tend to explore the outward world with linguistic descriptions and rules 
(which is suggested to be a more interactive mode). Imagers are thought to be intemally 
focused and more socially passive, as they are capable of building an image of the 
environment without interaction with others and tend to keep inward emphasis. Riding and 
Dyer (1980) reported a strong correlation between the VI cognitive style and the 
introversion-extraversion dimension of personality among 12-year-old children. And the 
'verbal children' were reported to appear more socially active, as reported by their 
classmates while 'imagery children' were reported to be more socially passive (Riding, 
Burthon, Rees, & Sharratt, 1995). 
5.1.4 Hypotheses 
According to the above review, hypothesised relationships between the cognitive 
styles and participants' performances on differed facets of self concept can be elicited by 
taking each cognitive style dimension in turn. 
The WA Cognitive Style 
1) Conceming the embodiment/disembodiment tasks, 
HIa. Analytic participants will exhibit better performance than wholist participants 
in the disembodiment task because of their superior disembedding ability. 
Or, the hypothesis can be theoretically reversed, 
HIb. Wholist participants will be favoured. in the disembodiment task compared to 
the analytic participants for their empathic nature. 
Additionally, the embodiment task as a control task is not expected to demonstrate. 
any difference if the WA cognitive style is only related to the disembodying process. 
2) Conceming the empathy scores, 
H2. Wholist participants will manifest higher scores in empathy than analytic 
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participants. 
H3. Nevertheless, analytic participants may manifest higher scores in cognitive 
empathy than wholist participants because of the overlapped mechanism between the 
cognitive empathy and the spatial disembodiment task (i. e. requiring disembedding ability). 
3) Concerning attachment anxiety/avoidance, 
H4. Wholist participants will report a higher level of attachment anxiety than 
analytic participants because they tend to behave more socially dependent (other-oriented). 
H5. Analytic participants will report a higher level of attachment avoidance than 
wholist participants because they are more separate from others and self-reliant during 
social activities (self-oriented). 
The VI Cognitive Style 
1) Conceming the embodiment/disembodiment tasks, 
H6. Verbal participants will show better performance in the disembodiment task as 
the inward tendency of imagery participants might interfere with the disembodying process. 
The performance of the embodiment task is expected to be untouched by the VI 
cognitive style as there is no disembodying process.. 
2) Conceming the empathy scores, 
H7. Imagery participants will express higher empathy scores because of their 
capability to concretely represent the empathic situations. 
3) Concerning attachment anxiety/avoidance, 
H8. Verbal participants will show a higher level of attachment anxiety than imagery 
participants as they are rather socially active (other-oriented). 
H9. Imagery participants will show a higher level of attachment avoidance than 




In both the transformation (disembodiment) task and mirror (embodiment) task, 
there was a 2x2x2 mixed design with the WA cognitive style (wholist versus analytic) and 
the VI cognitive style (verbaliser versus imager) as the between-subject factors and 
position of the figures (back-facing versus front-facing) as the within-subject factor. 
Reaction times to the stimuli in the two tasks were measured as the dependent variables. 
For empathy, a correlational design was employed. The WA ratios and VI ratios of 
CSA and the empathy scores worked as independent variables. 
A correlational design was also used in the attachment section. The WA and VI 
style ratios in conjunction with scores of attachment anxiety and avoidance scales were the 
independent variables. 
5.2.2 Participants 
One hundred and thirty undergraduate psychology students (66 female, 64 male) 
participated in the study for course credit or financial reward (except four work experience 
students who took part in the study voluntarily). Participants have a mean age of 20.11 
years (SD = 3.20 years). All participants reported normal or corrected to normal vision and 
were pre-selected to be right handed. 
5.2.3 Materials 
Disembodiment and Embodiment Task The stimuli used in the 
embodiment/disembodiment tasks modified from those used in previous mental own-body 
transformation studies (Mohr, Blanke, & Brugger, 2006). The schematic human figures 
involved four standing males (Steve) and four of standing females (Samantha) in order to 
avoid any single gender bias of the stimuli themselves (see Figure 5.1). The figure was 
either front- or back- facing from the participants, with a black ring around one of its hand. 
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The position of the figures (front-/back-facing) was distinguished by the cloth rendering 
and the presences of a face or hair. 
Empathy. The Empathy Quotient (EQ) questionnaire was employed to determine 
one's level of empathy (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; see Appendix D). The EQ 
comprises 60 questions, of which 20 are filler items to prevent participants from guessing 
the purpose of the questionnaire. The remaining 40 questions concern empathic behaviours 
in daily life with half of the questions are reversed. Participants were required to rate each 
question according to a 4-point scale; 'strongly agree', 'slight agree', 'slight disagree', and 
4strongly disagree'. Non-emPathic responses were scored 0 (i. e. respond disagree to 
empathic questions or respond agree to reversed questions). 2 or I point was granted to 
participants for empathic response depending on the strength of the reply (i. e. strongly... ' 
or 'slightly... '). Thus, every participant's empathy score varied from 0 to 80. The 
presentation of questions was randomised. 
The EQ is supported to be a reliable and valid measure of empathy. Its test-re-test 
reliability was reported to be high over a period of 12 months (r > 0.83; Lawrence et al., 
2004). It was shown to distinguish reliably between clinical groups, such as those who are 
diagnosed with autistic disorder and suggested to have problems employing 'empathy' 
(Blair, 1995), and healthy groups (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Lawrence et al., 
2004). The EQ was also highly correlated with other empathy-related measures (Baron- 
Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Lawrence et al., 2004). 
Further, the responses of the EQ were sub-divided into three subscales based on 
previous research (Lawrence et al., 2004) to separate the scores on the cognitive empathy, 
affective empathy, and social skills (for categorisation of the items see Appendix E). The 
latest component, which was suggested to emphasise well trained conditional skills in 
social environment, is argued to relate little to intuitive empathic understandings. 
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Attachment. The two dimensions of attachment (anxiety and avoidance) were 
measured using a revised version of the Experiences in Close Relationships Questionnaire 
(ECR; Brennan et al., 1998; see Appendix F). The original questionnaire was designed for 
investigating attachment behaviour with romantic partners. However, the revised version 
of the ECR modified attachment target to general close others (including romantic partners, 
family members, friends, etc. ) by replacing references to romantic partnqrs with references 
to general close others (Luke et al., 2004; Rowe & Camelley, 2003; 2005). For example, 'I 
prefer not to be too close to romantic partners' was revised into 'I prefer not to be close to 
others. ' 
The ECR questionnaire consists of 36 items. Participants were required to indicate 
the extent to which they would agree with each of the statements on a 7-point scale; from 
4strongly disagree' (score 1) to 'strongly agree' (score 7). Half of the statements are 
anxiety-related while the rest are avoidance-related. The final attachment scores are the 
average of responses of relevant statements (anxiety and avoidance). In addition, to 
balance the possible response bias, 14 of the 36 items are reversed. Those responses were 
reversed before being calculated into final scores (e. g. a response 'I' was re-keyed as 'T 
before averaging). 
Evidence from previous studies has supported the ECR with high internal 
consistency (generally > 0.80; Brennan et al., 1998; Rowe & Camelley, 2003; 2005) and 
validity that it has highly correlated with other multi-item self-report measures of romantic 
attachment (r ge 0.80; Crowell, Fraley, &. Shaver, 1999). 
The ECR questionnaire provides both a dimensional (e. g. one's position along the 
anxiety and the avoidance continuum) and a categorical measure of attachment style., 
However, in the present study only the dimensional scores were included in analyses. 
Cognitive Styles. Participants took CSA (Riding, 2005) to report their positions on 
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the WA and the VI cognitive style dimensions. 
5.2.4 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. 
They were first asked to perform the computerised disembodiment/embodiment 
tasks. Stimuli in both tasks were identical. In each trial, a figure preceded by a fixation 
cross on the screen for 500 ms and then remained in the centre of the screen until 4000 rns 
or a response was made. It automatically proceeded to the next trial. The internal stimuli 
interval was 1000 ins. The instructions differed between the two tasks. In the 
transfort-nation (disembodiment) task, participants were asked to imagine transforming 
themselves into the position and orientation of the figure they saw on the computer screen 
and then decide whether the indicated hand (with a black ring) would be their right (press 
right shift key) or left hand (press left shift key). In the mirror (embodiment) task, they 
were told to imagine that the figure on the screen was their mirror reflection, as seen from 
a habitual point of view, and then decide which of their hands was indicated by the ring. 
Again, the right shift key referred to right response and left shift key referred to left 
response. Participants were required to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to 
each trial, and always to perform the instructed mental imagination prior to giving any 
response. Either task (transformation or mirror) included 80 trials, which consisted of 10 
presentations of each stimulus (10 x 8) in a randomised order. To counterbalance the order 
effect, half of the participants performed the transformation task first, and the others did 
the mirror task first. 
Finally, participants completed the EQ and ECR questionnaires on paper followed 
by the CSA test., and were thanked and debriefed. 
5.2.5 Data Analysis 
Two one-way ANOVAs with gender (men versus women) as a between-subject 
118 
factor were conducted on the WA and VI cognitive style ratios. The intention was to 
determine whether gender would have any effect on the cognitive styles in the present 
sample. The result revealed that gender did not affect people's VI cognitive style (p > . 29; 
men 1.05 ± 0.12 versus women 1.03 ± 0.11) but females did appear to be more wholist 
(1.05 ± 0.25) than mate (1.22 ± 0.37), F (1,128) = 9.79, p <. 01. In addition, the WA 
cognitive style ratios were found to be positively correlated with the VI style ratios in the 
present sample, r (130) =. 248, p <. 01. The reason for the gender difference on the WA 
dimension and the correlation between the two dimensions of cognitive style were 
inconsistent with the literature (e. g. Riding, 1997) but they are included in the analyses to 
control for any possible confounding effects. 
5.3 Results 
To separate the sample into cognitive style groups, 130 participants were split based 
on their median ratios on the WA dimension and the VI dimension (Riding, 2005). The 
details of the division could be seen in Table 5.1. , 
Table 5.1 
The division ofthe cognitive style groups 
Verbaliser Imager Total 
(ratios: 5 1.0 1) (ratios ý! 1.02) 
Wholist 33 32 65 
. (ratios! 5 1.07) Analytic 30 35 65 
(ratios ý: 1.08) 
Total 63 67 130 
5.3.1 DisembodimentlEmbodiment Task 
Mean reaction times for correct responses were calculated for the 
disembodiment/embodiment tasks. Any non-responses and response latencies faster than 
200 ms were discarded from further analysis (Harris, Harris, & Caine, 2002). Four 
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participants were excluded from mirror task data set because of a low number of correct 
responses (accuracy < 75%). However, their transformation task performance remained for 
analysis. 
Figure 5.2. Reaction times of wholist and analytic participants in the 
embodied/disembodied tasks 
A 2x2x2 mixed sample analysis of variance with covariance (ANCOVA) was 
performed on the average reaction times of the transformation (disembodiment) task, with 
the position of figures (back-facing versus front-facing) as a within subject factor, the WA 
(wholist versus analytic) and the VI (verbaliser versus imager) style groups as between 
subject factors, and gender (men versus women) as the covariate. 
A significant main effect of the position of figures was shown as response latencies 
were longer for front-facing figures (928 ms) compared to back-facing figures (749 ms), F 
(1,125) = 73.79, p< . 
00 1, qP2 = 0.37, which replicated previous findings (Blanke et al., 
2005; Mohr et al., 2006; Zack et al., 1999). Such a reaction time difference of position in 
the transfonnation task indicated that participants have used mental rotation as a 
processing strategy, which suggested a successful manipulation that worked in a way as 
had been expected. Notwithstanding, the position of figures did not significantly interact 
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with any cognitive style groups (all p> . 32) or with gender (p > . 50). 
The WA cognitive style groups were found having a significant main effect on the 
reaction times of the transformation task (F (1,125) = 4.4 1, p< . 05, Ilp 
2=0.04) with 
wholists responding generally faster in the task (796 ms) than analytics (880 ins). 
The effect of the VI cognitive style groups failed to reach significance (verbalisers, 
857 ms versus imagers, 819 ms; p> . 33), neither its interaction with the WA cognitive 
style groups (p > . 46). 
Gender did not show an effect on the reaction times of the transformation task (p 
> .5 7). 
The same 2x2x2 mixed sample ANCOVA was then conducted on the mean 
reaction times of the mirror (embodiment) task. Similarly, the position of figures had a 
significant main effect on the speed of response, F (1,12 1) =35.12, p< . 00 1, IJP2 = 0.23. 
Participants responded'faster to front-facing figures (970 ms) in the mirror task compared 
to the back-facing figures (1156 ms), which again support the manipulation of the study 
(Arzy et al., 2006). Furthermore, the position x gender interaction was found significant (F 
(1,121) = 4.28, p <. 05, ilp 2=0.03) that women responded quicker than men when they 
faced figures in the front-facing positions in the mirror task (939 ms versus 1002 ms) but 
had similar response latencies with men to the back-facing figures (1165 ms versus 1141 
ins). None of the other interactions with position was found significant (all p> . 08). 
Similar findings of the WA and the VI cognitive style groups with the 
transformation task were revealed in the mirror task. The WA style groups showed a 
significant main effect on the mirror task reaction times, F (1,12 1) = 5.65, p< . 05, Ilp 
2 
0.05. Wholist participants again exhibited overall shorter response latencies (1005 ms) 
than analytic participants (1121 ms)., See Figure 5.2. However, it did not interact with 
other independent variables (all p>. 11). The YI style groups responded to thetask in at 
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similar speeds (verbalisers, 1047 ms versus imagers, 1075 ms; p> . 64), and did not 
interact with the WA style groups (p >. 11). 
Gender did not have a main effect on the reaction times of the mirror task (p > . 94). 
5.3.2 Empathy 
Mean EQ scores were showed in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 
Descriptive statistics of the EQ scores (n = 130) 











A series of one-way ANOVAs were applied and gender differences were found on 
the EQ scores (overall empathy, cognitive empathy, affective empathy, and social skills). 
Women did score significantly higher than men on overall empathy (48.97 versus 40.25, F 
(1,128) = 30.14, p <. 001). However, when separating items into subscales, it revealed that 
men did have the same level of cognitive empathy (13.27 versus 14.27) and social skills 
(6.92 versus 7.03) as women (both p >. 16). The only empathic difference between men 
and women was the affective empathy (8.89 versus 13.6 1, F (1,128) = 63.00, p< . 00 1). 
Women seemed more capable of responding intuitively to others' emotions compared to 
men. 
Table 5.3 displays partial correlations between each of the two cognitive style ratios 
and the EQ scores after controlling for gender and the other dimension of cognitive style. 
That is, when analysing the relationship between the WA style ratios and EQ scores, the 
VI style ratios and gender were treated as covariates. It was reversed when analysing the 
VI style ratios and EQ scores. The WA cognitive style showed no effect on any 
approaches of empathy (all p> . 32). In contrast, the VI cognitive style positively 
correlated with the cognitive empathy and affective empathy and the resulting total EQ 
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scores (all p< . 05), but not with the social skills (p > . 63). 
Table 5.3 
Partial correlations between the style ratios (7VA and VI) and EQ scores 
Total Cognitive Affective Social Skills 
Empathy Empathy Empathy 
WA ratios . 036 -. 089 . 048 -. 035 VI ratios . 231 ** . 192* . 221* . 042 
Note. The correlations in bold show the significant correlations between the style and the EQ scores after 
controlling for gender and the other style 
*p<. 05; **p <. 01 
Additionally, to examine the hypothesis that the cognitive empathy might share part 
of the underlyjng mechanism with the egocentric perspective taking process (see 
introduction 5.1.2), another Pearson correlation analysis (one-tailed) was employed 
between the cognitive empathy scores and the overall mean reaction times in the 
transformation task. However, no significant relationship was found between them (r (13 0) 
= -. 065, p> . 23). As a control comparison, the correlation between the cognitive empathy 
scores and the overall mean reaction times in the mirror task was analysed too; r (13 0) =- 
. 07 1, p> .21. 
5.3.3,4ttachment 
Participants had a mean score of 3.51 ± 0.91 for anxiety and 3.07 ± 0.88 for 
avoidance on the ECR questionnaire. A Pearson correlations analysis suggested 
independence between the two dimensions of attachment (r (130) = 0.15, p>. 08). Two 
one-way ANOVAs found no gender bias on either dimension of attachment (Anxiety: men 
3.43 versus women 3.59, F (1,128) = 0.93, p> .33; Avoidance: men 3.20 versus women 
3.93, F (1,128) = 3.14, p> . 07). 
Partial correlation (one-tailed; in order to manifest relation with the cognitive style 
with more sensibility) after controlling for gender and the VI cognitive style revealed no 
significant relationships between the WA style ratios and anxiety/avoidance scores, both p 
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> . 19. However, after controlling 
for gender and the WA cognitive style, the VI style ratios 
were found to be marginally correlated with the attachment anxiety (r (126) = -. 13 7, p 
= . 06) but irrelevant to the attachment avoidance 
(p > . 25). A negative correlation with 
attachment anxiety was found for female participants (r (63) = -. 213, p <. 05) but not for 
males (p > . 23) (after controlling 
for the WA cognitive style). 
5.4 Discussion 
This chapter aimed to investigate the hypothesised relationships between the two 
dimensions of cognitive style (WA and VI) and self related concepts. Previous research 
has suggested that both the WA and the VI cognitive style can theoretically (but 
differentially) associate with the self- or other-related perceptions, which involve, for 
instance, the embodiment/disembodiment process, empathy-, and attachment-related 
behaviours (e. g. Korchin, 1986; Riding, 1991; Riding & Rayner, 1998; Witkin et al., 1979; 
Witkin & Goodenough, 1977). Those hypotheses have been partially confirmed by the 
results and they will be discussed in turn with the two dimensions of cognitive style 
separately. 
5.4.1 The WA Cognitive Style 
The WA cognitive style has been found to have an effect on the 
embodied/disembodied tasks. It was initially assumed that the superior disembedding 
ability of analytic individuals should facilitate the disembodiment process. Accordingly 
analytic participants should exhibit an improved performance on the disembodied 
(transformation) task but not on the embodied (mirror) task (H I a). However, it was found 
that wholist individuals showed superiority in both the embodied and disembodied task 
after eliminating the confounding effect of gender. 
This finding could be explained with other hypotheses concerning empathy and 
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attachment, respectively: 1) wholists were favoured in the empathy related perspective 
taking (disembodied) task because they are more empathic (Hlb); and/or 2) wholists are 
more emphasising on social desires (H4) so that they may have spent longer time in front 
of miffors, which resulted in an enhanced performance in the miffor (embodiment) task. 
However combining with the findings of empathy and attachment anxiety/avoidance 
(other-/self-orientation), the two explanations seem not to be supported. 
The WA cognitive style dimension appears to be independent from the empathy 
continuum (H2 was not supported). Hence, wholist individuals do not entail better 
empathetic ability to facilitate the egocentric transformation. The first explanation is not 
likely to be supported. 
The finding seems to be conflicting with some previous findings, which have 
reported an autistic superiority on the EFT (Shah & Frith, 1983; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 
1997). It was suggested that people with autism, who are characterised with a detail- 
focused type of information processing (Frith, 1989), have a strong tendency to be 
categorised as FIs/analytics. Hence, the WA cognitive style might coincide with the autism 
- which was inversely correlated with empathy dimension (Baron-Cohen, spectrum, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). However, it was found not to be the case 
in the result. 
This could be caused by the fact that the relationship between the WA style and the 
extent of male/female brain (empathising - systernising balance; Baron-Cohen, 2002; 2003) 
is not as obvious in normal population as it may appears in the group with autism. It is 
noteworthy that there were also a few studies, which failed to reveal such an autistic 
superiority on the EFT (Brian & Bryson, 1996; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 199 1), 
suggesting that such a relationship may not be a stable one. ,, 
Moreover, the FDI measure (EFT) used in those studies was constantly questioned. 
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concerning its operational definition (measuring 'style' or 'ability? See Chapter 2). It is 
possible that autistic individuals incidentally have a superior ability in locating an 
embedded shape in a drawing but such ability is not really anything to do with the 'style'. 
Riding and Wigley (1997) surveyed 340 healthy college students (aged 17-18 years) with a 
series of measures of personality and attitude, and concluded (using a principal 
components analysis) a distinct dimension of empathy from cognitive style. Therefore, 
although previous research has linked the WA cognitive style with varied social tendencies 
(e. g. Riding & Rayner, 1998; Witkin & Goodenough, 1977), the relationship between the 
WA cognitive style and empathy needs more studies to substantiate. 
Additionally, one's preferred way of organising information (holistic or in parts) 
appears not to influence self- or other-oriented perception/behaviour. First, wholist 
participants did not demonstrate more anxiety about how other people would judge 
him/her (attachment anxiety; H4 was not supported). As a result, they are not more 
motivated to spend longer in front of mirrors because of the social pressure (i. e. to please 
their attached figures, such as a romantic partner). Thus the second explanation of the 
wholist superiority in embodiment/disembodiment tasks is not supported, either. Likewise, 
analytic people were not more avoidant and self-focused in relationships with their loved 
ones (attachment avoidance; HS was not supported), despite they were described as being 
more distant and separate in their social environments (Riding, 1991; Riding & Wright, 
1995; Witkin & Goodenough, 1977), and less interested in social information (Eagle et al., 
1969; Fitzgibbons et al., 1965; Witkin et al., 197 1). However, it should be kept in mind 
that this data merely concerns the self-/other-oriented behaviours with close others and it 
may differ from a more widespread environment with strangers. Probably this is the reason 
for the inconsistency between the present finding and previous observations of social 
behaviours; with wholist and analytic individuals. 
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Returning to the first question: if the wholist superiority in the two 
embodiment/disembodiment tasks was not because of mediating factors such as empathy 
and attachment anxiety, then what is the reason? The only explanation is the common 
underlying mechanism of the two tasks. Arzy et al. (2006) who have tested 
embodiment/disembodiment tasks with EEG recordings have identified activity in the left 
EBA to be involved in both tasks. It was suggested that EBA is associated with processing 
and coding of human bodies (e. g. Astafiev et al., 2004; Downing et al., 2001; Grossman & 
Blake, 2002; Saxe, Jamal, & Powell, 2006; Urgesi, Berlucchi, & Aglioti, 2004). 
Accordingly, Jeannerod (2004) presumed that this region could be potentially involved 
within self processing as it may represent the spatial self. Furthermore, Arzy et al. (2006) 
concluded that EBA was activated by the coding of human bodies and body parts. Whether 
mentally staying embodied (keeping'the spatial self inside the body) or disembodying the 
self location (localising the spatial self outside of the body), the process must be based on a 
holistic bodily self perception. In order to form the perception of the spatial self, an 
integration of the multisensory body-related information is required. In line with this, 
wholists are suggested to demonstrate advantage in this integrated bodily self process by 
their superior ability of holistic organisation. It is probably the reason why they showed 
enhanced performance in both the embodied/disembodied tasks. However, without a 
comparative experimental condition (i. e. embodiment/disembodiment of body parts rather 
than the whole body) it might have reduced the certainty of the assertion. More research 
related to this issue is required to confirm the hypothesis. 
The lack of analytic superiority in the disembodied task and in the cognitive 
empathy scores suggests that the ability of disembedding a part from a whole has little 
relevance in terms of the capability of mentally taking another person's perspective, either 
physically or emotionally. Notwithstanding, the current results did not provide any 
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supportive evidence to the proposition that the two processes (physically or emotionally 
taking someone's perspective) may share a common mechanism (Davis et al., 2004; 
Vogeley & Fink, 2003). 
5.4.2 The VI Cognitive Style 
In contrast with the WA cognitive style, the VI dimension of cognitive style 
showed no effect on the embodied/disembodied tasks. (1-16 was not supported. ) The 
tendency of an external/internal focus of the VI cognitive style does not particularly 
facilitate/inhibit the disembodiment process of the self location at all, neither the 
embodiment process. 
Nevertheless, the VI cognitive style ratios were found to increase with the cognitive 
empathy scores and affective empathy scores, and consequently the total empathy scores. 
(1-17 was supported. ) Imagers exhibited a superiority compared to verbalisers in both 
understanding other's mental states (cognitive empathy) and providing simultaneous 
emotional responses to the affective states of others (affective empathy). Imagers, who are 
characterised with the ability to rebuild mental images of the outside world internally, may 
elicit more direct experience of others'. feelings based on their vivid representations of the 
situations. In other words, imagers are able to imitate mentally the social setting of others' 
cognitive states that leading to better empathising. Accordingly, they may also feel more 
intuitive to offer emotional responses based on the 'first-hand' impression of others' 
affective states. Verbalisers, who in contrast are inclined to represent information in a 
more abstract linguistic form-like way, might tend to be more 'systemising' than 
'empathising' (Baron-Conhen & Wheelwright, 2004). Thus they are less capable of coding 
others' emotional states and reacting with simultaneous feedback. Furthermore, the scores 
of 'social skills' of empathy were found to be independent from the VI cognitive style 
ratios. This finding coincides with the prediction that this factor of empathy is acquired 
128 
from social learning and hence has little relevance to one's own cognitive styles. 
In addition, there was found a tendency for the verbal participants to have a higher 
anxious level of attachment than the imagery ones, but only for female participants (118 
was partially supported). The avoidance scores were found to be independent from the VI 
cognitive style ratios (H9 was not supported). The VI cognitive style was initially thought 
to have an effect on the self-/other-oriented social attention by influencing the focus and 
type of an individual's activities (Riding & Rayner, 1998). Verbalisers are assumed to be 
externally focused and socially active; hence, they are more likely to be other-oriented (e. g. 
higher level of attachment anxiety). Imagers are more internally focused and socially 
passive, and accordingly, show more self-oriented behaviour (e. g. higher level of 
attachment avoidance). The inconsistency between the hypotheses and the results can be 
explained in two aspects. 
First, the self-orientation of the attachment avoidance is based on the mistrust of 
close others resulting from an infancy experience (e. g. Bartholemew & Horowitz, 1991). 
The impression of mistrust may last for life. And the resulting self-oriented social 
behaviours would solidify this impression by evading any more interactions with other 
people. Thereby, it is not necessary to relate to the internal focus of imagers. In contrast, 
the other-orientation of anxiously attached individuals is encouraged to over-attend to 
others' reactions and consequently they are always reinforced in the way they represent the 
world. For example, an anxious girl one day heard her friend said the dress she was 
wearing did not suit her. She was probably taking this seriously and checking all dresses in 
her wardrobe. And on following days, she attended more to her ftiend's comments on her 
, 
dressing. The external focus and verbal coding of a verbaliser would reinforce this process 
(e. g. as a verbaliser, she is inclined to listen to others' suggestions and she is more 
sensitive to the implications of what others are saying, etc. ). As a result, the influence of 
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the attachment anxiety and the verbal coding can be added up on social oriented 
behaviours. 
Secondly, Riding and his colleague (1997; see Riding & Rayner, 1998) have 
reported that male imagers and female verbalisers were more likely to perceive the 
negative aspects of information. They concluded therefore that male imagers and female 
verbalisers were more pessimistic than male verbalisers and female imagers. This previous 
finding might explain the female-only effect found in the current study. For women, 
verbalisers are those who are sensitive to others' comments and tend to perceive 
information as negative. Thus the feedback is more likely to be negative concerning their 
perception of self which would further reinforce their attachment anxiety. Female imagers 
would have less chance to perceive such negative perceptions of the self and accordingly 
are less anxious. For men, the situation is reversed. Male verbalisers would explore more 
externally and seek outside feedback, but they would not treat the feedback as pessimistic 
as in the case of the female verbalisers. Whilst male imagers would be inclined to perceive 
information from outside as negative feedback, they are not as extroverted as verbalisers 
are. In sum, the gender x style interaction makes the VI cognitive style show a zero effect 
on attachment anxiety for men. 
5.4.3 The Gender Differences 
In addition, besides the interaction with the VI cognitive style on attachment 
anxiety, gender was found an influential factor on empathy and the mirror (embodiment) 
task. Although these gender effects did not interact with cognitive styles, it is worthy to be 
mentioned. 
Consistent with previous findings (e. g. Baron-Cohen etal., 2003; Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004; Lawrence et al., 2004), the present study replicated the female 
superiority on empathy. That is, overall women are more empathic than men in self-report. 
130 
However, interesting results were reported when dividing empathy into three components; 
cognitive empathy, affective empathy, and social skills. Men are not as inferior as it was 
thought in all empathic behaviours. Rather, they have the same level of ability as women 
to comprehend others' emotional states (i. e. cognitive empathy) and to apply rules into 
social judgements (i. e. social skills). The only difference is that men might be more 
inhibited from spontaneously responding to someone else' feelings, namely, the affective 
empathy. Such a finding is of value in considering the gender difference in future empathy 
research. 
Moreover, women were reported to react significantly faster than men in the front- 
facing condition of mirror (embodiment) task, but not in the back-facing condition. The 
explanation of this interaction could be drawn from daily life experience. Women 
generally spend longer time in front of mirrors because of the social pressure of 
appearance concerns. Inferentially they are more skilful than men doing the front-facing 
mirror judgements. 
5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has investigated the effect of the WA and the VI cognitive style on 
self- or other-related processes with both behavioural and self-report measures. 
Accordingly, the WA cognitive style is argued to be associated with integrated body- 
related infonnation rather than a disembodiment process. Wholists are advantageous in 
representing body-related information into a whole, and thus showed better performance in 
both the embodied/disembodied tasks. In contrast, the VI cognitive style demonstrated an 
effect on empathy in that imagers showed superiority in understanding and simultaneously 
responding to others' emotional states. It was argued this is attributed to the coding 
advantage of imagers in that they are able to hold a more detailed and vivid impression of 
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others' mental states. In addition, the female verbalisers appeared to be more anxiously 
attached to their partners than female imagers. Given the previous finding, it is suggested 
that this is caused by a co-effect of the external focus of verbalisers and the particular 
tendency to perceive the negative information of female verbalisers. However, caution 
must be drawn concerning those conclusions about the VI cognitive style. There are 
findings that have suggested the VI test of CSA is not a reliable measure as Riding has 
expected (see Chapter 1). And so its validitY would be compromised. Is that true? The next 
chapter will work closely on this issue. 
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CHAPTER 6. THEORETICAL VALIDITY OF THE VERBAL-IMAGERY 
COGNITIVE STYLE 
The review in Chapter I clearly showed that the VI dimension has little support in 
terms of reliability and validity when compared to the WA dimension of cognitive style. 
Although the Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 197 1 a) has provided strong theoretical support 
for the VI dimension and numerous educationalists have claimed successful applications of 
the VI style in educational practice (see Pearson, 2007; Riding & Rayner, 1998), its 
construct validity still needs to be confinned. The contradiction between the advantageous 
theory application and the poor empirical examination of the construct compromises the 
research on the VI cognitive style. Thus, more experimental evidence is needed in this area; 
and this is the main focus of Chapter 6. In addition, given the poor reliability record of the 
VI test of CSA, there is confusion in the research of the VI style about whether the lack of 
validity results from the low level of reliability. To clarify this issue, an improved 
measurement of this dimension of cognitive style would be required, and the chapter 
attempts to do this. 
This chapter is in three parts. First, an introduction to a revised test of the VI style - 
the Verbal-Imagcry Cognitive Style test (VICS) - is presented with an improved reliability 
as a substitute for the VI test of CSA. Then, an investigation of the relationship between 
the VI cognitive style (measured by VICS) and several other individual difference 
constructs is covered. It aimed to establish the relationship between the (in-built) VI 
cognitive style and other psychological/physiological constructs, such as learning 
modalities, brain dominance, and handedness, in order to manifest its construct validity. 
However, no significant relationship was revealed. Finally, three cognitive tasks are 
employed to determine the theoretical hypothesis (i. e. the operational definition) of the VI 
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cognitive style by a priming paradigm. Hypothesised effects (according to the operational 
definition of the VI cognitive style) were not found. In sum, the results provided liftle 
evidence to support the construct validity of the VI cognitive style with current operational 
definition notwithstanding the confounding effect of the measure's reliability has been 
eliminated. It thus suggested a cautious re-consideration of the VI cognitive style itself. 
6.1 Revision of the CSA: The VICS test 
6 LIA n Introduction to the V1CS Test 
Concerns have been raised about the unsatisfactory reliability (see Chapter 1) of the 
VI test of tSA to determine VI cognitive style. This leads to a need to seek a substitute 
measure with improved reliability. However, the CSA did indicate that it had strong 
theoretical support and practical applications (e. g. Peterson et al., 2005a). To improve the 
test but still keep its advantages, Peterson and her colleagues (Peterson et al., 2003; 2005a) 
developed a new test of the VI cognitive style - VICS - on the basis of the CSA, which has 
addressed of the flaws of CSA outlined in Chapter 1. The main improvements will be 
discussed in turn (based on the Administration Guide of VICS; Peterson, 2005). 
First, and most importantly the new test (VICS) modifies the stimulus questions. As 
participants might have confusion about whether two items are the 'same type' or the 
Gsame colour', the questions in the VICS test have been designed to be more objective and 
culture-independent. Questions for participants include being presented with two objects 
and asked to judge if they are 'Natural' or 'Man-made' (verbal task) or which object is 
bigger in real life (imagery task). These two tasks keep the verbal and imagery nature, but 
provide further advantages in that the distinctions/similarity between the two objects 
become more significant. -- 
Second, the VICS test uses the same stimuli in both the verbal and imagery tasks. 
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That is, a pair of objects is judged twice: once for size, once for being natural or man-made. 
This successfully solves the problem in the VI test of the CSA that the stimuli in the verbal 
and imagery tasks might not be well matched. 
Third, the VICS test presents each stimulus in both picture and word form, so that 
both verbalisers and imagers have a chance to represent the stimuli in their preferred 
circumstance. And the result report provides more detailed information including 
participants' reaction time, correct answers, etc. to each question, which enables 
researchers to do potential in-depth analyses or exclude outlier data. Hence, researchers 
can calculate a ratio in a variety of ways, for example, verbal task in total with imagery 
task in total, verbal tasks in words with imagery task in pictures, etc. Moreover, the VICS 
test enables researchers to use the median reaction times to calculate the VI style ratio and 
this reduces the influence of any outliers. 
Furthermore, practice phases have been added in the test to ensure that participants 
do know how to perform the tasks prior to the formal testing. And the VICS test has 
extended stimuli numbers to 232, which should be sufficiently increase reliability (Rezaei 
& Katz, 2004). 
The VICS is a rather new measure for the VI cognitive style. However, there is 
experimental evidence that its internal consistency and test-re-test stability are 
satisfactorily high. For instance, authors of the test (e. g. Peterson et al., 2003; 2005a; 
2005b) have reported the internal consistency of VICS was stably high (r > . 72) and the 
test-re-test reliability was more acceptable (r ; -- .5 6) compared to the original CSA test (i. e. 
internal consistency < . 03; test-re-test stability < .3 1). Thus, it is considered to be a suitable 
substitute measure in this study to examine the validity of the VI dimension of cognitive 
style without considering the interference from the measure's poor reliability. 
In addition, the internal consistency of the VICS test and its relation with the 
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original CSA test will be further examined in the first section of this chapter (6.1). The 
following hypotheses should be supported if the VICS test is an appropriate measure for 
the VI cognitive style: 
III. The VICS test should show a high split-half reliability in the present sample. 
H2. The VICS test should show a correlation with the VI test of CSA because of its 
theoretical inheritance; however, the correlation might be moderate. 
61.2 Method 
6.1.2.1 Design 
A correlational design was used. The WA ratios and the VI ratios of CSA and the 
ratios from VICS test (including two split-half ratios) were treated as independent 
variables. 
61.2.2 Participants 
The 91 participants of the study were psychology students enrolled at the 
University of Bristol. All participants were native English speakers with no dyslexics. 
They took part in the study for the reward of course credit. Seventy-three of the 
participants were female. (Although the number of women in the sample is 
disproportionately high, it was argued to be acceptable. Riding (1997) consistently 
suggested that the cognitive style is independent from gender difference and previous 
studies (see Riding, 2005; plus all the samples within this thesis) have not found any 
significant gender difference with respect to the VI dimension of cognitive style. ) The age 
of participants ranged from 17 to 44 years with a mean age of 20 years (SD = 4.31 years). 
61.2.3 Materials 
Computerised versions of the VICS test (Peterson, 2005) and the CSA test (Riding, 
2005) were used to determine participants' style ratios. 
The VICS test contains new sections (verbal versus imagery), which include 232 
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stimuli in total (Rossion & Pourtois, 2001; Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980). The verbal 
and the imagery sections, which display the same items of stimuli, have different 
instructions of tasks. In the verbal section, participants are required to answer the category 
question "Are A and B natural? ". There are three possible responses to each question: 
"Yes"', "No", or, "Mixed" by pressing labelled number keys 1,2,3. The extra "Mixed" 
response, which was not included in the original CSA, is added to ensure that participants 
perceive both items (A and B) in each question in the verbal task. Qtherwise, if the two 
items are always congruent (i. e. both natural or both man-made), participants may respond 
correctly by looking at only one and guessing the other. Feedback of correctness is given 
after each response. In the imagery section, participants are asked size questions: for 
example, "Is A bigger than BT' They are required to answer the question according to real 
sizes, as in the picture form the two objects are always presented as a similar size. There 
are also three possible answers: "Yes", "No", and (approximately) "Equal". Feedback is 
given after responses. Accordingly, the "Equal" responses in the imagery task are designed 
to be consistent with the verbal task. 
There are 58 different questions in each section (with only a few with a "Mixed" or 
"Equal" response). Each of them is presented in both a word form and a picture form. This 
solution is designed to fix the confounding effect that individuals with various VI styles 
might respond differently to picture and word based stimuli. Consequently, there were 116 
questions in each section (verbal and imagery) and 232 questions in total. The presentation 
of stimuli is randomised within each test section. 
Instruction is given before the testing of either the verbal or imagery section with - 
example items (correct responses presented) and a practice session. The latter is an 
improvement to the CSA as it prevents participants from making mistakes or confounding 
delays occurring because of misunderstanding of the manipulation. 
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The reaction time and accuracy for each item are recorded. Similar to the CSA, the 
assumption underlying the test is that individuals always respond faster to their preferred 
'style' of processing. Consequently, verbalisers will generally respond faster to the 
category questions in verbal-form than to the size questions in picture-form. In contrast, 
imagers perform in the opposite direction. By comparing the participant's average reaction 
time on each task (verbal and imagery), a ratio that captures the person's preference of the 
verbal or imagery representation of information can be calculated. 
In addition, the VICS test has provided a variety of ways to investigate participants' 
VI style of cognitive process. For example, ratios can be calculated in each stimulus form 
(words or pictures) by mean or median reaction times. However, the present study only 
uses an overall ratio (including all stimuli both in words and in pictures) for median 
reaction times to represent each participant's position on the VI style preference continuum 
(Peterson et al., 2005a). The two additional split-half VICS ratios are also calculated by 
joint median reaction times based on both the word-form and picture-form stimuli. 
6 1.2.4 Procedures 
Participants were first tested by the CSA measure at the start of the test session. The 
VICS test was displayed after at least a one-hour gap (when they have completed some 
other tasks that will be presented in Section 6.2 and 6.3). Participants were not given any 
explanation about their cognitive styles until they had completed the final VICS test. 
6.1.3 Results 
The results of the two cognitive style measures are shown in. Table 6.1. In order to 
examine the internal consistency of the VICS test, responses of the test were randomly 
split in half in each subsection (e. g. Natural, Mixed, Man-made - verbal task; Bigger, 
Equal, Smaller - imagery task). As a result, two more VICS ratios 
based on the split-half 
responses were calculated for each participant (namely, VICSJ, VICS_ii). The 
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correlations between the ratios are given in Table 6.1. 
The internal consistency was reflected by the correlation between the split-half 
VICS ratios VICSJ and VICS_ii, which was consistently high with previous findings, r 
(9 1) = 0.75 8, p< . 00 1. HI was supported. In addition, both the split-half VICS ratios were 
highly correlated with the overall VICS ratios (i. e. both r> . 84), which further supported 
the test's intemal reliability. 
The VI ratios of CSA were significantly correlated with both the overall VICS 
ratios and the two split-half VICS ratios (all p <. 05), but the correlations themselves were 
moderate (r value ranges from . 24 to .3 1). The finding was consistent with H2. 
Table 6.1 
Correlations between the style ratios with the means and standard deviations (SD) from 
two tests 
Mean SD WA-CSA VI-CSA vics VICS-i 
WA-CSA 1.22 0.37 
VI-CSA 1.04 0.12 . 055 
vics 0.91 0.15 . 077 . 310--- 
VICS-i 0.94 0.18 . 074 . 295-* . 863*** 
VICS-ii 0.87 0.16 . 113 . 242* . 845*** 0.758*** 
Note. WA-CSA = WA ratio of CSA; VI-CSA =- VI ratio of CSA; VICS = overall ratio of VICS; VICS_i, 
VICS-ii = two split-half ratios of VICS 
*p<. 05; **p <. Ol; ***p <. 001 
In addition, all VICS ratios, either overall or split-half, stayed low and non- 
significantly correlated with the WA ratio (all p> . 05). This finding further testified 
Riding's (1997) claim of the independence between the WA and VI style dimension and 
supported the construct validity of the VICS test. 
61.4 Discussion 
The first section of Chapter 6 introduced a newly developed measure of the VI 
cognitive style, which has improved a number of the design flaws that have been proposed 
in Chapter 1. The analyses indicated that the VICS test is highly internally consistent (r 
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> . 75) compared to the original 
VI test of CSA which showed a very poor internal 
consistency (r < . 03; Peterson et al., 
2003). In addition, its moderate but significant 
correlation with the VI test of CSA and the low correlation with the WA test of CSA 
further establish the validity of this measure to some extent. Consequently, all these, 
combined with the previous studies of its satisfactory test-re-test'reliability (e. g. Peterson 
et al., 2005a; 2005b), have made the VICS test a suitable substitute for the measure of the 
VI cognitive style since the possible confounding effect caused by the poor measure 
reliability could now be eliminated. Hence, the VICS ratios will represent participants' VI 
cognitive styles in the following analyses. 
In the next two sections (6.2 and 6.3), questionnaires and behavioural tasks will be 
conducted to determine the construct validity of the VI cognitive style. 
6.2 The Relationship behveen the VI Cognitive Style and Other Individual Difference 
Constructs 
6.2.1 Introduction 
In a recent survey of the definition of styles among researchers and experts, the 
cognitive style has been conceptualised as a kind of individual difference that exhibits the 
64... way of processing (perceiving, organising and analysing) information using cognitive 
brain-based mechanisms and structures... " and is "... partially fixed and relatively stable" 
(E. Peterson, S. Rayner, & S. Armstrong, personal communication, May 21,2008). 
Therefore, the cognitive style, in this case, the VI style, would be expected to have a 
relationship with other individual differences that are also linked to brain-based 
mechanisms. Section 6.2 includes three psychological/physiological indexes (learning 
modality, brain dominance, and handedness) in conjunction with the VI cognitive style in 
order to manifest such a relationship. Each will be described in turn. 
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6 2. LI Learning Modality 
Humans have five basic senses: vision, hearing, touch, smell, and taste. The term 
perceptual modality refers to the sensory channel via which input is received (Reiff, 1992). 
Among them, visual, auditory, and kinaesthetic are thought to be the three major sensory 
modalities during learning activities (Eislzer, 1983). Two surveys have shown that about 
40% of children are visual modality dominant, 20-30% of children are auditory modality 
dominant, and the remaining 30-40% of children are kinaesthetic modality dominant 
(Dunn & Dunn, 1978; Haggart, 1995). There are few studies of the distribution of adults' 
dominant modality, but there is evidence that about half of the adult population have a 
preference for a predominant visual learning modality (Bell & Fogler, 1997; Kirby, Moore, 
& Schofield, 1988) and the majority of western students have been found to be visual 
modal ity. dominant, too (Wallace, 1995). 
Visual modality learners like shape, form, and images; while auditory learners 
prefer to hear someone's voice. The kinaesthetic modality can be divided into tactile and 
kinaesthetic channels; however, they were usually combined together in research (Grinder, 
1989). Kinaesthetic learners have a desire to sense (e. g. position, movement, etc. ) while 
tactile learners like to touch the materials. When the presented information is not in their 
preferred modality, people often try to transfer it. For instance, auditory learners may 
transfer visually presented information into auditory form by verbally describing it to 
themselves. Visual learners can transfer auditory information to visual format by conjuring 
images from the words (Pimentel & Teixeira, 1992). 
There is a belief that learning will be enhanced if materials are presented in 
multiple modalities (Yates, 1966). For instance, Veenema and Gardner (1996) suggested 
that multimedia can facilitate learning by presenting information in both pictorial and 
textual manners. Some researchers have argued that the multi-modality input actually 
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increases the possibility that enables people to perceive information via their favoured 
modality channel (e. g. Riding & Ashmore, 1980; Riding & Douglous, 1993; Riding & 
Grimly, reported in Riding & Rayner, 1998). In other words, individuals have preferences 
of learning with a particular modality, similar to cognitive styles or learning styles 
(Fleming & Mills, 1992). When information is presented via multiple modalities, an 
individual can always choose information in a particular modality that matches his/her 
leaming preferences and thus leads to an enhanced performance. 
Although there is no official theory of perceptual modalities, it has been mentioned 
in the theory of Multiple Intelligences (Gardner, 1993). Currently, there are a number of 
different versions of learning modality questionnaire available for investigation. In the 
present study, the Barsch Learning Style Inventory (adapted from Barsch, 1991; see 
Appendix G) has been chosen for the identification of participants' dominant leaming 
modalities. 
Little research has been carried out to study the relationship between the VI 
cognitive style and learning modality preference. However, the general empiricist 
assumption suggests that mental processes retain the modality; that is, specific properties 
from the sensory channel via which information is derived would remain for following 
processes. The Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 2007) has claimed a modality-specific nature 
of representation. That is, the main sensory channel by which the individual acquires 
information will affect the subsequent manner of information processing. Accordingly, 
one's favoured perceptual modality could be related to his/her preferred approach of 
information processing. For example, Riding and his colleagues have reported that 
generally imagers learn better from pictorial presentation while verbalisers learn better 
from verbal presentation (see Riding & Rayner, 1998). Therefore, an empirical 
relationship between one's dominant modality in learning and his/her preferred way of 
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infonnation representation (i. e. the VI cognitive style) can be expected. (See Subsection 
6.2.1.4 for corresponding hypotheses. ) 
6 2.1.2 Brain Dominance 
Brain activity is another important index for the VI cognitive style. A review of the 
literature suggests that, after simplifying the concept, generally the left hemisphere of the 
brain is the location of verbal function whilst the right hemisphere is the location of 
imagery processing (see e. g. Bisiach & Berti, 1990; Borod, Bloom, Brickman, Nakhutina, 
& Curko, 2002; Gazzaniga, 1998; 2005; Geschwind & Miller, 2001; Langhinrichsen & 
Tucher, 1990; Riss, 1984). To be more precise, cognitive behaviours depend on the 
conjoint functioning of the left and right cerebral hemispheres (Hellige, 1993). That is, for 
performing a task, both brain hemispheres would make their respective contributions. 
However, significant asymmetries (brain dominance) exist within specific tasks. For 
instance, the left hemisphere is normally dominant for language and logical processing (e. g. 
mathematical and logical reasoning), whereas the right hemisphere is specified for emotion 
and spatial processing, such as shape recognition, spatial attention, musical and artistic 
functions, etc. 
Numerous studies have revealed that performance on visual perceptual and spatial 
tasks can be selectively impaired following damage to the right cerebral hemisphere while 
the left hemisphere provides an overwhelming advantage for most linguistic tasks (see 
review in Paivio, 2007). Besides the differential effects caused by unilateral brain lesions, 
stimuli intentionally presented to the left or right hemisphere for neurologically normal 
individuals or commissurotornised patients lead to differing performance profiles'(Hellige, 
1993). 
Based on this, Levy (1990) proposed that the verbal and the spatial performance 
can be predicted by measuring the balance of hemispheric activation. In line, Cohen (1982) 
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has hypothesised that individual differences in left-right brain electrical activity might be 
relevant to cognitive style differences. Riding, Glass, and Douglas (1993) reviewed several 
electroencephalogram (EEG) studies on verbal and imagery processing and concluded that 
the EEG alpha suppression during information processing was left hemisphere dominant 
for verbalisers and right hemisphere dominant for imagers. 
Therefore, the VI cognitive- style is asserted to be relevant to the left-right brain 
dominance with left-brain dominance for verbal individuals and right-brain dominance for 
imagery individuals. 
62.1.3 Handedness 
The assessment of handedness is a standard procedure in many neuropsychological 
related investigations of human behavioural asymmetries. It has been linked with 
lateralised 
-functions 
in the brain for a long time. 
Unlike many other individual differences, the distribution of handedness is an 
atypical J-shaped curve because of the majority of right-handers in the general population. 
Previous research has revealed that the left hemisphere controls movements of the right 
side of the body while the right hemisphere regulates movements of the left side of the 
body (Corballis, 2003). In the normal population, most humans (circa. 90%) are naturally 
more skilled with their right hand compared to the left hand (Sun & Walsh, 2006), which 
manifests a left-brain dominance. In contrast, non-humans have a fairly even distribution 
of the left- and right- handedness (see Annett, 1967). Such a unique asymmetric 
distribution of handedness in humans is suggested to be a result of a genetic basis 
emanating from a long history of evolution, but it is still thought to be somewhat 
susceptible to a cultural bias (Corballis, 1997). Annett (1998) proposed a 'right shift' 
theory to explain the human handedness asymmetry with an evolutionary perspective. She 
assumed that it results from an adaptively developed favour of the left cerebral hemisphere 
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in language activities; handedness is the secondary consequence of this development. 
There is enormous experimental evidence to support Annett's postulation of 
handedness. For instance, left-handedness was found to increase the occurrence of right- 
hemisphere language dominance (Corballis, 2003). The previous section (6.2.1.2) has 
presented the general advantage of the left brain hemisphere in linguistic processing. 
However, the left hemisphere dominance in language exists in more than 95% of the right- 
handed population but in only 70% of the left-handed population (Corballis, 2003). Some 
recent studies (e. g. Knecht et al., 2000; Pujol, Deus, Losilla, & Capdevila, 1999) even 
suggested a linear relationship between the two indexes. 
Congruent with Annett's (1998) theory, Paivio (2007) commented in his Dual 
Coding Theory that the verbal system is also a consequence of the requirement of language 
activities. Compared to the non-verbal system, the verbal system emerges much later 
during human evolution. Inferentially, modem humans are inclined to be more right- 
handed compared to non-humans because of the evolutionary emergence of the verbal 
system of coding (which was suggested to be located in the left cerebral hemisphere). 
Therefore, handedness must to some extent be related to the verbal system in a brain-based 
mechanism, and consequently, to the VI dimension of cognitive style. Thus it is proposed 
that verbalisers, who focus more on the verbal system of representation, are more likely to 
be right-handed. Imagers, in contrast, are less dependent on the verbal system of coding, 
are likely to be left-handed. 
6 2.1.4 Hypotheses 
According to the previous review, proposed relationships between the VI cognitive 
style and an individual's preferred learning modality, brain dominance, and handedness are 
as follows: 
H3. Imagery individuals tend to be visual modality dominant as the visually input 
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information (containing more visual properties) might facilitate the following imagery 
mental representation during processing. 
H4. Verbal individuals tend to be auditory modality dominant so that the 
information input and the information processing have the congruent verbal nature. 
H5. Verbal individuals tend to exhibit left-brain dominance whilst imagery 
individuals tend to show right-brain dominance in self-reports. 
H6. There will larger number of right-handers within verbalisers than within 
imagers, and will be larger number of left-handers within imagers than within vcrbalisers. 
6.2.2 Method 
62.2.1 Design 
This section of the study employed a between-subject design with the VI style 
groups (split based on the VICS ratios) as the independent variable. The dependent 
variables were participants' preferences of learning modality, brain dominance, and 
handedness. 
6.2.2.2 Participants 
The participants were the same as reported in Section 6.1 (n = 91). 
6.22.3 Materials 
In this and following part of the study, participants'VI cognitive style was 
represented by their VICS ratio (Peterson, 2005). 
Participants were also surveyed by three additional paper-and-pencil questionnaires 
of learning modality, brain dominance, and handedness. 
The Barsch Leaming Style Inventory (adapted from Barsch, 1991; see Appendix G) 
was employed to evaluate the degree to which an individual is predominantly visual, 
auditory, or kinaesthetic during learning activities. The inventory contains 24 statements of 
leaming activities for which participants are required to report how often each of them 
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happens (by three options: often, sometimes, and seldom). Each "often" response values 5 
points, "sometimes" response values 3 points, and "seldom" response values I point. The 
points are added up with the corresponding statements under each modality preference. 
The highest score, which is also the most frequent activity related modality, refers to an 
individual's predominant learning modality. 
The Brain-Dominance Inventory (original author unknown, revised by Davis, 1994; 
see Appendix H) examines the general individual difference in terms of which side of the 
brain one prefers for information processing. The questionnaire includes a series of 39 
questions of one's behaviours or attitudes with three possible responses (referring to a 
preference of left-brain processing, right-brain processing, or bi-lateral processing, 
respectively) to each question. Responses are scored for the choices of each side of the 
brain. Then, individuals can be classified into left- or right-brain dominant or whole brain 
dominant. 
Handedness was assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971; 
see Appendix I). This is a preference-based questionnaire consisting of 12 items. It is the 
most popular measure of handedness in research with a well-established test-re-test 
reliability (Ransil & Schachter, 1994). The inventory scores from 0 (very left-handed) to 
100 (very right-handed). Generally, those people scoring beyond 75 are grouped as right- 
handers while those scoring below 75 are grouped as non right-handers. 
6 2.2.4 Procedures 
Each participant was tested on the three paper-and-pencil questionnaires in a 
randomised order before the final VICS test. There was no time pressure for completing 
the questionnaires. 
6 2.2.5 Data Analysis 
Participants' results for handedness, brain dominance and modality preference were 
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recorded and analysed in the form of counts and percentages. One-way ANOVAs and Chi- 
squared ()? ) tests were performed to determine the significance of their relationship to the 
VI style groups. 
62.3 Results 
Individuals with differing VI cognitive style were categorised based on their 
median ratio of VICS test (0.902). Each Verbaliser had a VICS ratio of :50.902 while each 
imager had a VICS ratio of > 0.902. 
The results for learning modality preferences were recorded and totals were 
calculated for each of the three modalities (see Table 6.2). It was obvious from visual 
inspection of the table that the means of each modality scores varied little with respect to 
the VI style groups. Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted on the scores of visual, 
auditory, and kinaesthetic modality preference with the VI groups as a between-subject 
factor. The result showed there was no difference between the VI groups to any of the 
modality scores, all p> . 05. 
Table 6.2 
Mean scores (± standard deviations) of each modalityfor verbalisers and imagers 









T6tal 30 ±4 24 ±6 25 ±5 
An individual's dominant modality was decided according to in which modality, a 
participant's highest score was located. However, there were a few participants (n = 5) who 
had more than one dominant modality (i. e. two or three modalities had equal highest 
scores). In these cases, they were randomly assigned into one of their dominant learning 
modalities in order to be analysed. The distribution of the sample is shown in Table 6.3. It 
exhibited a majority of visual dominant individuals in the sample (about 71%), which was 
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congruent with previous findings (Bell & Fogler, 1997; Dunn & Dunn, 1979). The Chi- 
squared (e ) test showed no difference of dominant modalities between the VI groups, )e 
(2) = 0.004, p> . 99. 
Table 6.3 
Number andpercentage of learning modality groupsfor verbalisers and imagers 











Total 65(71.4%) 14(15.4%) 12(13.2%) 91(100%) 
The distribution of participants' brain dominance (i. e. left-brain dominant, bi-lateral, 
and right-brain dominant) in conjunction with their VI style groups is shown in Table 6.4. 
Again, no significant difference was reported by the Chi-squared &) test between the VI 
groups of their brain dominance, )e (2) = 0.934, p> . 62. 
Table 6.4 
Number and percentage of brain dominance groupsfor verbalisers and imagers 
Left-brain Bi-lateral Right-brain Total 
Dominant Dominant 
Verbalisers 26(56.5%) 11(23.9%) 9(19.6%) 46(100%) 
Imagers 21(46.7%) 14(31.1%) 10(22.2%) 45 (100%) 
Total 47(51.6%) 25(27.5%) 19(20.9%) 91(100%) 
Table 6.5 
Number andpercentage ofright- and left- handersfor verbalisers and imagers 









Total 16(18%) 75(82%) 91(100'/0) 
Participants were divided into left- and right-handed groups based on their 
handedness scores (i. e. left-handed: 5 75; right-handed > 75). Table 6.5 shows the 
distribution of the right- and left- handers within the VI groups. 'The Chi-squared ()e ) test 
showed that there were no differences between verbalisers and imagers in their handedness 
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distributions, )e (1) = 0.002, p> . 96. 
62.4 Discussion 
The verbal and the imagery participants in the present study were revealed to have 
almost identical distributions on predominant learning modality, brain hemisphere 
dominance, and handedness. Those results were inconsistent with the hypotheses H3 to H6. 
It was expected that the verbalisers and imagers would exhibit different preferences on the 
three neuropsychological related individual differences, as the VI cognitive style may 
share some brain-based common mechanisms with them. Consequently, the results failed 
to provide positive support to the construct validity of the VI cognitive style although the 
confounding effect from the poor reliability of the measure (i. e. CSA) has been eliminated 
by introducing the new VICS test. 
In addition, the restricted distribution of the VI style ratios of the present sample 
(0.91 ± 0.15; see Section 6.1) could be argued as being an important factor in the non- 
significant results. That is, the difference between the verbal style group and the imagery 
style group was too little to exhibit a decisive difference. Peterson (2005) has stated that 
those whose VI style ratios are between 0.8 and 1.0 probably have little or no style 
preference. Hence, these middle ranged participants, who were the majority of the study 
sample, probably inhibited the overall results from significant differences in predominant 
learning modality, brain hemisphere dominance, and handedness. 
However, it should be noted that it is not only the study sample but also the 
standardised sample (n = 376, mainly university students), which had a rather centred 
range of VICS ratios (0.99 ± 0.41). Further, concerning the original CSA test (Riding, 
2005), it was also found that the distribution of the VI ratios in a standardised sample (n 
999) seemed much more suppressed than of the WA ratios (VI ratios 1.06 ± 0.20 versus 
WA ratios 1.25 ± 0.45). (Comparatively, the CSA-VI ratios from the present sample were 
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1.04 ± 0.12. ) Accordingly, it is concluded that the majority of the population (according to 
the standardisation samples) bear a tiny variation of the VI style preference. Thus it should 
be regarded as rather a phenomenon than a confounding effect. (This will be further 
discussed in Section 6.3. ) 
In the next section (6.3), three behaviour experiments are introduced to examine 
further the validity of the VI cognitive style. 
6.3 The Effect of the VI Cognitive Style on Verbal/Imagery Priming Tasks 
6.3.1 Introduction 
In trying to establish whether a psychological construct exists, observed behaviours 
are the most important index; however, there has been rather a lack of this in the research 
on the VI cognitive style. This section aims to proffer experimental evidence for the 
validity of this dimension of cognitive style by using a priming paradigm. 
In general, the VI cognitive style is about the preferences for the form and function 
of individual knowledge, either verbal or imagery. The Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 
197 1 a) has established dissociation between a verbal system, which deals directly with 
linguistic materials, and a non-verbal (imagery) system, which is specialised for non- 
linguistic objects and events. The systems are thought to be composed of internal 
representational units; respectively, logogens (verbal units) and imagens' (imagery units). 
The most obvious distinction between the two modes of representations is that logogens 
(verbal representations) are language-like and imagens (imagery representations) are 
picture-like. Logogens include not only the forms of nature language, but also formal 
systems such as mathematics, symbolic logic, and computer language, etc. Imagens could 
include forms of photographs, drawings, maps, and diagrams etc. Verbal representations 
are characterised as being non-analogue, non-iconic, digital, or discrete, referentially 
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arbitrary, and propositional. While the features of imagery representations can be 
described as having analogue, iconic, continuous, and referentially isomorphic properties. 
Paivio (1971b) further linked the Dual Coding Theory to the verbal-imagery 
individual differences. He developed the Individual Differences Questionnaire (IDQ) to 
profile individuals' ability, habits, and preferences for the verbal- or the imagery- system. 
IDQ employs a series of true/false questions to measure participants' preferences for 
information processing, verbal or imagery. The responses result in a single dimension with 
high scores reflecting imagery tendency and low scores reflecting verbal tendency. Here, 
Paivio implied a dominant-non-dominant relationship between the two coding systems, 
which is proposed to be reflected in individual differences. 
Riding and Cheema (199 1) signified the VI cognitive style based on Paivio's 
(197 1 a; 197 1 b) work. They surnmarised it as a marked tendency that an individual 
consistently uses one representational system more than the other. However, this definition 
of the VI cognitive style remains vague to some extent. Riding and his colleagues (e. g. 
Riding & Rayner, 1998) did not clearly explain the relationship between the two 
representational systems and how it manifests in the VI style. It is apparent that every well 
human has the two representational systems and s/he is capable of using either during 
information processing. But what exactly does a 'preferred' mode mean? Is it that the 
verbal and non-verbal systems compete with each other and the 'preferred' style refers to 
the consistent winner? Or are the two representational systems actually functionally 
independent but one is more explicit than the other at output? And so on. This question is 
crucial to answer in order to clarify the nature of the VI cognitive style. 
There might be clues in its measurement; the VI test of CSA. The operational 
definition of the VI style (according to CSA and VICS) implies a one-or-the-other 
competing relationship between the verbal and imagery representations. The measure of 
152 
the VI cognitive style is based on the implicit assumption that in a given circumstance/task, 
only one of the two representing systems is activated. For example, an imager is defined 
by CSA as the person who responds faster to imagery questions than to verbal questions. 
In order to conclude this, the mean/median reaction time (either for the verbal or the 
imagery questions) must be a comprehensive representative of the speed of each 
representing process. That is, the individual only uses the imagery representations for the 
imagery questions and uses verbal representations for the verbal questions. Or, if both 
systems are activated for either questions, the VI reaction time ratio becomes meaningless. 
It is necessary to investigate whether such an assumption holds. If not, the validity 
of the VI cognitive style (or at least, the current measure of it) collapses no matter how 
reliable the measure is. However, little work has been done on this issue. Section 6.3 aims 
to examine the assumption of a competing VI dimension of representation by three 
priming tasks with the identical paradigm. In each of the tasks, participants were primed 
by images or words prior to the target test (either of an imagery or verbal nature). Three 
common findings were expected based on the competing VI dimension assumption: 
(a) One's preferred VI representational mode will enhance his/her performance 
on a congruent target task. For example, a verbaliser would respond generally faster than 
an imager in a lexical decision task as the word will be readily represented verbally; 
therefore, the comparison between the stimulus representation and the ones in a pre- 
existing lexicon is faster. 
(b) The congruent prime-target stimuli will facilitate the response latencies 
whereas the incongruent prime-target stimuli will inhibit'the responses. This is because in 
the incongruent situation the prime has evoked a conflicting representational system to the 
one of the target task, which would cause extra effort to reconcile. For example, an image 
prime would arouse imagery representing, which is conflicting with the following lexical 
153 
decision task. Therefore, there will be an inhibitory priming effect. In contrast, in the 
congruent situation the prime has pre-evoked the required representational system, and 
consequently saves time for the target task. A word prime would evoke the verbal coding 
system, which is consistent with the following lexical decision task. Hence, there will be a 
facilitating priming effect. 
(c) The VI cognitive style and prime-target congruency will function 
corporately on one's performance of the task. In the prime-target incongruent condition, 
participants may have to spend more time to reconcile their representation from their 
preferred representation mode (e. g. aroused in prime phase) to their unpreferred one (e. g. 
required in target task). For instance, a verbaliser might need more effort to quit the verbal 
representing system aroused by a word prime to attend the following mental image rotation 
task. This is because in a competing VI representing continuum, a 'preferred' mode of 
repr esentation should always refer to a more robust one (no matter verbal or imagery). 
Thus, it may need more effort to leave for another representing system. 
In the following subsections, the three prime tasks will be discussed in more details. 
6 3. LI Mental Rotation Task 
Mental rotation refers to a cognitive process of mentally imagining an object as 
turning around (Shepard & Metzler, 1971). This process is understood to be implemented 
in the parietal cortex (e. g. Jordan, Heinze, Lutz, Kanowski, & Jancke, 2001) and suggested 
to heavily depend upon the imagery system. A typical task that employs a classic mental 
rotation procedure usually presents two stimuli (e. g. 3D-cube figures) with varied angular 
disparity, and measure the reaction time taken for participants to decide whether the two 
figures match or not. The cognitive process of the mental rotation task can be functionally 
divided into five phases. They are: 1) perceptual encoding of the stimuli; 2) mental rotation; 
3) comparison; 4) decision making; and finally 5) response output. For the relationship 
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between these five phases of process, researchers have suggested that it is either strictly 
sequential (e. g. Stoffels, 1996) or only with very small overlap (e. g. Heil, 2002). 
Given the present study, the interest is in the encoding phase of mental rotation in 
conjunction with the VI dimension of cognitive style. One's VI style determines his/her 
verbal versus imagery preference for information encoding/representation. For example, an 
imager would represent the figures more efficiently than a verbaliser as the stimuli match 
the form of his/her favourite representing mode. Consequently it could shorten the entire 
response time of the mental rotation process for the imager. 
Furthermore, if the VI cognitive style refers to a single competing dimension with 
the verbal versus imagery representation, that is, if every time individuals tend to use only 
one mode of representation rather than another, then the mode of prime stimuli should 
affect the following process significantly. For instance, a pictorial prime will arouse the 
imagery coding in advance and shorten the following coding phase of image mental 
rotation. In contrast, a word prime will arouse the verbal coding system and interfere with 
the following (imagery) coding of stimulus figures. 
In addition, one's VI cognitive style, which is a person's principal mode for 
representing (i. e. being consistently used for coding rather than the other), will probably 
affect the priming effect as well. The priming effect is caused by whether or not the 
representing mode should be switched from one to the other. And leaving the primary (i. e. 
preferred) mode of representation for the secondary (i. e. un-preferred) one must require 
more effort than leaving the secondary mode of representation for the primary one. In this 
task, verbalisers' performance of mental rotation should be affected more by the 
interference from the verbal primes. 
6.3.1.2 Lexical Decision Task 
The second task is a lexical decision task. It mainly emphasises visual word 
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recognition and focuses on the orthographic process. In this task, participants are asked to 
determine as quickly as possible whether a letter string is a word or a non-word. By this 
means, researchers are able to study the processes of word recognition, based on which 
reading process commences. The lexical decision task is a very popular toolin linguistic 
research and a large number of studies have been conducted using it. Currently, the process 
of lexical decision is generally agreed by the majority of models as a consecutive process 
according to the following. 
First, the presented letter string activates the prior existent word representations in 
mind that are orthographically and/or phonologically similar to the presented letter string. 
Secondly, every match of features between the stimulus and the mental word 
representation provides a positive feedback. Finally, when the positive feedback exceeds a 
criterion value, a 'word' response was made; in contrast, not enough positive feedback 
leads to a 'non-word' response (the default response) (see the review of Jacobs & Grainger, 
1994). 
In this study, a lexical decision task is employed to address the impact of an 
individual's preferred mode of representation (VI style) on his/her ability in recognising 
words. To compare with pre-existent word representations, individuals need to code the 
stimulus words in a verbal mode. And verbalisers, who are more adept to verbal 
representation, should benefit during this process. 
Similar to the mental rotation task, verbal or imagery primes will be presented prior 
to each trial of the lexical decision task. It is presumed that the type of the primes will 
either facilitate or interfere with the process of lexical decision because of the 
consistency/conflict between the representation of the prime stimuli and the representation 
of the lexical decision stimuli. However, in contrast to the mental rotation task, the lexical 
decision task is a task of a verbal nature and favours the word primes. Hereby the word 
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primes are expected to lead to faster responses in the lexical decision task. 
Again, the priming effects are suggested to interact with participants'VI cognitive 
styles as the switch from the primary mode of representation to the secondary mode of 
representation must be more effortful than vice versa. Thus, imagers might face more 
difficulty than verbalisers during the image prime condition of lexical decision. 
6 3.1.3 Relatedness Judgement Task 
Reading is a complex process that involves activating many different types of 
hiformation, such as orthographic (i. e. visual), phonological (i. e. sound), and semantic (i. e. 
meaning) information. The lexical decision task primarily invokes the orthographic 
process; yet it may be of interest to look at another component of language processes, 
namely, the semantic process. Although intuitively the semantic processing of a word (i. e. 
access to the meaning of the word) should happen after entire word recognition, there are 
debates that semantic information could be activated early in the recognition process (e. g. 
see Marslen-Wilson, 1987). However, this is not a question to be addressed in the thesis. 
Rather the aim is to investigate whether and how the semantic process (i. e. judgement of 
semantic relations between words) is influenced by the different types of primes and one's 
VI cognitive style. 
In the third priming task, participants will be presented with word pairs and be 
required to judge if the words in each pair are semantically related. Semantic relatedness 
covers a range of relationships between words, including similarity/difference as well as 
other relations such as "is-a-kind-of', "is-a-part-of', "is-a-specific-example-of'. and "is- 
the-opposite-of ' (Budanitsky & Hirst, 200 1). Humans usually are able to judge quickly the 
relative semantic relatedness between a pair of words/concepts. For example, most people 
would agree that paper is more related to pencil than it is to dog. Mis ability to assess the 
relatedness between words/concepts has an important application in language practice. For 
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instance, 'The interest rate of my bank is 5%. 'In this case, a reader would know the 'bank' 
refers to a financial institution rather than a river shore with reference of the related words 
'interest' or 'rate'. 
It is assumed that the semantic relatedness judgement of word pairs is verbally 
abstract in nature and especially requires verbal representations. Thus, verbalisers would 
make more speedy decisions than imagers as verbalisers are quicker in verbally coding the 
stimulus words and then facilitating the following processes (Riding & Rayner, 1998). 
Consistent with the lexical decision task, the semantic relatedness judgement task is 
expected to be positively primed by the word primes, which are assumed to pre-evoke a 
verbal representation and facilitate the following semantic process. Whilst the image 
primes are expected to exhibit an inhibitory effect on the judgement because the 
incongruent imagery coding caused by image primes will interrupt the verbal 
representation of words and consequently interfere with the semantic judgement. 
The final hypothesis of this task is concerned with the interaction between the 
priming effect and individuals'VI cognitive style. The inhibitory effect of the image 
primes is probably more significant in imagery individuals in respect that they find it more 
difficult to switch from their preferred imagery representation to the following verbal 
representation required in the semantic relatedness judgement. 
6 3.1.4 Hypotheses 
Based on the literature, nine experimental hypotheses were devised witli respect to 
the three priming tasks. They are as follows: 
Mental Rotation Task 
H7. The imagery participants would show overall shorter reaction times than the 
verbal participants in the mental rotation task. 
H8. The image primes will shorten the reaction times of mental rotation, and the 
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word primes will lengthen the reaction times of mental rotation. 
H9. The negative priming effect of the word primes in the mental rotation task will 
be larger for verbalisers than imagers. 
Lexical Decision Task 
H 10. The verbal participants would show overall shorter reaction times than the 
imagery participants in the lexical decision task. 
H 11. The word primes will speed the reaction times of the lexical decision and the 
image primes will slow the reaction times of the lexical decision. 
H12. The negative priming effect of the image primes in the lexical decision task 
will be larger for imagers than for verbalisers. 
Relatedness Judgement Task 
H 13. The verbal participants would show shorter reaction times than the imagery 
participants in the semantic relatedness judgement task. 
H 14. The word primes will shorten the reaction times of the relatedness judgement 
and the image primes will enlarge the reaction times of the relatedness judgement. 
H 15. The negative priming effect of the image primes in the semantic relatedness 
judgement task will be larger for imagers than verbalisers. 
6.3.2 Method 
6.3.2.1 Design 
The three priming tasks employed a similar 2x3 mixed design paradigm with the 
VI cognitive style (verbalisers versus imagers) as the between-subject factor and prime, 
type (word, image, and blank) as the within-subject factor. The dependent variables 
differed according to individual tasks. 
Mental Rotation Task The dependent variables for the mental rotation task were the 
reaction, times and accuracy in identifying the figures (i. e. 'are the two figures the same 
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One? ') 
Lexical Decision Task. The dependent variable for the lexical decision task was the 
reaction times for participants to respond correctly to presented letter strings (i. e. whether 
words or a non-words). 
ReluleelnessJudgemem T(isk. The dependent variable for the semantic relatedness 
judgcnictit task was the reaction latency in judging whether the words in each pair were 
semantically related. 
More details of each task can be seen in Subsection 6.3.2.3 Materials. 
6.3.2.2 Participants 
fhe participants \. N, cre the same as in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 (n=91 ). 
6.3.2.3 Materials 
The three priming tasks were designed and administrated using the commercial 
software SuperLab version 2.0 (Cedrus Corporation, 1999). 
Colic Cylinder Sphere Figul-e 6.1. The image primes presented in priming tasks 
There were three types of primes used in the tasks of this section; word, image, and 
blank. The word primes contained nine lowercase 5-letter words with three in each task. 
Their details will be stated individually for each task. All word primes were presented 
centrally in size 100 Arial flont (bold) in black on a white background. The image primes 
were constant throughout al I tasks and presented as an approximately I 0cm xI Ocm grey 
cone, cylinder, and sphere at the centre ofthe screen (see Figure 6.1 ). The blank prime was 
the control condition, in which participants were presented with nothing but a blank mask. 
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Menial Roltition. The stimuli used in the niental rotation task were modified from 
the classic S hepard- Metzler 3D- cube object (Shepard & Metzler, 1971). The object 
consisted of' 10 cubes attached face-to-face to form an arnifike strLICtLire (see Figure 6.2). 
Each cube had an apparent edge length of I cn-i. 
%war_ 
(a) (b) (C) 
Figure 6.2. The three initial puspectives of the original obJect 
A total of 88 stimuli figures were created by rotating the object and its mirror 
counterpart in 45' steps from a start perspective around ail axis. There were three axes that 
were chosen for the construction of the stinILIli: the horizontal x-axis, the vertical y-axis, 
and the depth z-axis. Three initial perspectives of the object were chosen as shown in 
Figure 6.2. It was noteworthy that the figural axes (through the object's mass centre) ol'the 
object differed 10' from the rotational axes (x, y, z). Whereas the perspective (a), (b), and 
(c) rotated 180' from each other through the figural axes, they would not superpose each 
other at , ter rotating through one of the axes (x, y, z). For example, even (a) rotated 180' 
through z-axis, could not superpose (b). Rather, it officred a chance to produce more 
differcm perspectives ofthe object. 
Accordingly, perspective (a) produced seven more stimuli figures by rotating tile 
ob ject around x-axis (via every 45' step), seven by rotating around y-axis, and seven by 
rotating around z-axis. Similarly, perspective (b) and (c) produced another 42 stimuli 
figures. In addition, a 'mirror' object was generated by mirror-reflecting the original object 
at perspective (a) (Figure 6.2) via Y-Z Picture plane. Likewise, 21 more mirrored stimuli 
fioures were created by rotating the 'mirror' A ect around x-, y-, z- axis. In sum, 88 
161 
StirllUli lIgUres were randomly presented with 44 pairs, in which 22 pairs contained 
congruent figurcs that the two could be rotated into congruence with each other (as in 
Figure 6.3, A), and 22 pairs contained different figures that the two differed by a reflection 
as well as a rotation and could not be rotated into congruence (as in Figure 6.3.13). For 
each pair participants were asked to decide whether the two figures were from the sarne 
ob . lect. 
The iriclusion of the mirrored object for the "different" pairs was intended to 
prevent participants from discovering some distinctive features possessed by only one of 
the two oýjccts and thereby reaching the incongruent decision without carrying out an 
actual mcntal rotation of the objects. 
(A) (B) 
Figum 6.3. Examples ofpalrs of stimull presented to participants. (A) a -sarne" palr, (B) a 
"different/mirrored" pair 
The word primes inclUded in the mental rotatIon task were specially chosen as low 
iniageable (< 350) words ("clan-n-, "issue", "reply") that intended to avoid evoking the 
imagery representation with concrete (i. e. highly imageable) words (Paivio, 2007). 
The overall session ofthe mental rotation task consisted of three blocks of 42 trials 
and one practice block of'six trials, which resulted in a total 132 trials. 
The practice block contained two pairs of stimuli with one "same" pair and one 
"different" pair, which were randomly repeated three times with an image prime 
('cylinder'), a word prime (does'), and a blank prime. In the practice block, the 
experinicritcr would survey whether the instruction had been fully understood and would 
clarify any possible questions. The practice block was excluded from data analysis. 
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Each test block contained all 42 pairs of stimuli, which were finiher divided into 
three sets of 14 stimulus pairs and counterbalanced between the blocks with the three 
prime conditions (see Table 6.6). Each of the three sets was in each prime condition (i. e. 
words, image, and blank) once across the three blocks. In sum, each stimulus pair was 
presented three times across the whole session that combined with all three prime 
conditions. For example, stimulus pair I appeared in block I with image prime, appeared 
in block 2 with blank prime, and appeared in block 3 with word prime. Trials within each 
block were randomised by the computer and participants had breaks between blocks. 
Consequently, participants did not see the same stimulus pairs but experienced all three 
prime conditions within one block. This was to prevent any possible confounding effect in 
case some stimulus pairs were more difficult than others, and hence interfere with the - 
priming effect. Moreover, to avoid boredom effects, trials in block I were primed with 
image "cylinder" and word "reply", trials in block 2 were primed with image "sphere" and 
word "issue", and block 3 were primed with image "cone" and word "claim". The order of 
the presentation of the three blocks was balanced across participants. - 
Table 6.6 
The allocation of the stimulus pairs (numbering 1-42) throughout the three blocks with 
prime conditions 
Imaze Prime Word Prime Blank Prime 
Block 1 1-14 15-28 29-42 
Block 2 15-28 29-42 1-14 
Block 3 29-42 1-14 15-28 
Lexical Decision. Previous studies have found that there are several linguistic 
factors that would affect the lexical decision process. To eliminate possible confounding 
effects, they have been carefully controlled prior to the study. More details of the criteria 
used to select stimulus words can be found in Appendix J. ' 
I 
Generally, all stimulus words were four to six letter nouns with high written 
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frequency (> 25 per million) and familiarity (> 500). Any words, which did not have at 
least one neighbour and were morphologically complex, were discarded. The remaining 
words were matched for written frequency, familiarity, imageability, and Age of 
Acquisition (AoA) scores across the prime conditions. 
Non-words were generated from changing a single letter in a group of words 
matched with the experimental word set (e. g. length) but without overlapping. All non- 
words were pronounceable and plausible, e. g. fine -> fune. 
A total of 120 words and 120 non-words were used in this experimental task, with 
an extra three words and three non-words added in preceding practice trials (Stimulus 
words and non-words can be seen in Appendix J). Hence, a total of 246 stimuli were used 
in the overall experimental session. Target words (/non-words) were presented in size 66 
bold Arial font in lowercase letters at the centre of the screen. 
Consistent with the first mental rotation task, participants were primed at the 
beginning of each trial by images, or words, or blank pages. The image primes were 
identical with the ones used in the mental rotation task (see Figure 6.1), whilst the word 
primes were chosen as low imageable (< 350) 5-letter noun words ("dirge", "melee", 
64vista"), which did not appear in the target word stimuli. 
This session of lexical decision task contained two blocks of 120 trials each and one 
practice block of 6 trials. The six trials of the practice block comprised three words and 
three non-words with each of them primed with the sphere (image prime), or word 'kongo' 
(word prime), or blank. So, participants could become familiar with the task prior to the 
formal testing. In each of the two test blocks, there were 20 words and 20 non-words that 
primed with word prime, 20 word and 20 non-word primed with image prime, and the rest 
20 word and 20 non-word primed with blank. In the word-priming condition, each 
word/non-word was randomly combined with one of three prime words to avoid 
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boringness throughout the whole session. Similarly, in the image-priming condition each 
word/non-word was randomly combined with one of three prime images. Participants saw 
no word or non-word twice throughout the whole testing session. The stimulus words and 
non-words were randomly allocated to two blocks and the intention was to prevent 
participants becoming fatigued in completing all trials in one go. A break was located 
between the two blocks. The presentation of the trials was randomised within each block 
and the order of the two blocks was balanced across participants. 
Relatedness Judgement. In the relatedness judgement task, 80 highly semantically 
related word pairs were employed. The word pairs were selected from Tyler, Moss, Galpin 
and Voice's (2002) study, which has empirically established the degree of semantic 
relatedness by creating 344 test word pairs and required 19 participants to relate each pairs 
on a scale from I (not related) to 9 (very strongly related in meaning). The mean value for 
each pair constituted its semantic relatedness score. To ensure that all word pairs were 
highly semantically related, any word pairs with a semantic relatedness score less than 5 
were rejected. The average semantic relatedness score of the 80 word pairs were 7.0 ± 0.7. 
And the stimuli words (n=160) were all 3-9 letter words (average 5.34 ±1.31 letters per 
word) with written frequencies 44.72 ± 75.33 per million (Tyler et al., 2002). 
In the present task, every semantically related word pair was further matched with a 
semantically unrelated word pair. Those semantically unrelated word pairs were obtained 
by pseudo-randomly rotating the original word pairs. That is, the word in one related pair 
was randomly paired with a word originally from another word pair. Half of the first word 
(located at left side of the word pairs) of the newly created unrelated word pairs changed 
their location (i. e. moved to the right side of the word pairs) and half of them remained the 
same location. Thus, participants saw each single word twice with different partner words 
(i. e. one was semantically related and the other was semantically unrelated). The method 
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ensured that the semantically unrelated word pairs were matched to the semantically 
related word pairs in terms of linguistic features such as familiarity, letter length, 
imageability etc. (The stimulus word pairs can be seen in Appendix K. ) 
The stimuli, either semantically related or unrelated word pairs, were presented in 
lowercase letter on the screen in Arial size 66. There were eight letter spaces and a "&II 
between the two words of each word pair (e. g. "origin & resource"). 
The image primes in the task were identical with the other two prime tasks with 
cone, cylinder, and sphere (see Figure 6.1). The prime words (i. e. "pause", "block", "train") 
were chosen based on the same criterion of low imageability (< 500), which did not appear 
in the target word pairs. 
The total 160 word pairs (80 related and 80 unrelated) were randomly assigned into 
three prime conditions. There were 30 semantically related and 30 unrelated word pairs 
under the image prime condition; 10 related and 10 unrelated word pairs were assigned 
into each image prime ('cone'/'cylinder'/'sphere'). Another 30 related and 30 unrelated 
word pairs were allocated to the word prime condition; 10 related and 10 unrelated stimuli 
with each word prime ('pause'/'block'/'train'). The final 20 related and 20 unrelated word 
pairs were presented with a blank prime as the control condition. Accordingly, participants 
dealt with 160 trials in total. The trials were presented in two blocks. Each block contained 
half of the trials under every condition and stimuli were randomised inside each block. The 
order of the presentation of the two blocks was counterbalanced across participants. 
Participants were able to take a break between the two blocks. 
An additional practice task was created to help participants becoming familiar with 
the task and responses. The practice task constituted of 12 trials with the word pairs that 
did not show in the main session. Six of the word pairs were semantically related and six 
were not. Participants also experienced an image prime condition with the cone, a word 
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prime condition with the word "guess", and a blank prime condition. 
6 3.2.4 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually on the three priming tasks before the 
questionnaires (Section 6.2) and the final VICS test but after the CSA test. 
The three priming tasks employed the same paradigm of procedures. On each trial 
of the tasks participants were first presented with a fixation cross in the middle of the 
screen for 500 ms, and then a prime appeared for 150 ms followed with 200 ms inter- 
stimulus interval. The target task (e. g. mental rotation, lexical decision, relatedness 
judgement) was displayed immediately after the interval and remained on the screen until a 
response was made. Trials proceeded continuously after responses were given. 
Responses were given by pressing either blue dotted "N" button or the red dotted 
"B" button on the keyboard. Throughout the three tasks, a blue dot always referred to a 
"YES" response (e. g. the "same" object for the mental rotation task; "words" for lexical 
decision task; and "related word pairs" for relatedness judgement task), while a red dot 
always referred to a "NO" response (e. g. the "different" object; "non-words"; and 
crunrelated word pairs'). Those responses were consistent with the responses made in the 
CSA test, too, so that it reduced the systematic errors that participants might make by 
pressing the wrong button. The response times and accuracies were recoded for each task. 
No feedback was given to participants concerning the accuracy of their response during 
testing. 
The order that participants received the three tasks was counterbalanýed across 
participants. 
6 3.2.5 Data Analysis 
Concerning the two verbal tasks (i. e. lexical decision task and the relatedness 
judgement task), a biased distribution of stimulus words (i. e. with varied frequency, word 
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length, imageability scores, etc. ) might confound task performances. To eliminate such a 
possibility, ANOVAswere carried out to examine if there were any statistical differences 
of stimulus words' linguistic characteristics across the experimental conditions for these 
two tasks. 
Table 6.7 
Linguistic statistics for the word stimuli used in the lexical decision task 
Prime ' Frequency Familiarity Imageability AoA Number of 
Mean/SD' Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD letters 
Mean/SD 
Image (n=40) 126/153 549/39 326/77 363/59 4.72/0.8 
Word (n=40) 137/160 565/34 328/75 340/55 4.88/0.9 
Blank (n=40) 128/266 559/38 331/74 349/59 4.80/0.8 
Total (n=120) 130/199 558/37 328/75 1 350/58 1 4.80/0.8 
Written frequency, familiarity, imageability and AoA scores as well as the woid 
length of the stimulus words used in the lexical decision task were shown in Table 6.7. 
Five one-way ANOVAs were carried out to see if those linguistic characteristics were 
matched across the three prime conditions (blank, word, and image). No statistical 
differences were found in the frequency (F (2,117) = 0.03 8, p= . 963), familiarity (F (2,117) 
= 1.756, p=. 177), imageability (F (2,117) = 0.041, p=. 960), and AoA scores (F (2,117) = 
1.556, p= . 215) as well as the number of letters (F (2,117) = 0.326, p= . 722). 
Table 6.8 
The average word length and writtenfrequencies (with standard deviation in bracket) for 
word stimuli used in the relatednessjudgement task 
Related Word Pairs Unrelated Word Pairs 
Image Word Blank Image Word Blank 
(n=60) (n=60) (n=40) n=60 (n=60) (n=40) 
Word 47.06 43.49 43.04 49.06 49.96 30.35 
length (79.77) (82.08) (57.47) (90.82) (79.10) (30.13) 
Written -5.30 5.42 5.30 5.33 5.35 5.35 
fre uency (1.28) (i. 12) (1.60) (1.39) (1.33) (1.19) 
Two more one-way ANOVAs were raised to examine if there were any statistical 
differences of word length and frequency of the stimulus words across the experimental 
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conditions in the relatedness judgement task. No significant differences were found for 
either related or unrelated word pairs, both F (2,157) < 1, p> . 05. See Table 
6.8. 
Thus it can be concluded that stimuli were well matched throughout the three prime 
conditions for both the lexical decision and the relatedness judgement task. And it should 
not bring relevant confounding effects for the final findings. 
6 3.3 Results 
6 3.3.1 The VICS Style Groups 
The grouping of the VI style was identical with Section 6.2. Participants were 
divided into two groups based on the median (0.902) of their VICS ratios and consequently 
there were 46 in the verbal style group and 45 in the imagery style group. 
6 3.3.2 Mental Rotation Task 
The reaction times from the correct responses and the accuracies were recorded 
from the mental rotation task. They were analysed separately. 
Reaction times of 17 participants were excluded from the analysis for this task 
because of a low number of correct responses (< 60%). See Table 6.9 for descriptive 
statistics of remaining data. 
Table 6.9 
The descriptive statistics (mean ± standard deviation) of reaction times (ms) for three 
prime conditions within each VI group in the mental rotation task 
RTs Image Blank Word 
Verbal (n=35) 
Imagery (n=39) 
11051 ± 3848 
11155 ± 3809 
11079 ±3704 
11079 ± 3713 
11106 ± 4024 
10921 ±3635 
A two-factor mixed ANOVA with prime condition (word, image, and blank) as the 
within-subject factor and the VI group (verbal versus imagery) as the between-subject 
factor, was conducted on the response latencies of the mental rotation task. No significant 
main effects were found for prime (F (2,144) = 0.177, p> .80, ilp 
2=0.002) or VI group (F 
(1,72) = 0.00 1, p> . 97, qP2 = 0.000). The prime x VI group interaction was not significant 
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either (F (2,144) = 0.440, p> .61, ilp 
2=0.006). 
Table 6.10 
The descriptive statistics (mean ± standard deviation) of the number of correct responses 
for three prime conditions within each VI group in the mental rotation task 
No. of correct responses (out of 42) 
- 
Image Blank Word 
Verbal (n=46) 
Imagery (n=45) 
31.54 ± 7.39 
31.51 ± 5.95 
31.17 ± 6.78 
31.27 ± 6.16 
31.83 ± 6.59 
31.29 ± 6.33 
A similar two-factor ANOVA was conducted on the number of correct responses of 
the mental rotation task (including all participants). And similar results were revealed. 
Neither the prime condition (F (2,178) = 0.497, p> . 60, ilp 
2=0.006) nor the VI group (F 
(2,89) = 0.015, p > . 90,11P2 = 0.000) showed a main effect. Their interaction also failed to 
reach significance, F (2,144) = 0.3 97, p> . 67, ilp 
2=0.004 (see Table 6.10). 
6 3.3.3 Lexical Decision Task 
Table 6.11 
The descriptive statistics (mean ± standard deviation) of the reaction times (ms) for three 
prime conditions within each VI group in the lexical decision task 
RTs Image Blank Word 
Verbal (n=45) 
Imagery (n=45) 
749 ± 235 
694 ± 129 
751 ± 228 
711 ± 131 
741 ± 226 
713 ± 139 
As non-words were thought to be processed differently from familiar words (Weeks, 
1997) the analysis of the lexical decision task included word stimuli only to avoid relevant 
confusion. The response latencies of word stimuli were recorded. Before data analysis, 
outlier responses with reaction times under 250 ms or over 1500 ms together with incorrect 
responses were discounted. One participant was excluded from the analysis of the task 
because of an extremely high error rate of responses. (Based on the raw data, this 
participant was suspected to be responding constantly 'non-word' to most of the stimuli. ) 
Descriptive statistics of the remaining participants can be seen in Table 6.11. 
A two-factor mixed ANOVA with prime condition (word, image, and blank) as the 
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within-subject factor and the VI group (verbal versus imagery) as the between-subject 
factor, was employed on the response latencies of the lexical decision task. Likewise, there 
was no main effect of prime conditions (F (2,176) = 0.5 8 1, p> . 54, ilp 
2=0.007) and no 
main effect of VI group (F (1,88)= 1.158, p>. 28, ilp 2=0.0 13). The prime x VI group 
interaction failed to reach significance, F (2,176) = 1.168, p= .31,71P2 = 0.013. 
6 3.3.4 Relatedness Judgement Task 
The incongruent responses in the relatedness judgement task (e. g. respond 
'unrelated' to presumptive related word pair or vice versa) were discarded to prevent a 
possible confounding effect. No participants were excluded since they all performed with 
high correct rates (> 70%). The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 6.12. 
Table 6.12 
The descriptive statistics (mean ± standard deviation) of the reaction times (ms) for three 
prime conditions within each VI group in the relatedness judgement task 
RTs (ms) Image Blank Word 
Verbal (n=46) 
Imagery (n=45) 
1608 ± 581 
1610 ± 386 
1515 ± 490 
1545 ± 365 
1597 ± 530 
1648 ± 397 
A two-factor mixed ANOVA with prime condition (word, image, and blank) as the 
within-subject factor and the VI group (verbal versus imagery) as the between-subject 
factor, was conducted on the mean reaction times of relatedness judgement based on all 
items. Different from the results of mental rotation task or lexical decision task, prime 
condition did have a significant main effect at semantic relatedness judging speed (F (2, 
178) = 17.162, p <. 001,11P 2=0.162) but as before, the VI group remained non-significant 
(F (1,89) = 0.083, p >. 77,11P2 = 0.001). There was no significant prime x VI group 
interaction found, F (2,178) = 1.0 11, p> .35, ilp 
2=0.011. Post hoc analyses of the . 
significant prime condition were conducted by three paired t-tests, which compared all 
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three pairs of meansý. They revealed that participants responded significantly faster in the 
blank prime condition than either in the image prime condition (t (90) = 3.515, p< . 003) or 
in the word prime condition (t (90) = 5.03 7, p<. 003). No difference was found between 
the image and the word prime condition, t (90) = 2.226, p> .0 167. 
6 3.3.5 Further Analysis 
In order to determine whether the non-significant effects were resulting from ill 
group division, individuals were further grouped into three classical style groups 
(verbalisers, bimodals, and imagers; Riding, 199 1) and all the analyses repeated. However, 
the results did not differ. Hence the two-group division remains for discussion. 
6 3.4 Discussion 
The three priming tasks, although varied in their nature from imagery to verbal, 
showed no effect from the VI cognitive style or its interaction with the prime conditions. 
Neither of the types of prime had an effect on the target tasks as predicted; the only 
significant result concerned the relatedness judgement task. However, it was merely found 
that blank primes facilitated the overall semantic judgement compared to the other two 
types of prime, which left little relevance to the present discussion. (The hypotheses were 
interested in the difference between the image prime condition and the word prime 
condition. ) The general non-significant findings throughout the three priming tasks did not 
corroborate Riding's assumption of the VI cognitive style of a competing relationship, of 
the two representing systems. 
These findings may signify more challenges to the validity of the (present) VI 
cognitive style. The current operational definition of the VI style (Peterson, 2005; Riding, 
2005) encapsulates the concept of a single competing dimension between the verbal and 
ý There is an argument that the post hoc tests are not appropriate for significant related factors (Field, 2003). Thus the 
current analyses applied paired t-test instead of a post hoc test with Bonferroni correction to the p values. The correction 
is achieved by dividing acceptance p values (0.05; 0.01) by the number of Mests conducted (Field, 2003). In this case, 
the significance level would be 0.0513 = 0.0167, and 0.01/3 = 0.003, respectively. 
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the imagery representation systems. That is, every time only one of the two representing 
systems will be activated (an "either one or the other" relationship) rather than activating 
two independently and mutually functioning systems (a "both" relationship). If this is true, 
the results would be expected to show significant effects of priming, VI style and their 
interaction (see introduction 6.3.1), which was not found in the present study. In addition, 
since all three tasks have revealed consistent results, it is less possible to attribute the in- 
significant findings to the methodology flaws of any single task (e. g. stimulus materials, 
task question design, etc. ). 
The centred-range VICS ratios of the study sample might have an effect on the 
overall non-significant results. However, as has been discussed in Section 6.2, it is the 
entire population that shows a narrow distribution of the VI style ratios. Hence it rather 
propounds a new question to the validity of the VI cognitive style; how can a 'style' be 
valid if most people only show little of it? 
Paivio (2007) has been successful in establishing two distinct mental subsystems of 
representing, which is a solid basis for the VI cognitive style. However, different from 
Riding's (199 1) belief, Paivio (2007) has propositioned a co-operative relationship 
between the two representing systems (verbal and imagery) in that both systems are 
generally involved in most activities. The examples even include language phenomena. 
The verbal representing system is necessary for linguistic information, but usually not 
sufficient. The imagery system could, more or less, complement the information input with 
rich knowledge and potential rules (see Paivio, 2007). The most significant evidence for 
this assertion is the concreteness advantage of memory (e. g. Begg, 1972; Paivio, 1967; 
1975; Paivio & Csapo, 1973). Memory performance was generally found to be much better 
(i. e. it could be twice as good) in concrete materials (e. g. words, sentences, long passages) 
than in abstract materials. The most direct explanation of this is that verbal and non-verbal 
173 
systems encode information co-operatively. The concrete stimuli may activate both the 
verbal and non-verbal representations, where the two systems are functioning 
independently. Therefore, they have an additive effect on the memory trace. In contrast, 
the abstract stimuli are difficult to image and hence are likely to activate merely the verbal 
representations. As a result, the memory trace will be shallower than dually coded concrete 
stimuli. Paivio (2007) believed that cognition results from the interaction between the two 
coding systems. The verbal system dominates in some tasks and the non-verbal imagery 
system dominates in others. Accordingly, there is little chance for an either-one-or-the- 
other coding but a dual-code processing for most material input. 
Hereby, the VICS test became invalid, at least at an operational level, despite its 
satisfactory reliability. Whereas the question "Are A and B natural? " is assumed verbal 
nature in semantic level, both the verbal and the imagery coding systems are aroused when 
participants undertook the questions. It is because in the VICS test the words were all 
selected as highly imageable ones in order to match the stimuli used in the verbal questions 
and in the imagery questions (CSA also does this). Thus, the dual coding effect is 
unavoidable when representing those stimulus words. Consequently, the reaction latency 
to the question is no longer a good indicator of the representing efficiency of a single 
representing system. Even though choosing only picture-form questions for the imagery 
task, the responses could be confounded. Paivio and Csapo (1969) found that the dual-code 
effect automatically occurred that pictures tend to be silently named and concrete words 
are imaged when participants have enough time and resource. It may happen in the 
VICS/CSA test as participants were told to take their own pace for the questions. It could 
also explain the central-distributed ratios of the VICS/CSA test. 
At a base level, to validate the measure, the stimuli used in the tasks need to be 
strictly controlled. Such as, abstract words only for the verbal task with a word-form and - 
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picture-form only for the imagery task, and in addition with a time pressure. However, it 
may be not enough to re-build the validity of the VI cognitive style with the face-value 
modification. Is the reaction time ratio (from two "pure" verbal/imagery tasks) a 
meaningful indicator of the VI cognitive style? It is possible that there are pure verbal 
tasks and rare pure imagery tasks, so that when performing them only one coding system is 
activated. Hence the reaction time ratios based on these tasks can be argued valid. 
However, individuals inter-work between the two systems in most realistic tasks. This kind 
of 'VI cognitive style' might have little ecological validity. 
Otherwise, to measure this VI style as a preference (or dominance) between the two 
representing systems seems to have a better face validity (e. g. IDQ by Paivio, 197 1 b). A 
subjective self-report can tell directly whether and how much an individual likes to, or 
tends to, deal with pictorial or textual materials whereas the underlying two coding 
systems are both involved in the activities. Although such a measure might be influenced 
by social desire or personal experience etc., it could have a better ecological validity. 
Besides these suggestions for modifications of the measure of the VI style, it is 
probably time to re-consider the basic definition of it. Riding and Cheema (1991) 
conceptualised the VI cognitive style as a stable preference of representing information, 
either verbally or imagery, although individuals obviously have capability to use either 
mode. Based on the earlier discussion, there could be a conscious preference between the 
two representing systems; however, the choice of which of the two systems dominate or 
how the two systems are to interact is heavily dependent on the given circumstance. 
Cognitive styles are assumed to be partially fixed and relatively situation independent (E. 
Peterson, S. Rayner, & S. Armstrong, personal communication, May 21,2008). 
Comparatively, the VI style here seemingly coincides more with the definition of a- 
malleable 'learning style' that one's preferred way of responding to information according 
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to the envirom-nent or context (E. Peterson, S. Rayner, & S. Armstrong, personal 
communication, May 21,2008). It is hard to imagine any individual reporting that s/he 
constantly uses only one mode of representation (e. g. verbal or imagery) in all 
environments. Certainly, more evidence is heeded. 
In addition, it might be worthy to raise a little more discussion of the population 
validity of the VI cognitive style. As has been mentioned earlier, the VI style has gained a 
very Successful application in classroom practice especially for younger pupils, which 
seems to contradict the present finding of its poor (theoretical) construct validity. However 
the evolutionary perspective of the Dual Coding Theory might have provided a sensible 
explanation. Paivio (2007) regarded the non-verbal system as a primeval 'root' in the 
evolution of the human mind, which is the basement of the emergence of the verbal system. 
Consequently, a dual coding system leads to human intellect and achievement., Likewise, 
the early development of the non-verbal system of infants is fundamental for the later 
development of the verbal system. In short, the non-verbal system is accomplished earlier 
during child development while the verbal system is accomplished at a much later stage. 
The young children who have been categorised to be imagers are probably those who did 
not yet accomplish their verbal system so that they respond slower to the verbal questions 
(but not necessarily faster to the imagery questions compared to their peers). Although 
both the verbal questions and the imagery questions of CSANICS would involve the 
activities of both systems, the not well-developed verbal system is likely to affect the 
responses more of verbal questions (as the verbal system presumably dominates more in 
the verbal questions) compared to those of imagery questions. The modem education 
systems in western countries emphasise the primacy of language practice. Thus, those 
children who have not accomplished their development of the verbal system are 
presumably disadvantaged in the classroom. However, by providing them with 
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complementary presentation of pictorial or multimedia mode/s of learning materials, their 
learning achievements can be restored (e. g. Riding & Ashmore, 1980; Riding & Douglas, 
1993; Riding & Grimley, see Riding & Rayner, 1998). Hereby, the success in the 
classrooms could be attributed to the detection of those students with late developed verbal 
systems rather than the successful application of the 'VI cognitive style'. 
The final part of the discussion is to address a couple of possible experimental 
flaws of the study. The disproportionately high number of female participants recruited in 
the study might be criticised as a confounding factor of the behavioural data. Whereas 
some researchers have postulated that females usually outperform males on measures of 
verbal fluency, and males outperform females on tasks concern spatial ability (e. g. Halpern, 
1992), the empirical reality of such a claim is still under debate. For exaniple, men's 
superiority of mental rotation tasks mostly manifests on those accuracy-based paper-and- 
pencil tests (Voyer, Voyer, & Bryden, 1995); however, it is seldom found on mental 
rotation reaction times (see Heil & Jansen-Osmann, 2008). Recent studies with the 
Shepard-Metzler 3D- cube figures (which were used in the present mental rotation task) 
did not demonstrate any reliable gender differences in mental rotation speed (e. g. Peters, 
2005; Voyer et al., 2006). Jansen-Osmann and Heil (2007) revealed that with various types 
of stimuli and well-matched samples, the gender difference in mental rotation reaction 
times is exhibited in polygon stimuli only, but not in 3D-cube stimuli. The mental rotation 
task in the present study employed 3D-cube figures as stimulus materials and reaction 
times as measurements, and accordingly is argued to be gender-bias free. Likewise, no 
specific evidence about the gender-bias was reported in the lexical decision and semantic 
judgement tasks. 
Another concern of the experimental design, which might be raised, is the prime 
presentation. Each trial of the experiments presented the prime stimulus (image or word) 
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for only 150 ms. Although pilot research has proven that it was visible and identifiable, 
participants may have ignored them by intentionally attending to the target tasks (they may 
do it because they know it was irrelevant to their experimental performance). Fortunately, 
the significant prime effect found in the relatedness judgement task (although not in the 
direction that has been expected) may have testified to the effectiveness of the prime 
conditions. However, it still could not be certain if participants perceived image and word 
primes to a similar degree (i. e. whether the verbal and non-verbal systems coded the prime 
stimuli into a similar level). In future studies, the design of priming experiments should 
include an examination about whether the primes have been thoroughly perceived. For 
example, a simple post-study recognition task can be employed; "Have you seen this 
image/word during the experiment? " By this extra measure, an index of how well the 
prime stimuli have been perceived can then be empirically analysed. ' 
In summary, by keeping possible experimental flaws in mind, the three behavioural 
priming tasks have provided challenging evidence to the current operational definition of 
the VI cognitive style. Experiment results did not support a competing relationship 
between the verbal and imagery systems of representation; rather, they implied a mutually 
functioning relationship between the two coding systems. Thereby, the theoretical basis of 
the VI cognitive style requires serious review before extending its applications into 
practice. 
6.4 Conclusions 
The VICS test has been examined as a more reliable measure for the VI cognitive 
style compared to the original CSA test. However, it still demonstrated poor correlation 
with other individual differences, which were assumed to share some common brain-based 
mechanisms with the VI style. Moreover, the three priming tasks have provided 
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incongruent findings to the current operational definition of the VI cognitive style with an 
either-one-or-the-other assumption between the verbal and imagery representing systems. 
All these have raised concerns about the theoretical basis of the VI cognitive style itself. It 
is suggested that there could be a co-operative relationship between the two coding 
systems rather than a competing relationship as Riding (1997) has implied in the CSA. In 
this case, it is necessary at present to reconsider the understanding of this dimension of 
style. For instance, is it still sensible to use the reaction time ratio to indicate one's VI style? 
And is it appropriate to classify the VI style as a 'cognitive style' rather than a 'learning 
style'? It is important to clarify all these questions in order to develop our understanding of 
cognitive styles. 
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CHAPTER 7. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Summary of Experimental Chapters 
Individuals' consistent tendencies in the way in which they process information 
have been marked as cognitive styles (Tennant, 1988).. The principle aim of this thesis is to 
elucidate the nature of two cognitive style dimensions, namely the WA and the VI style. 
Experimental evidence was provided to facilitate the understanding of their underlying 
mechanisms and to examine their construct validity. 
I As noted in Chapter 1, two distinct dimensions have been identified based on the 
cognition-centred style research by Riding and Cheema (199 1). The WA cognitive style is 
thought to concern the organisation of processing and whether the input information tends 
to be viewed holistically or in parts. The VI cognitive style emphasises the coding process 
of information and whether individuals prefer to represent information pictorially or 
verbally. Riding and his colleagues (see Riding, 1997; Riding & Rayner, 1998) reported 
numerous studies to purport the construct validity of this two-dimensional cognitive style 
model. However, questions remain concerning the reliability and validity of the measure of 
the VI dimension, and more experimental evidence is needed to clarify the underlying 
mechanism of those style dimensions. Given these concerns, six studies (presented in 
Chapters 2 to 6) were conducted to address some of the research questions concerning the 
nature of cognitive styles. 
Chapter 2 examined empirical relationships between the two cognitive style 
dimensions and their family relatives (i. e. those constructs that theoretically feature either 
style dimensions). This investigation provided further positive support for the validity of 
the WA cognitive style by demonstrating its significant relationship Aith its origin, the 
FDI cognitive style. In addition, the limitations of the GEFT (i. e. measure of FDI style) 
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were discussed, which might help to clarify previous controversial findings and the current 
moderate correlation between the two constructs. Moreover, the WA cognitive style was 
also found to relate to individuals' preferences of learning activities. Wholists are more 
inclined to "feel" than analytics during experiential learning (CE scores of LSI; Kolb & 
Kolb, 2005). The latter finding can be regarded as an influence from the WA cognitive 
style, which is assumed to be located at a root level of individual differences, to a 
superstructured information processing level (Curry, 1983; see Chapter 1). A restricted 
variety of the VI family members in earlier research made it impossible to select a reliable 
and valid index (as the FDI cognitive style to the WA dimension) for the VI dimension. 
But the significant relationship that was revealed between it and the concrete-abstract 
dimension of LSI (ACCE; Kolb & Kolb, 2005) provides indirect support for its construct 
validity also. Like the WA cognitive style, the VI cognitive style was suggested to locate at 
the innermost layer of the onion-shaped model of individual differences (Curry, 1983; 
Riding, 1997). Thus, its relationship with the concrete-abstract dimension of learning 
preferences is rather a projection from the underlying process to a more 
behavioural/habitual level. An individual's favoured coding manner, either picture-like or 
language-like, does affect his/her preferred type of learning materials, either concrete or 
abstract. This hypothesis was confinned and it added positive weight to the validity of the 
VI cognitive style. 
Chapter 3 and 4 focused on the WA cognitive style related processes and aimed to 
extend comprehension of its nature. Chapter 3 presented two experiments with the 
hypothesis that-an attentional control function is reflected in the WA cognitive style. 
In the first experiment, an attempt was made to yary the attentional-control 
difficulty for a metalinguistic task for second language speakers. It was achieved by 
presenting a list of short English texts with contexts being manipulated to be either normal 
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or absurd. Participants were then asked to find both grammatical and orthographic 
mistakes contained in texts. In this way, a higher level of attentional control ability was 
required for the absurd contexts to perform tasks as participants had to fix their attention to 
grammars and spellings of the language but ignore any influence from meaning. For 
second language speakers, the analytics performed significantly better (i. e. more grammar 
corrections) than the wholists in the high-attentional-control condition. The difference 
between the WA style groups was less distinct for the control condition. Interpreting this 
finding in conjunction with a previous study (e. g. Bialystok, 1992), a conclusion might be 
drawn that the WA cognitive style does feature in the attentional control function, at least 
for those who are at an earlier stage of language acquisition (e. g. young children and 
second language speakers). 
In the second experiment, the task employed was essentially the same as that of the 
first experiment, except that only native English speakers were involved and were allowed 
a reasonably shorter time to perform the task (i. e. increasing the task difficulty). Different 
from the second language speakers, native speakers did not exhibit any difference in 
attentional control related performance according to their WA cognitive styles. Instead of 
conflicting with the conclusion of the first experiment, it was argued that such a null 
finding resulted from the "coverage" of the influence of language proficiency. Native adult 
speakers, who normally have mastered the language well, might no longer depend much 
on attentional control effort during their language processing. Hence, their WA cognitive 
style fails to show an effect on the metalinguistic performance. In addition, an issue of 
"attentional control skill" has been raised to explain the 'cover-up' effect of the finding. At 
the later stage of language acquisition (even probably at a proficient stage of many 
activities) individuals may be capable of developing the relevant skills to compensate their 
initial disadvantages caused by their natural cognitive styles, and consequently they attain 
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a similar level of performance to their peers. In this case, the WA cognitive style may be 
still involved in the attentional control function for native participants, but the relationship 
is very likely covered by the employment of the nurtured attentional control skills. 
Chapter 4 focused on the question of whether the WA cognitive style is an 
influential factor in stereotypic representations. The stereotypic effect of memory was 
assumed as a consequence of accessibility to pre-existing knowledge frameworks. With 
presented stereotype labels (e. g. "doctor") those stereotype related traits (e. g. "caring", 
which is consistent with the knowledge framework of "doctor") are more accessible during 
information organising. Hence, they are easier to remember. The WA cognitive style was 
found to be an influence on this process. Overall, wholist participants were dependent on 
the conditions according to both the presence of the stereotype labels (i. e. explicit clues 
referring to pre-existing stereotypic frameworks) and the congruity of the traits (i. e. related 
or neutral to stereotypic knowledge frameworks). In contrast, analytic participants' 
performances were merely affected by the presence of the stereotype labels but not the 
congruity of the traits. Comparably, analytics were "material-independent" while wholists 
were "material-dependent" (see discussion in Subsection 7.2). The intermediate 
participants combined the features of holistic and analytical views, and selectively applied 
them to the needs of the tasks. As a result, inten-nediates' performances were not affected 
by the presence of stereotype labels or stimuli congruity separately, but exhibited an 
interaction effect with outstanding memory for the stereotype consistent traits with 
explicitly presented stereotype labels. Moreover, results also revealed an inferior ability of 
wholist individuals in organising and mcmorising discrete information compared to 
analytic and intermediate individuals. 
In order to test the assumption that cognitive styles may also relate to processes that 
are relevant to self concepts, a series of behavioural and self-report measures were ý 
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introduced in Chapter 5. In this study, both the WA and the VI cognitive styles were found 
to be concerned with, although in different aspects of, the self concept. Instead of the 
original hypothesis that the superior disembedding ability of the analytic participants might 
facilitate their disembodying process (i. e. taking a mental position outside of the body), the 
wholists were found to have an advantage in both the embodiment (the control task) and 
the disembodiment tasks. Thus, the WA cognitive style was purported to affect a more 
fundamental process of the spatial self perception (i. e. integrate bodily information into a 
holistic perception) rather than the sole disembodiment process. The VI cognitive style 
failed to show any effect on the two tasks. Nevertheless, the levels of empathy and 
attachment anxiety (i. e. a scale of other-oriented social attention) were reported relevant to 
the VI cognitive style but not the WA cognitive style. Imagers who can represent 
information in a more concrete scale found it easier to understand others' mental states and 
consequently, gave appropriate emotional responses. Verbalisers tend to view the world in 
a more abstract propositional manner, and accordingly found it difficult to work out 
intuitively others' feelings. Moreover, female verbalisers were reported to be more anxious 
to their partners than female imagers (which may reflect an over-attention towards others 
in order to secure the proximity of the relationship). The VI cognitive style had no effect 
for males. Such a gender difference was attributed to the additive effect of the external 
focus of verbalisers and the pessimistic tendency (i. e. to perceive information as negative) 
for female verbalisers but not male verbalisers. 
Finally, after introducing a substituting measure of the VI test of CSA with 
improved reliability, the validity of the VI cognitive style was re-examined in Chapter 6. 
The results can be categorised into two parts. 
First, although the confounding effect of the unreliable measure has been 
eliminated, the VI cognitive style failed to show predicted relationships with other 
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individual difference constructs, which were proposed as sharing relevant brain 
mechanisms with the VI style. Secondly, three behavioural experiments (mental rotation, 
lexical decision, and relatedness judgement; either imagery or verbal natured) using a 
priming paradigm examined three hypothetical assumptions according to the current 
operational definition of the VI cognitive style. (More discussion about the assumptions 
will be presented in Subsection 7.3. ) None of the experiments provided support for any of 
the three hypotheses. Therefore, the theoretical definition of the VI cognitive style has 
been critically discussed with questions about the true relationship between the two coding 
systems. Instead of the one-or-the-other relationship, an additive relationship between the 
verbal and imagery representing systems is proposed. Further, the successful applications 
of the VI test of CSA within education were arguably due to the pseudo VI style detecting 
children with a later developed verbal system. These results urge a serious re-consideration 
of the VI dimension of cognitive style itself. 
Having outlined the findings, the following sections narrate the implication of these 
results from four aspects; the WA and the VI cognitive style dimension separately, the 
interaction between the two dimensions, and the confusable concept of style/skill. 
7.2 Extending Understanding of the WA Cognitive Style Dimension 
With supportive evidence of its reliability and validity in the literature, the WA 
cognitive style dimension has been mainly investigated in this thesis in order to extend the 
understanding of its nature. Evidence from the research described here reflects different 
aspects of functions of this cognitive style dimension. 
The correlation between the WA cognitive style and preference in concrete 
experience (i. e. CE scores) in Chapter 2 expressed an aptitude-for wholists that inclines 
towards intuitive, receptive, and first-hand situations for learning experiences. Although 
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this result is not directly related to cognitive performances, it points out some features that 
are related to this cognitive style dimension. An individual's preferred organisation manner, 
either global or analytical, may lead to varied predilections for intuition, concreteness, and 
feeling of information input. This result might yield extensive application in not only 
educational, but also other fields of practice and interest. A systematic approach was also 
. suggested to be associated with an analytic style, notwithstanding that the link might have 
been concealed by the impact of environmental factors (e. g. education). 
The other results of Chapters 2 and Chapter 3 indicated an obvious relation between 
the disembedding process and the WA cognitive style. The WA style succeeded from the 
idea of the FDI cognitive style, which was famously characterised with disembedding 
ability (Witkin et al., 1971). Such a kin relationship undoubtedly features the WA 
dimension with the disembedding functioning as suggested by experimental findings. In 
Chapter 2, the WA style ratios were positively correlated with the GEFT performance, 
which was measured by how many disembedded figures could be outlined within a certain 
time limit. The more analytical an individual is, the more capable s/he is in disembedding 
figures from a complex background. The results of Chapter 3 were, in addition, consistent 
with this conclusion. Analytic individuals who are in their earlier stage of language 
acquisition (when some relevant skills have not yet developed) are more able to disembed 
selectively their attentions from context meaning and direct them to the required aspect of 
input information (e. g. grammar and spelling). Both results added support to the notion 
that the WA cognitive style plays a role in disernbedding functioning. 
However, the WA cognitive style dimension does not only entail the disembedding 
ability, which always favours analytic individuals. The influence of style should be either 
positive or negative depending on the task type rather than a uni-dimensional increase for 
all tasks (Riding, 1997). The new WA cognitive style (Riding & Cheerna, 199 1) was 
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shown to fulfil well this requirement. 
Riding and Cheema (199 1) emphasised the WA cognitive style dimension with two 
ends (i. e. wholist versus analytic) by conceptualising it as the way by which individuals 
tend to organise infonnation, either globally or in parts. Thus, an individual at one end of 
the dimension (e. g. wholist). might found it hard to accomplish a particular task while 
someone at the other end of the dimension (e. g. analytic) may feel the same task is easy. 
More importantly, the situation can be reversed for another task. In short, individuals with 
different cognitive styles can be good and poor respectively at different tasks (whilst they 
are determined to be good or poor for all tasks according to their ability). It makes this 
style distinct from the impact of ability (Riding, 1997). Results in Chapters 4 and 5 have 
presented this contrast evidence for both wholist and analytic style groups. 
In Chapter 5, analytic participants were originally hypothesised to exhibit faster 
reaction times in the perspective transformation (disembodiment) task because of their 
superior disembedding abilities. But it was found that wholists demonstrated better 
performance in both disembodiment and the embodiment (control) tasks. Despite a lack of 
comparison results, it was suggested that wholists do have an advantage in integrating 
bodily information into a holistic self perception. In this task, the advantage of global 
organisation of information probably overwhelmed the advantage of disembedding 
functioning. 
Chapter 4 investigated how individuals with different WA cognitive styles would 
deal with information with or without accessing pre-existing knowledge frameworks. 
Wholist individuals were found to have a significant handicap compared to their peers in 
organising and perceiving irrelevant items without an organising theme. Rather, they were 
sensitive to implicit relations between items (i. e. their recall performance was significantly 
better for stereotype consistent traits than stereotype neutral traits even without an explicit 
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stereotype label to remind the pre-existing frameworks). Analytic individuals, in contrast, 
were not so sensitive to the undercover relations (i. e. their recall performance was no 
different for stereotype consistent and stereotype neutral traits without an explicit 
stereotype label) but were good at memorising discrete items. These results illustrate well 
the features of their favoured organisations. Wholists perceive information with an 
intuitive, global view with little concern about details (that are not significantly relevant to 
the main idea). In contrast, analytics perceive with their attention on all the details but 
probably at the expense of the holistic view. In addition, overall wholist individuals were 
found to be more "material-dependent" in that their performances were corresponding to 
implicit material features. Analytic individuals were relatively more "material- 
independent" as their performances were determined by explicit clues (e. g. presence of the 
stereotype labels) but not implicit ones (e. g. stereotype related or neutral traits). 
Intermediates, who are able to utilise freely both the holistic and analytic organisation 
during information process, flexibly employed either feature and ultimately, showed the 
best recall performance. 
Results from Chapter 4 may also have practical implications. Stereotypic 
perceptions about others are normal phenomena in everyday life. This has been discussed 
in Chapter 4. However, even presenting the same information, individuals with different 
WA cognitive styles may achieve varied stereotypic perceptions. For example, wholist 
persons are more sensitive to stereotypic information, no matter whether it is explicitly 
clued (even if it is falsely clued) or implicitly hidden; but have poor memory of non- 
stereotYPic information. Hence, they are inclined to hold stereotypic impressions of others. 
Analytic people would respond to explicitly stereotypic clues but they are not affected by 
implicitly stereotypic information. Intermediates are the most fastidious ones for 
stereotYPic perceptions. Stereotypic bias only appears for them when information and the 
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explicit clue are matched. 
On all counts, the findings profile different strands of evidence that are presented in 
this thesis to exhibit various facets of the nature of the WA cognitive style dimension. 
These can be concluded and extended as follows. Individuals who locate at the wholist end 
of the dimension tend to organise information in a global way and accordingly manifest an 
intuitive manner of perceiving information as well as sensitivity to implicit relationships 
hidden in materials. They are good at integrating pieces of information into a holistic 
concept, but impaired at perceiving/memorising discrete units and disembedding parts 
from a whole. Individuals who locate at the analytic end of the dimension tend to organise 
information in an analytical manner and do not prefer the situations where they need to 
"feel". Hence they are insensitive to the "hidden" information when they perceive and 
rationally organise information based on explicit clues. Analytic individuals, in 
comparison to wholist ones, are good at perceiving/memorising discrete information and 
show a superior disembedding ability. 
7.3 The VI Cognitive Style Dimension: A valid cognitive style dimension? 
The original concept of the VI cognitive style dimension can be analogised as two 
windows. One "window" is the verbal coding system while the other "window" is the non- 
verbal (imagery) coding system. The verbal "windoV' contains logogens (verbal 
representations) that describe information with abstract, propositional, and referentially 
arbitrary features. The imagery "windoV' comprises imagens (imagery representations) 
with analogue, iconic, and referentially isomorphic information. To change a 
representation mode, one needs to switch from one window to the other. In this case, the 
VI cognitive style reflects which "window" is the primary one that the person uses most 
frequently and efficiently. 
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The findings in Chapter 2 provided some support to this style dimension. In line 
with the prediction, individuals who are more engaged with the verbal "%Andow" during 
information processing tend to learn by conceptualising knowledge into theories. 
Individuals'who are habitual to use the imagery "window" prefer to learn by feeling the 
concrete experiences. Either preference is congruent with the features of eadh "window", 
respectively. 
Otherwise, Chapter 5 discussed the impact of the VI cognitive style on social 
perceptions. There was an imager superiority reported for empathy. It is explained in that 
the imagery "window" can enhance the empathic process because of its richness of 
concrete details of information. In addition, the VI style interacted with gender to influence 
individuals' attachment anxiety, which may manipulate people's othcr-oricntcd social 
behaviours. This might be attributed to the exterrial-internal focus caused by the VI 
cognitive style and its interaction with gender on pessimistic perceptions. 
However, it needs to be remembered that all the preceding findings were gained by 
the VI test of the CSA with a questionable reliability. And the results of Chapter 6 (after 
substitution of the measure with a more reliable one) further reduced credit for those 
conclusions of the VI cognitive style. The present definition of the VI cognitive style is 
based on a one-or-the-other presumption of the two "windows". That is, when performing 
a task, only one "window" is always being used. If this is true, three assumptions of each 
priming experiment can be made: 1) an individual's performance on a spcci f ic task should 
be influenced by his/her VI cognitive style as the primary "window"should be more 
efficient in performing congruent tasks; 2) congruent primes should facilitate the following 
target task and vice versa, because the user does not need to switch between the two 
"windows", which saves time; 3) switch from the primary "window" to the secondary one 
should cost more effort than the opposite process. However, the three priming experiments 
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supported none of these assumptions. Moreover, the null finding of an investigation of the 
relationship between the VI style and other related brain-based constructs further 
discredited its validity. Both sets of findings could be said to challenge the current 
theoretical basis of the VI cognitive style dimension. 
The selective interference effect (see Chapter 1) which demonstrates that 
performance on a cognitive task can be selectively impaired by another competing 
cognitive process using the same "window" (i. e. either verbal or imagery coding system) 
establishes two distinct verbal and imagery representing systems. However, it is not 
enough to establish a simple one-or-the-other relation between the two systems as Riding 
and Cheema (199 1) assumed. Rather, there is evidence (e. g. Begg, 1972; Paivio, 1967; 
1975; Paivio & Csapo, 1973) to suggest that the two "windows" are able to work 
simultaneously and add their effects together (i. e. the concreteness advantage of memory). 
In this manner, the relation between the two "windows" can be inferred to be 
analogous with the relation between the functions of the two brain hemispheres (although 
Paivio did not explicitly express this). Cognitive processes probably depend on conjoint 
functioning of both representing systems, but each coding system can be dominant in 
particular tasks. For example, the verbal system is essential for language and imagery 
system is indispensable in spatial tasks. For most tasks, both systems are making their 
contributions, as has been claimed by Paivio (2007). When performing two tasks at the 
same time, if both tasks depend heavily on one "window" (e. g. the verbal system) the 
capacity of the "window" might limit the performance of both tasks (i. e. a ceiling effect) 
and result in the selective interference effect. If the two tasks mainly depend on either 
"window" respectively, no ceiling effect happens and consequently no interference is 
found on performance. The concreteness advantage of memory is also a result of the dual 
coding (an additive effect) from the collabpration of two "windows". . 
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Therefore, the present operational definition (e. g. CSANICS) of the VI cognitive 
style is argued to be inappropriate. Because both representing systems are involved in 
every task question (no matter whether verbal or imagery), the reaction times are no longer 
proper indexes of the efficiency of each system. Consequently the reaction time ratio has 
very limited meaning for the VI cognitive style. This is possibly responsible for the non- 
significant results in Chapter 6 and the reason for a narrow distribution of the VI style 
ratios in normal population. So it is suggested that a new measure of VI cognitive style 
(with a new method) is necessary. And a definition needs to be critically discussed and 
decided. Further studies are urgently required. 
Finally, in order to dispel the possible confusion caused by those successful 
applications of the VI cognitive style in classrooms, a pseudo VI stylc effect is purported 
to be observed in children. Paivio (2007) proposed that the verbal system is a later 
developed product than the non-verbal system. The "imagery" children detected by CSA 
might have been falsely categorised from those who have not yet fully developed their 
verbal system. Hereby, their disadvantage during education (i. e. they do not suit teaching 
which involves a majority of verbal materials) was significantly helped by complementary 
pictorial or multi-media presentation of teaching. 
To sum up, the current operational definition of the VI cognitive style has been 
critically evaluated in this thesis. Unsupportive evidence has been presented to its validity 
and theoretical basis. Thus, the measures of the VI style that are based on one-or-the-other 
assumption between the two representing systems are suggested to be inappropriate, which 
might have caused confusion in the area of research. More research is required to examine 
current findings. If they are confirmed to be true, exploratory reviews are needed to re- 
establish a new acceptable definition of the VI cognitive style. 
As well as covering each cognitive style dimension separately, the next section will 
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discuss a possible interaction between the two styl& dimensions; the "adaptation", which 
has been mentioned in Chapter 1. 
7.4 "'Adaptation" between the WA and the VI Cognitive Style Dimensions 
Chapter 1 discussed the "adaptation" between the WA and the VI cognitive style 
dimensions and showed that the verbal representation may complement the analytic feature 
of organisation while the imagery representation is able to provide a holistic view. In this 
way, the VI style dimension can assist to substitute (more or less) the WA style dimension 
when the latter feature is not available. Meanwhile, Riding and Rayner (1998) explicitly 
claimed the independence between the two style dimensions. Is there any conflict between 
the two statements? If not, what is the relation between them? Some of the results in 
Chapter 2 may have given hints for this question. 
In Chapter 2, both the WA and the VI cognitive style dimensions were found to be 
correlated with the concrete-abstract learning style dimension whereas the two cognitive 
style dimensions were independent from one another. This indicates that the WA and VI 
style separately and independently account for part of the variance of the concrete-abstract 
dimension. As this learning style dimension was suggested to locate at an outer layer of the 
onion model (Curry, 1983) the concrete-abstract dimension can be regarded as a co- 
operating product of the two distinct underlying cognitive style dimensions. That is, the 
WA and the VI style are independent from each other at the cognitive style level but are 
able to interact to form new modifiable characteristics (e. g. learning style) in a more 
activity-centred level to adapt specific learning demands. This might inspire us to clarify 
the adaptation between the two cognitive style dimensions. The adaptation is not necessary 
to contradict the independence between the WA and the VI style dimensions since they 
may happen at different levels of an individual's characteristics. - The results of Chapter 2 
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are, at least, consistent with this postulation. 
In addition, Riding and Rayner (1998) briefly described the adaptation between the 
two style dimensions as a strategy resulting from utilising an awareness of style in order to 
enhance learning. Hence, they implied that the adaptation is the product of a conscious 
activity based on the understanding of one's own styles. However, the finding of Chapter 2 
may partially disagree with this assertion. Participants were not informed of their cognitive 
styles when they were reporting their learning preferences in Chapter 2. Thus, their 
adaptation process could only reflect the learning style dimension rather than being a 
conscious choice based on knowledge. It is suggested that the two underlying distinct 
cognitive styles (WA and VI) can be spontaneously'utilised to work interactively in order 
to adapt to the environmental requirements. Hence, the adaptation process between the WA 
and the VI cognitive styles may be employed not only intentionally when individuals are 
aware of their styles, but also automatically. 
In summary, findings in Chapter 2 have been discussed to support and extend, 
although indirectly, the understanding of the "adaptation" process between the WA and the 
VI cognitive style. A future behavioural study, which examines individuals' 
holistic/analytic views according to their cognitive style groups, may add more direct 
evidence to the postulation. Wholist-verbalisers are proposed to exhibit better analytical 
organisation of information than wholist-imagers whereas both of them gain only the 
holistic feature from the WA style dimension; the verbal representation would adapt to 
compensate the disadvantage of the lack of an analytical view. Likewise, analytic-imagers 
would show better holistic organisation than analytic-verbalisers since the imagery 
representation may import the global view of information. If the predicted results are 
found with participants, with or without the knowledge of their own cognitive styles, the 
adaptation process would be fully established to be an existing and automatic process. 
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7.5 Variability or Invariability of Cognitive Styles: A possible confusion between style 
and skill 
Chapter I also reported that confusion exists in previous studies about the 
variability/invariability of cognitive styles. Most researchers agree that cognitive styles 
should at least be "partially fixed and relatively stable" (e. g. E. Peterson, S. Rayner, & S. 
Armstrong, personal communication, May 21,2008). However, contrasting evidence 
shows that in some cases individuals' cognitive styles do appear malleable (see Chapter 1). 
Are these conflicting findings merely due to sampling or do they reflect other variables? 
Results in Chapter 3 have provided another possible explanation for the unstable 
findings of styles: namely, the development of corresponding skills which may substitute 
the functions of styles. The first experiment in Chapter 3 has established that at the earlier 
stage of language acquisition (e. g. young children and second language speakers) the WA 
cognitive style may entail the attentional control functioning during metalinguistic 
processes, and resultingly affect relevant performances, However, such a cognitive style 
effect is eliminated at a latter stage of language acquisition (e. g. adult native speakers). 
One explanation of this is that the effect of the natural cognitive style (WA) is 
"overwritten" by the influence of a similar functioning skill to compensate the 
disadvantage of situations to which the cognitive style is not ideally suited (see discussion 
in Chapter 3). Those skills were developed with years of practice. In other words, nurtured 
skills that are functionally analogous to the cognitive styles can be developed (probably 
within a particular activity) and finally, will interferewith the impact of an individual's 
original cognitive style on behaviour (which very likely will lead to an improvement in 
performance). 
Taking this one step further, the conflicting evidence about the stability of cognitive 
styles might result from the same reason. That is, the lack of distinction between style and 
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skill in much research. Style is probably fairly fixed for individuals. However, 
corresponding skills are malleable and vary according to situation demands. 'Me latter, if it 
mutually exists with style, might lead to confusing results about the invariability of 
cognitive styles. Chapter 3 has pointed out that caution should be applied in the 
superposition between style and skill. It could not only muddle our understanding of the 
variability of styles, but also other important aspects of styles (e. g. applications in teaching, 
etc. ). 
In addition, the development of style-compensated skills on human activities also 
implies a profound optimistic perspective in style research. Cognitive styles are regarded 
as relatively fixed, invariable individual characteristics with both advantages and 
disadvantages during learning activities. Hence, most researchers have focused on how to 
proffer supportive environments for individuals so that they can perceive and process 
information in their preferred ways, and consequently enhance their learning performance. 
Here individuals are (implicitly) viewed as passive recipients. However, the spontaneous 
utilisation of substituted skills to compensate the disadvantage of original styles, and the 
adaptation between the two cognitive style dimensions, have disclosed another aspect of 
the understanding of styles: namely, human ability to adapt to the environments. Our 
cognitive styles may be unable to change or be modified, but humans are positive and 
active to adapt to the world. Accordingly, we generate different skills/strategies in diverse 
situations to compensate for our innate disadvantages during activities. This was an 
example demonstrated in Chapter 3. Despite natural disadvantages, wholist individuals can 
achieve equivalent performance on attentional control tasks to analytic peers with the help 
of self-developed skills. Humans always tend to, and probably are able to, make the best of 
situations even if the environments are not supportive (i. e. the environment does not suit 
their styles). Thus, the capability of the human should not be underestimated. Future 
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research should emphasise how to inspire individuals, especially children, to devise useful 
skills to adapt themselves to diverse situations rather than simply put them into fully 
supportive envirorunents. 
7.6 Conclusions 
Overall, the findings presented in this thesis provide further experimental evidence 
in inspecting the WA and the VI cognitive style dimensions. The WA cognitive style has 
been established to be a valid and reliable construct and to have impact on various 
cognitive processes, such as disembedding function in figures and metalinguistic tasks, 
stereotypic perceptions, and integrated bodily perception of self. All these observed 
relationships were discussed to be consistent with the view of an organisation aptitude of 
the WA cognitive style. In contrast, the VI style dimension, which is assumed to be 
concerned with information representation, failed to gain support for its validity after 
controlling for reliability. The current operational definition of the VI style has been 
critically evaluated and it is suggested that a re-consideration of the theoretical basis of the 
style is needed before the practical success of its application can be claimed. In addition, 
the adaptation between the two independent style dimensions has been discussed. A 
distinction between style and skill needs to be made in future research. 
7.7 Future Research 
While the new laboratory evidence reviewed in this body of work advances (more 
or less) the understanding of the nature of the two cognitive style dimensions (WA and VI), 
a number of new questions appear and further research is need to clarify these. They are 
summarised as follows. 
1) The VI Cognitive Style. Clarification of the concept of the VI cognitive style 
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is needed. Can the conclusion of Chapter 6 be confirmed by a more extensive range of 
evidence? If so, the measure of the VI style must change. In other words, the 
operational definition of the VI style needs to move to a valid one. What Nvill it be? 
And after modifying the definition, can it still fulfil the criteria of a "cognitive style"? 
All these questions imply much work is required. And until this happens, caution is 
needed when applying the style into practice. 
2) Style and Skill. The possible interaction between styles and skills has been 
discussed. In order to avoid confusion in future style research, distinguishing skills 
from styles is important. This might clarify some of the mixed evidence relating to 
styles, such as invariability, relationship with other constructs, etc. Besides that, how 
can a relevant skill be fostered on the basis of a particular style in a particular situation? 
For example, individuals with certain cognitive styles may find it difficult to 
accomplish a specific task. How would they develop an effective skill to compensate 
for this natural disadvantage? And what is the role that previous experiences play 
during this process? All these questions are of interest and need to be investigated with 
both theoretical and applied approaches. 
3) Other Style Dimensions. Although Riding and Cheema (1991) rcviewcd 
over 30 cognitive style descriptors to categorise the WA and VI dimension, there may 
still be ones omitted. Chapter 2 has proposed that the reflective-active dimension 
(AERO; Kolb & Kolb, 2005) was independent from either the WA or the VI cognitive 
style dimension. The reflective-active dimension has been identified as a learning style, 
but there is the possibility that more cognitive style dimensions other than NVA and VI 
may exist. Their exploration in future work will be of great value in helping our 
understanding of this field of research. 
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The work that comprised this thesis has also been published in the following peer 
reviewed journals and conferences: 
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Zhang, M., & Noyes, J. M. (2007). Individual differences and academic performances of 
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Zhang, M.,. & Noyes, J. M. (2008b). Wholist-Analytic style and context as variables in 
metalinguistic performance: A follow-up study of adult native speakers. The 
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Conference Papers§ 
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Learning Styles Information Network (ELSIN), University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway. 
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I Note. The last two conference papers were later revised to the journal papers Zhang and Noyes (2008a; 
2008b). 
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Appendix A. Learning Style Inventory (LSI) Version 3.1 (Kolb & Kolb, 2005) 
LEARNING-STYLE INVENTORY 
The Learning-Style Inventory describes the way you learn and how you deal with Ideas and day-to-day situations In your 
life. Below are 12 sentences witha choice of endings. Rank the endings for each sentence according to how well ou think 
each one fits with how you would go about learning something. Try to recall some recent situations where you had to 
leam something new, perhaps in yourjob or at school. Then, using the spaces provided, rank a '4' for the sentence 
ending that describes how you learn best, down to a "I" for the sentence ending that seem least like the way you learn. 
Be sure to rank all the endings for each sentence unit. Pleasedo not make ties. 
Example of completed sentence set. 
1. When I lemm: 
-L 
I am happy. I am (ask. I am kgk&L 4 lamcAftful. 
Remember. 4-mosthkeyou 3- second twst like you 2-thirdpwahkeyou 1-kvolikeyou 
- 
. 
71 -B -71 C -D-1 
1. When I lea rn: - 
I like to deal with - Iliketothinkabout - 
I like to be doing - 
I hke to watch and 
my feelings. ideas. things, ILSbM 
ZI learn best 
- 
I listen and watch - I rely on logical - 
I trust my hunches - 
I work hard to get 
when: carefully. thinking. and leelings. things done. 
3. When I am - 
I tend to reason - I am responsible - 
I am quiet and - 
I havt strong 
learning: things out about things. reserved. feelings and 
reactions, 
4.1 learn by: - 
feeling. - doing. - watching. - thinLing. 
S. When I lea m: - 
I am open to new - 
I kiok at a I] sides of - 
I Ilk. to analyze - 
I like lo try things 
experiences. Issues. things. break them out. 
down into their parts, 
6. Wiwn I am - 
I am an observing - I am an active - 
I am an intuitive - 
I am a logical 
learning: PCr3O1L person. Person- person. 
7.1 Learn best from: - observation. - personal - rational 
theories. - a chance to try out relationWps. &M practice. 
S. When I lea m: - 
I like to see results - I like Ideas and - 
I take my bme before - 
I feel personally 
from my work. theories. acting. involved in things. 
9.1 learn best - 
I rely on my - I rely on my - 
I can try things wit - 
I rely on my Ideas, 
when: observations. feelings. for myself. 
10. When I am I am a reserved - I am an accepting - 
I am a responsdAe I am a rational 
learning: Fvr3on. person. pers"L person. 
11. When I learn: I get Involved. - I like to observe. - 
I evaluate things. I hke to be active. 
12.1 leam best I analyze idea& - I am receptive am - 
I am careful. I am practical. 
when: open-minded. 
NILB2O0C 0 1993 David A. Kab, £"rwý8w»d Lmrnbissy. Wý. htr- An fleht. fesre ? 'k FOtt «0 " P-bbmtkm 
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Appendix B. Two example texts used in the metalinguistic task 
1) The text in the meaningful context: 
"Cannes Film Festival, the most prestigious motoin picture festival in the world held each 
May in resort city of Cannes, in southeast France. The Cannes Film Festival was 
conceived at the end to 1938 as a reaction of a reports that the Venice Film Festival 
became a platform for fascist propaganda. Due to World War 11 (193 9- 1945), however, 
the first Cannes Film Fsetival was not held untill 1946. Internationalism and post-war 
optimism characterize the first festival, as organizers placed less emphasis on competetion 
than on mutual creative stimulation between national productions. In later years the 
selection, by juries, of entries for prizes reflects more commercial intrests and the festival 
soon acquired its current reputation as fashionable professional events, more concerned 
with advancing the film industry than the art of film. French derector Francois Truffaut 
addressed these issue in1956 when he exposed festival's political intrigues and 
promotional deals, and predicts its commertial demise. The festival survives, however and 
in 195 9, Truffaut himself were awarded the prize for best screenplay for Les Quatre Cents 
Coups (The Four Hundred Blows, 1959). 
In spite of its ever present financial interests and political overtones, the Cannes Film 
Festival remain an essential showcase for international cenema. " 
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2) The text in the'me. aningless context: 
"Cannes Film Festival, the most logical motoin picture festival in the world held each May 
in resort city of London, in southeast France. The Cannes Film Festival was laughed at the 
end to 1938 as an introduction of a reports that the New York Film Festival became a 
classroom for poverty propaganda. Due to World War II (193 9- 1945), however, the first 
Cannes Film Fsetival was not handed untill 1946. Beauty and loneliness optimism 
V 
characterize the first festival, as organizers placed more emphasis on compctction than on 
mutual productive stimulation between national schools. In later years the selection, by 
juries, of students for prizes reflects more fairy intrests and the festival soon acquired its 
current reputation as huffish violent events, more concerned with advancing the plastic 
industry than the art of music. French derector Francois Truffaut addressed these issue 
in 1956 when he exposed festival's stupid intrigues and promotional deals, and predicts its 
commertial demise. The festival survives, however and in1959, Truffaut himself were 
awarded the notebook for best jumper for Les Quatre Cents Coups (The Four Hundred 
Blows, 1959). 
In spite of its ever present industrial interests and artistic overtones, the Cannes Film 
Festival remain an essential hotel for international cenema. " 
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Appendix C. The recall sheet used in the stereotype study 
Recall Sheet 
Nox\ is the final part ofthe experiment -recall. There are the four persons' narnes listed in 
the table below. You are required to write down under each name as many of the traits that 
were originally paired with each individual as possible. You will have 10 minutes for the 
recall. 
Nigel Julian John Graham 
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Appendix D. The Empathy Quotient (EQ) 









1.1 can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a 
conversation. 
2.1 prefer animals to humans. 
3.1 try to keep up with the current trends and fashions. 
4.1 find it difficult to explain to others things that I 
understand easily, when they don't understand it first 
time. 
J. 1 dream most nights. 
6.1 really enjoy caring for other people. 
7.1 try to solve my own problems rather than discussing 
them with others. 
_ 8.1 find it hard to know what to do in a social situation. 
9.1 am at my best first thing in the morning. 
10. People often tell me that I went too far in driving my 
point home in a discussion. 
_ 11. It doesn't bother me too much if I am late meeting a 
friend. 
_ 12. Friendships and relationships are just too difficult, so 
I tend not to bother with them. 
13.1 would never break a law, no matter how minor. 
14.1 often find it difficult to judge if something is rude or 
polite. 
15. In a conversation, I tend to focus on my own 
thoughts rather than on what my listener might be 
thinking. 
1 6.1 prefer practical jokes to verbal humour. 
_ 17.1 live life for today rather than the future. 
_ 18. When I was a child, I enjoyed cutting up worms to 
see what would happen. 
_ 19.1 can pick up quickly if someone says one thing but 
means another. 
20.1 tend to have very strong opinions about morality. 
21. It is hard for me to see why some things upset 
people so much. 
_ 22.1 find it easy to put myself in somebody else's shoes. 
_ 23.1 think that good manners are the most important 
thing a parent can teach their child. 
24.1 like to do things on the spur of the moment. 
25.1 am good at predicting how someone will feel. 
_ 26.1 am quick to spot when someone in a group is 
feeling awkward or uncomfortable. 
27. If I say something that someone else is offended by, 
I think that that's their problem, not mine. 
28. If anyone asked me if I liked their haircut, I would 
reply truthfully, even if I didn't like it. 
_ 29.1 can't always see why someone should have felt 
offended by a remark. 
30. People often tell me that I am very unpredictable. 




32. Seeing people cry doesn't really upset me. 
33.1 enjoy having discussions about politics. 
34.1 am very blunt, which some people take to be 
rudeness, even though this is unintentional. 
35.1 don't tend to find social situations confusing. 
36. Other people tell me I am good at understanding 
how they are feeling and what they are thinking. 
37. When I talk to people, I tend to talk about their 
experiences rather than my own. 
38. It upsets me to see an animal in pain. 
39.1 am able to make decisions without being influenced 
by people's feelings. 
40.1 can't relax until I have done everything I had 
planned to do that day. 
41.1 can easily tell if someone else is Interested or bored 
with what I am saying. 
42.1 get upset if I see people suffering on news 
programmes. 
43. Friends usually talk to me about their problems as 
they say that I am very understanding. 
44.1 can sense if I am intruding, even if the other person 
doesn't tell me. 
45.1 often start new hobbies but quickly become bored 
with them and move on to something else. 
46. People sometimes tell me that I have gone too far 
with teasing 
47.1 would be too nervous to go on a big roller coaster. 
48. Other people often say that I am insensitive, though I 
don't always see why. 
49. If I see a stranger in a group, I think that it is up to 
them to make an effort to join in. 
50.1 usually stay emotionally detached when watching a 
film. 
51.1 like to be very organized in day-to-day life and often 
make lists of the chores I have to do. 
52.1 can tune in to how someone else feels rapidly and 
intuitively. 
53.1 don't like to take risks. 
54.1 can easily work out what another person might 
want to talk about. 
55.1 can tell if someone is masking their true emotion. 
56. Before making a decision I always weigh up the pros 
and cons. 
57.1 don't consciously work out the rules of social 
situations. 
58.1 am good at ýredicting what someone will do. 
59.1 tend to get emotionally involved with a friend's 
problems. 
60.1 can usually appreciate the other person's viewpoint, 
even if I don't agree with it. 
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Appendix E. Categorisation of the items of EQ into three subscales: "cognitive 
empathy", "affective empathy", and "social skills" 
Lawrence et al. (2004) applied a principal component analysis on the initial EQ 
questionnaire and concluded three factors remaining in the questionnaire: "cognitive 
empathy", "affective empathy", and "social skills". The categorisation in the present study 
was based on their work. 
Twelve of forty target questions were removed from further analysis because of the 
low correlations with the overall model and other items. Twenty-cight questions remained. 
The 'cognitive empathy' subscale was with question 1,19,22,25,26,36,41,44,52,54, 
55,5 8; 'affective empathy' subscale was with question 6,21,27,29,32,42,43,48,50,59; 
and 'social skills' subscale was with question 4,8,12,14,35,57. Question 1,22,36, and 
43 had double loadings in two factors. Among them, question I and 36 were allocated 
according to their biggest loading ('cognitive empathy', load 0.50 compared to 0.30 in the 
other factor). Question 22 and 43 had a similar loading in both 'cognitive empathy' and 
'affective empathy'. They were allocated to either factor on the basis of content. 
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Appendix E The revised version of the Experiences in Close Relationships 
Questionnaire (ECR) 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. Do this by placing a 
number from the scale below (I - 7) in front of each state 
Strongly Neutral Strongly 
disgree agree 
I ................. 2 .................. 3 .................. 4 ................... 5 ................. 6 ................ 7 
1.1 prefer not to show people close to me how I feel deep down. 
2.1 worry about being abandoned. 
3.1 am very comfortable being close to others. 
4.1 worry a lot about my relationships. 
5. Just when people start to get close to me I feel myself pulling away. 
6.1 worry that people won't care about me as much as I care about them. 
7.1 get uncomfortable when people want to be very close. 
S. I worry a fair amount about losing my relationships. 
9.1 don't feel comfortable opening up to others. 
10.1 ofien wish that my loved ones' feelings for me were as strong as my feelings for them. 
11.1 want to get close to others but they keep pulling away. 
12.1 often want to merge completely with others, and this sometimes scares them away. 
13.1 am nervous when others get too close to me. 
14.1 worry about being alone. 
15.1 feel comfortable sharing my thoughts and feelings with those I am close to. 
16. My desire to be close sometimes scares others away. 
17.1 try to avoid getting too close to others. 
18.1 need a lot of reassurance that I am loved by those close to me. 
19.1 find it relatively easy to get close to others. 
20. Sometimes I feel that I force others to show more feeling, more commitment. 
2 1.1 find it diff icult to allow myself to depend on others. 
22.1 do not often worry about being abandoned. 
23.1 prefer not to be close to others. 
24. If I can't get those close to ine to show interest in me, I get upset or an- , -ry- 2 5.1 tell those close to me just about everything. 
26.1 find that others don't want to get as close as I would like. 
27.1 usually discuss my problems and concerns with those close to me. 
. 28. When I'm involved 
in a relationship, I feel somewhat anxious and insecure. 
29.1 feel comfortable depending on others. 
30.1 get frustrated when those I am close to aren't around me as much as I would like. 
3 1.1 don't mind asking others for comfort, advice, or help. , 32.1 get frustrated when those close to me are not available when I need them. 
33. It helps to turn to others in times of need. 
34. When those close to me disapprove of me, I feel really bad about myself. 
35.1 turn to others for many things, including comfoll and reassurance. 
36.1 resent it when those I am close to spend time away fiom. me. 
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Appendix G The Barsch Learning Style Inventory (adapted from Barsch, 1991) 
Barsch learning Style inventory 
Please check the appropriate line after each statement. 
Often Sometimes Seldom 
1. Can remember more about a subject through listening than reading. 
2. Follow written directions better than oral directions. 
3. Like to write things down or take notes for a visual review. 
4. Bear down extremely hard with a pen or pencil when writing. 
5. Require explanations of diagrams, graphs or visual directions. 
6. Enjoy working with tools. 
7. Are skillful with and enjoy developing and making graphs and charts. 
8. Can tell if sounds match when presented with pairs of sounds. 
9. Remember best by writing things down several times. 
10. Can understand and follow directions on maps. 
11. Do better at academic subjects by listening to lectures and tapes. 
12. Play with coins or keys in pocket. 
13. Learn to spell better by repeating the letters out loud than by writing the 
word on paper. 
14. Can better understand a news article by reading about it in the paper than 
by listening to radio. 
15. Chew gum, smoke or snack during studies. 
16. Feel the best way to remember is to picture it in your head. 
17. Learning spelling by "finger spelling" the words. 
18. Would rather listen to a good lecture or speech than read about the same 
material in a book. 
19. Are good at solving and working on jigsaw puzzles and mazes. 
20. Grip objects in hands during learning period. 
21. Prefer listening to the news on the radio rather than reading about it in a 
newspaper. 
22. Obtain information on an interesting subject by reading relevant materials. 
23. Feel very comfortable touching others, hugging, handshaking, etc. 
" How oral directions better than written ones. 
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BARSCH LEARNING STYLE INVENTORY 
SCORING PROCEDURES AND EXPLANATIONS 
SCORING PROCEDURES 
OFTEN =5 POINTS SOMETIMES =3 POINTS SELDOM 
=1 POINT 
Place the point value on the line next to its corresponding item number. Next and the points to obtain the 













VPS = Visual Preferences Score 
APS = Auditory Preferences Score 













If you are a VISUAL LEARNER, that is, you have a high visual score, then by all means be sure 
you see all study materials. Use charts, maps, filmstrips, notes and flashcards. Practice 
visualizing or picturing spelling words, for example, in your head. Write out everything for frequent 
and quick visual review. It is obvious you learn best when you SEE things... make it a point to see 
things. 
If you are an AUDITORY LEARNER, that is, have auditory score, then be sure to use tapes. Sit in 
the front of the lecture hall or classroom where you can hear best and can review them frequently. 
Tape your class or lecture notes. After you read something, summarize it on tape or out loud. 
Verbally review spelling words, lectures or test material with a friend. 
If you are a TACTUAL LEANER, that is, have a high tactile score, trace words, for example, as you 
are saying them. Facts that must be learned should be written several times. Keep a supply of 
scratch paper just for that purpose. Taking and keeping lecture notes will be very important. 
I 
As a result of this learning inventory what do you think you can do to strengthen your learning? 
Give yourself some examples. 
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Appendix 11. Brain Dominance Inventory 
BRAIN DOMINANCE INVENTORY 
Participant NO. 
Date 
This inventory will help determine if you are primarily a left-brain or right-brain learner, or if you 
are bi-lateral (using both about equally). 
Directions: Answer the questions carefully, checking the answer that is correct for you. Select the 
one that most closely represents your attitude or behaviour. When you have f mishcd, refer to the 
scoring instructions. 
1.1 prefer the kind of classes 
- a. where 
I listen to an authority. 
_b. 
in which I move around and do things. 
- c. where 
I listen and also do things. 
2. Concerning hunches: 
_a. 
I would rather not rely on them to help me make important decisions. 
__ýb. 
I frequently have strong ones and follow them. 
_c. 
I occasionally have strong hunches but usually I do not place much faith in them or 
consciously follow them. 






In some areas of my life, but not in others. 
4. When I want to remember directions, a name, or a news item, I usually: 
_a. write notes. 
_b. visualize 
the information. 
- c. associate 
it with previous information in several different ways. 




_c. sometimes. 6.1 prefer the kind of classes: 
a. where there is one assignment at a time, and I can complete it before beginning the next 
_b. one. 
_c. where 
I work on many things at once. 
I like both kinds about equally. 





both equally well. 
In reviewing instructions, I prefer: 
- a. 
to be told how to do something. 
_b. 
to be shown how. 
- c. no real preference 






_c. no preference 
for dogs over cats or vice versa. 
10.1 am: 
_a. almost never absentminded. 
_b. 
frequently absentminded. 
_c. occasionally absentminded. 11. Do you instinctively feel an issue is right or correct, or do you decide on the basis of 
information? 
a. decide on the basis of information. 
_b. 
instinctively feel it is right or correct. 
_c. 
I tend to use a combination of both. 
12.1 have 
_a. no or almost no mood changes. 
_b. 
frequent mood changes. 
_c. occasional mood changes. 13.1 am: 
_a. easily 
lost in finding directions, especially if I have never been to that place before. 
_b . good at 
finding my way, even when I have never been in that area. 
-C. not 
bad in finding directions, but not really good either. 





_c. sometimes. 15,1 generally: 
- a. use 
time to organize work and personal activities. 
_b. 
have difficulty in pacing personal activities to time limits. 
_c. 
usually am able to pace personal activities to time limits with ease. 
16.1 prefer to learn: 
- 
a. details and specific facts. 
_b. 
from a general overview of things, and to look at the whole picture. 
_c. 
both ways about equally. 
17.1 learn best from teachers who: 
_a. are good at explaining 
things with words. 
_b. are good at explaining 
things with demonstration, movement, and/or action. 
_c. 
do both. 
18.1 am good at: 
_a. explaining 
things mainly with words. 
_b. explaining 
things with hand movements and action. 
_c. 
doing both equally well. 




my gut feelings. 
_c. 
both logic and gut feelings. 
20.1 prefer: 
- a. simple problems and solving one thing at a time. 
_b. more complicated problems, more 
than one thing. 
_c. 
both kinds of problems. 
21. Daydreaming is: 
a. a waste of time. 
_b. a usable 
tool for planning my future. 
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- c. amusing 
and relaxing. 
22.1 prefer classes in which I am expected: 
- a. 
to learn things I can use in the future. 
_b. 
to learn things I can use right away. 
- c. 
I like both kinds of classes equally. 
23. lam: 
_a. not 
very conscious of body language. I prefer to listen to what people say. 
_ýb. good at 
interpreting body language. 
_c. good at 
understanding what people say and also in interpreting body language. 
24. In school, I preferred: 
_a. algebra. geometry. 
- c. 
I had no real preference of one over the other. 
25. In preparing myself for a new or difficult task, such as assembling a bicycle, I would most 
likely: 
_a. 
lay out all the parts, count them, gather the necessary tools, and follow the directions. 
__ýb. 
glance at the diagram and begin with whatever tools were there, sensing how the parts 
-C. 
f it. 
recall past experiences in similar situations. 





Im usually equally comfortable with both. 





28.1 like my classes or work to be: 
_a. 
planned so that I know exactly what to do. 
_b. open with opportunities 
for change as I go along. 
_c. 







c. I like both kinds of tests equally. 
30. In reading, I prefer: 
_a. 
taking ideas apart and thinking about them separately. 
__ýb. 
putting a lot of ideas together before applying them to my life. 
T 
c. both equally. 
31. When I read, I prefer to look for: 
___4. specific 




both about equally. 
32. i enjoy: 
- a. 
talking and writing. 
_b. 
drawing and handling things. 
_c. 
doing both equally. 






both are exciting to me. 
34.1 am skilled in: 
- a. putting 
ideas in a logical order. 




35.1 am good at: 
- a. recalling verbal material 
(names, dates). 
_b. recalling visual material 
(diagrams, maps). 
_c. equally good at 
both. 







37. When reading or studying, 1: 
- a. prefer 
total quiet. 
_b. prefer music. 
_c. 
I listen to background music only when reading for enjoyment, not while studying. 
38.1 like to learn a movement in sports or a dance step better by: 
_a. 
hearing a verbal explanation and repeating the action or step mentally. 
_b. watching and 
then trying to do it. 
_c. watching and 
then imitating and talking about it. 






They are parallel. 
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BRAIN DOMINANCE INVENTORY SCORING 
Number of As 
Number of Bs 
Number of Cs 
Your A s, B s, and Cs must total 39, or your score is incorrect. 
1. Compute your B score minus your A score. It can be a minus or a plus answer. 
2. If your C score is 17 or higher, divide your B minus A score by three. Round your score to the 
nearest number. The answer will be your score. It can be a minus or plus number. 
OR 
If your C score is from 10 to 16, divide your B minus A score by two. Round your score to the 
nearest number. The answer will be your score. It can be a minus or plus number. 
OR 
If your C score is less than 10, do not divide at all. Your B minus A score is your answer. 
3. NOW PLOT YOUR SCORE BELOW 
-11 -10-9-8 -7 -6-5 -4-3 -2 -1 0+1 +2+3 +4+5+6+7+8+9+10+11 
A score of 0= Whole-brain dominance (bi-lateral) 
A score of -I to -3= Slight preference toward the left 
A score of -4 to -6= Moderate preference for the left 
A score of -7 to -9= Left-brain dominant 
A score of -10 to -11 = Left-brain dominant (very strong) 
A score of +I to +3= Slight preference toward the right 
A score of +4 to +6= Moderate preference for the right 
A score of +7 to +9= Right-brain dominant 
A score of +10 to +11 = Right-brain dominant (very strong) 
Note. The original Brain-Dominance Inventory originally groups participants into 9 groups 
as 1) whole-brain dominance (bi-lateral); 2) slight preference towards the left; 3) moderate 
preference for the left; 4) left-brain dominant; 5) left-brain dominant (very strong); 6) 
slight preference towards the right; 7) moderate preference for the right; 8) right-brain 
dominant; 9) right-brain dominant (very strong). In order to simplify the analysis of data, 
the author has further suppressed the classification by including groups 2) - 5) into an 
overall left-brain dominant group, including groups 6) -9) into an overall right-brain 
dominant group, and remained group 1) as the whole-brain dominant group. 
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Appendix 1. The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) 
Participant No.: 
Handedness Questionnaire (Edinburgh Inventory) 
Read each of the questions below. Decide which hand you use for each activity and then 
select the answer that describes you the best by making a cross in the corresponding 
column. If you aren't sure, try acting it out to see which hand you are using. 
Please make sure that all questions are answered. 
left either right 
1. With which hand do you normally write? 
2. With which hand do you draw? 
3. Which hand would you use to throw a ball to hit a target? 
4. With which hand do you use your toothbrush? 
5. Which hand holds a knife when you are cutting things? 
(not with a fork) 
6. Which hand holds the thread when you are threading a 
needle? 
7. When you strike a match, which hand holds the match? 
8. When you open a box, which hand holds the lid? 
9. Which hand holds the spoon when you are eating a soup? 
10. With which hand do you use scissors? 
11. Which hand is at the upper part of the broom? 
12. Which hand holds the hammer when you are driving a 
nail? 
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Appendix J. The selection of stimulus words used in the lexical decision task 
During the selection of stimulus words of the lexical decision task, some linguistic 
characteristics were first reviewed in order to eliminate possible confounding effects. 
First was the word frequency/familiarity". In the case of visual word idcntirication, 
most linguistic theories assume parallel encoding of letters within the orthographic lexicon. 
That is, all letters in a written word are processed simultaneously (e. g. the Dual Route 
Model by Coltheart et al., 1993; the Logogen Model by Morton, 1979; the PDP Models by 
Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989). Although the experimental findings about this issue are 
complex, it was found that high frequency medium length words (e. g. frequency > 25 per 
million) suggested no word length effect (i. e. longer words takes longer time to identify) 
and parallel process (Weekes, 1997). Accordingly, in order to determine the impact of the 
VI cognitive style on lexical decisions after controlling for any possible word length cffect, 
only highly frequent and highly familiar words (familiarity rating (range from 100-700) > 
500) with 4-6 letters were used as stimuli in the task. In addition, there are a few more 
confounding factors on lexical decision which need to be taken into consideration. 
Imageability is one of the wide accepted influential factors for word recognition. 
The imageability of a word is the degree to which a word can be perceived as a mental 
picture (a scale range from 100 to 700 was used by Paivio, 1986). For instance, hmrk and 
cry are two highly imageable words as they are easily imagined to be an image of object or 
scene. Whereas, mercy and envy are low imageable words that people find hard to 
associate with sensory properties or episodes (e. g. size, shape, feeling, ctc. ). Many studies 
have supported the superiority of the highly imageable words to those abstract words in 
lexical decision tasks (e. g. Bleasdale, 1987; De Groot, 1989; Rubenstein, Garfield, 
Millikan, 1970; Schwanenflugel, Hamishfegcr, & Stowe, 1988). There is 
** The present study introduced familiarity scores as another index because it was thought to be a more 
robust estimate of how well known a word is (Gernsbacher, 1984). 
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neuropsychological evidence of the dissociation between the concrete and abstract word. 
(Note that imageability and concreteness are used interchangeable here. ) Patients with 
certain lesions in the brain are selectively impaired for abstract words processing yet their 
processing with concrete words remains intact (e. g. Franklin, 1989; Franklin, Howard, & 
Patterson, 1995). Whilst a few reverse cases with impairment of concrete words but not 
abstract words were also found (e. g. Breedin, Saffran, & Coslett, 1994; Warrington & 
Shallice, 1984). The Dual Coding Theory explains such an advantage in that concrete 
words are activating both verbal and image representing systems while abstract words are 
activating the verbal representing system only (Paivio, 1971a). Therefore, this study 
specially chose low imageable words as target stimuli (average imageability score 328.36 
74.66) in order to ensure the verbal nature of the task (i. e. only the verbal representations 
are activated during the lexical decisions). 
In addition, there is an ongoing debate about the effect of the Age of Acquisition 
(AoA), which refers to the age at which one acquired a word, on the visual words 
recognition tasks such as lexical decision. It is logical that a word learned earlier in life 
will be better recognised and visually processed than a word learned later in life (e. g. 
Menenti & Burani, 2007; Stadthagen-Gonzalez, Bowers, & Damien, 2004). Whereas some* 
findings suggest that AoA has little effect (Lewis, 1999; Zevin & Seidenberg, 2002), there 
is other evidence that AoA and frequency are influential factors (Ellis & Morrison, 1998; 
Gerhand & Barry, 1998). There are also studies, which imply that AoA is the only factor, 
affecting performance on word recognition tasks (Brown & Watson, 1987; Vitkovitch & 
Tyrrell. 1995). Thus, AoA of the stimulus words needed to be controlled throughout the, 
conditions. 
Neighbourhood (N) size is the number of words that include one different letter,,,; 
from a particular word (Bowers, Davis, & Hanley, 2005). In other words, it is a measure of 
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the orthographic similarity between words (Coltheart et al., 1977). For example, the word 
sell is orthographically similar to many words such as tell, well, bell, jell and sill by 
simply replacing one letter; hence, it has a large neighbourhood size. In contrast, the word 
deny is orthographically similar to few words and only has the neighbours defy and dent (N 
= 2). In lexical decision tasks, Andrews (1989) found a facilitatory effect of N size that 
words from large neighbourhoods elicit quicker responses than words from small 
neighbourhood size. The similar finding has been observed in a number of studies (e. g. 
Laxon et al., 1992: Scheerer, 1987). It propounds that a lexical entry would activate not 
only the target but also its neighbours, and this local neighbourhood activation somehow 
speeds up target access. However, competition was also found between orthographically 
similar words (neighbours). The inhibitory effect of N size in word recognition is reflected 
by the fact that words with orthographic neighbours will take longer to recognise 
compared to those with none. The precise mechanism of the N effect is still under debate. 
However, researchers did report that as long as a word has at least one orthographic 
neighbour, the effect between words with few or many neighbours is not as considerable 
(Bowers, Davis, & Hanley, 2005; Perea & Pollatsek, 1998). Tbus, to minimise the possible 
N size effect during the lexical decision task, only words- with N size ý. - I were selected as 
stimuli. 
All stimulus words (4 to 6 letter nouns) in the lexical decision task were originally 
derived from the MRC psycholinguistic database (Clarke, 1997) and then placed into a 
program, Neighbourhood Watch (Davis, 2005) to gain scores of the linguistic 
characteristics (e. g. frequency, familiarity, imageability, AoA, N size, etc. ). Finally, 
stimulus words of the lexical decision task were chosen according to the above criteria (see 




Stimulus words used in the lexical decision task in Chapter 6 
Image Prime Word Prime Wank Prime 
Word Non-word Word Non-word Word Non-word 
ever beaz law wid mood sarn 
lack cend safe cate ease cege 
duty flah busy clet unit bame, 
rate gand weak hant fool pand 
seek leck pick iren find fude 
rear porb glad somy deal sape 
grow sket hate thet pain prib 
blow sove west tobe task crun 
loss sush minor betch year brarn 
theme blent being crand aware hotal 
worth crish order drial guilt spont 
skill horch sense lorge value carge 
broad skown peace shart month merch 
might steck style sorch guess prain 
whole whurf close thurn blame sheat 
choose bredge simple brants title grite 
belief clitch severe lasson proper stetch 
advice hupped normal pretch excuse granks 
search snutch weight spants safety clotch 
report sworve wonder tranks design steble 
aim sab rare blug send sute 
able bobe fair cide wise wilk 
pure cife main colm pull lurd 
sell fote load hine calm frip 
firm gope wild shub harm bolg 
part pege gain stul term gend 
fill seeb sold thun luck cuge 
area sneg allow anemy type fane 
risk spuk loose borth other plown 
hold tord quick cruss worse ladio 
shown cland trust frosh cause swonk 
tough grink place scele alive splet 
moral prish blind slort tight frund 
fresh spead teach thard rough trabe 
broke whick become branks spite clain 
faint yorth recent -crants slight shrain 
reason breeth effect loaked appear dattle 
repeat grewth matter pruise supply clants 
appeal slanch motion squate strain frctch 
threat I sprine I bitter I whetch object threwn 
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